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With the rapid expansion of China’s information and communications technology 
(ICT) sector, there has emerged a strategic group of IT leaders.  These IT leaders are 
characterized by their “amphibiousness”. On the one hand, they have become bridges 
that introduce Western concepts of competition and decentralization to China.  On the 
other, they do not want to challenge the state because they feel comfortable with their 
personal ties to promote their business interests.  They belong to the “non-critical realm” 
of social elites and have not coalesced into a coherent and organized social force. Even 
though they may not represent an independently innovative force that would push for 
political change in China, they have become catalysts and have created part of the 
necessary conditions for political changes, for example enhancing institutional 
performance of the state and creating a forum for public debate and political participation 
of the grassroots. Therefore, they have a subtle political impact on state responsiveness 
and civic participation.   By carefully contrasting the autonomous, parasitic, symbiotic, 
negotiating, and amphibious actor models, this study of IT leadership in China 
emphasizes the creative aspect of politics—their visions, craftsmanship, and courage for 
ICT diffusion in China.  In contrast with the top-down or bottom-up paths of Communist 
transitions in East Central Europe, the Chinese path seems to be grounded in the middle. 
The conclusion of this dissertation is that in a time of uncertainty, a strategic group of IT 
leaders starts to inspire and lead this nation in new directions like a spark when China is 
in desperate need of a systematic and convincing rationale and vision for its progress in 
an era of great transformation.
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1Chapter 1.  Introduction:
A Theoretical Framework to Study China’s IT Leadership
The rapid development of China’s information and communications technology 
(ICT) sector has been an amazing phenomenon in a Communist country.1 The fusion of 
computing and telecommunications, especially the Internet, has broken the bounds of 
cost, time and distance, launching an era of global information networking.  By the end of 
October 2004, China had over 310 million fixed line telephones and over 325 million 
mobile phone users.2  By January 17, 2005, there were 94 million Internet users including 
42.8 million broadband users.3 The ICT sector has become one of the most dynamic 
locomotives for development in China.   IT brings about shrinking space, shrinking time 
and disappearing borders and therefore poses potential political challenges to China.
Moreover, the transition of the ICT sector from one with strict control to one that is 
widely diffused and decentralized reveals a new pattern for resolving the tension in 
contemporary Chinese politics—fang (release) and shou (control).   This intrigued us to 
locate those actors who push for changes in ICT sector and uncover the “black-box” of 
the inner workings of decisions behind the technical revolution in China. 
There are several groups of IT elites in China who push for changes in the ICT 
sector.  They pass through Beijing’s office buildings, absorb new values, and develop 
1 The information and communication technology (ICT) is defined as a “scarce and desirable resource that 
groups and individuals contend for in order to consume, control, or own those resources for their own 
purposes” (Wilson 2004a, 40).
2
 Major Business Report of Ministry of Information Industries, URL:  http://www.mii.gov.cn/mii/hyzw
/tongji/yb/tongjiyuebao200410.htm
2critical strategies for the ICT diffusion in China.  Many of these IT gurus are also 
charismatic social leaders who enjoy a good reputation among the people.  The IT elites 
in east Beijing’s Central Business District are usually extraverted, outspoken, and 
fashionable “poster children of globalization”.  Edward Zeng educated senior 
governmental officials on cyber war and Internet café.  Charles Zhang entertained the 
public with his sohu.com (literally meaning “searching for fox” ).  Jasmine Zhang 
attracted stares with her Genesis Capital to use the Internet as leverage to upgrade 
traditional industries.  The east Beijing leaders have gained notoriety and become popular 
icons of 21st century information technology.
In contrast, the IT leaders in west Beijing’s high-tech zone, known as 
Zhongguancun, seem to be more introverted.  They are more interested in transplanting 
foreign technology into Chinese practices.  Liu Chuanzhi, CEO of Legend, made his first 
fortune by inventing the Chinese version of computer usage—the card for Chinese 
characters.  With his office on the financial street, Edward Tian devised concrete plans to 
lead a “green revolution” via broadband to enlighten people through his company, China 
Netcom.4  Mao Wei and other technicians at the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) 
organized to manage networks via the China Information Network Information Center 
(CNNIC) for “.cn” domain name registration.  Most of these west Beijing leaders have 
remained behind the scenes but enjoy successful entrepreneurial careers.
  These intriguing characters remind us that the IT elites are not homogeneous. 
They seem to differ in style, goals, and perhaps in their impacts too. Who are the actors 
3 China Internet Network Information Center, URL: http://www.cnnic.cn/html/Dir/2005/01/18/2744.htm
4 To Tian, the information revolution is clean and energy-saving compared with the first industrial 
revolution characterized by steam engines. 
3that drive changes in the ICT sector?  What are the motives that initiated these actors’ 
interests to promote changes?  How do they behave to achieve their goals?  Do they act 
alone or through coalitions with other actors?   Are they more divided, or unified? Do 
some of them represent an independently innovative force that would press for political 
changes in China?  Or, are they merely businessmen who seek patron-clientelist ties 
with the state merely for the sake of advancing their self-interested money making 
concerns?  Or, are they some combination of the two?  Second, do they have an impact 
on state policies, government rules and institutions, and popular civic engagement?  
How do we weigh evidence of changes at both state and society levels as a result of 
their visions and activities?  
Starting from an interest to locate the sources and processes of information 
revolution in China, the dissertation attempts to burrow the process in which IT elites
can devise, within limits, strategies to hasten trends in ICT diffusion, thus having a 
potential impact on political panorama in China. It strips away all inessential attributes 
and lays bare a central process that underlies and serves to explain observed political 
events in the ICT sector via the study of elites in ICT sector. In sum, this dissertation 
attempts to test whether there are linkages between emerging IT elites and political 
changes in China.  
Defining China’s IT Leadership
There are many studies on elites and leadership.  By definition, elites are those 
who manipulate power, and that power is the essence of politics.  In contrast, “leadership 
is an aspect of power, but it is also a separate and vital process in itself” (Burns 1978, 
418).  The universe of leadership is composed of elites defined in both positional and 
behavioral terms. As positionally defined, leadership is identified with a superior 
organizational position or command (Edinger 1975, 255-6). In the same vein, Putnam 
suggests that we can speak of “elites” in referring to people at or near the top of the 
pyramid of power.  They are the people who have the ability to influence other 
individuals and collective decision making, including full time politicians--the proximate 
decision makers as incumbents of key official posts (Putnam 1976, 11).   They also 
comprise influentials with substantial indirect or implicit influence over public policies, 
including legislators, party officials, industrialists, and senior consultants.   
Second, when behaviorally defined, leadership is related to the processes that can 
possibly influence, shape, or alter the actions of others. In contrast to a hierarchical 
formal position, it is associated primarily with the processes of interpersonal relations 
(Edinger 1975, 256).  This leadership can be manifested in the influences among a group 
of strategic elites such as industrialists or mangers of public and private enterprises, 
leaders of mass organizations such as labor union, interest groups and civic associations 
(Putnam 1976, 14).5
Adopting a positional definition, the current elite in China include: 
• Executive elite—premiers, ministers, directors at governmental institutions;
• Rule making elites—Party leaders, politburo,  law makers at the national 
congress, 
5
 Thus in a general sense, leadership is both a property and a process.  It is a property that the leadership is 
perceived as a set of qualities or characteristics who successfully employ the influences.  Leadership is not 
only the qualities of one posses, but what he does to influence people.  It is a process in that a leader 
influences others in order to direct and coordinate an organized group towards accomplishing certain
collective goals.  
5• Leaders in state-owned companies—president and CEOs .
• Leaders of peak associations, trade unions, and non governmental organizations  
To adopt a behavioral definition, there are two ways to study elite politics in 
China.  One approach is to understand the elite through their traits and social 
backgrounds.  Michael Oksenberg and Steven Goldstein accordingly categorized Chinese 
elites into four groups: 
• militant fundamentalist who believed in total isolation from the rest of the world; 
• radical conservatives who asserts China’s independence from outside influences; 
• eclectic modernizers who believe in self-reliance but allow contacts with the 
outside world; 
• Westernized Chinese who advocated increasing openness to catch up with 
technological development of the advanced countries (Oksenberg and Goldstein 
1974, 1-13). 
However, a handicap for technocrats of the Fourth Generation of China’s political elites 
is that are intellectually poorly equipped to recognize policy linkages between and across 
spheres of social sciences.   In addition, they had superficial exposure to Western 
countries, thus they found it difficult to understand international affairs.  Ordinary 
bureaucrats were weeded out their innovative initiatives because many of their behaviors 
or ideals could hardly be tolerated by incumbents.  Therefore, they are unlikely to be the 
leaders for real political changes in China.  
Another approach is to look at elite behavior through the institutions that make 
policy.  Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg’s path-breaking study of energy 
policy, followed quickly by other studies of policy implementation, followed this 
6approach.  These scholars apply a factional model to study elite conflicts within a single 
party system or a bureaucratic model to understand the stability or adaptability of elites in 
formal institutions in changing environment via policy making process.   But these 
institutional approaches to study leadership still cannot locate the sources and processes 
of changes.   
Also included in this category are economic and policy entrepreneurs who lack 
institutional status, but exercise influences via their ideas and networks.  Thus leaders can 
be active and influential individuals outside of a formal position.  Recent studies of elite 
politics in China extend to strategic actors--"business elite" which denotes a group 
defined primarily according to its position in the hierarchy of the economy and its 
members' income, education (primarily formal), and prestige (Pearson 1997, 6). In this 
sense, Jasmine Zhang, Michael Wan, and John Wang are this kind of entrepreneurs who 
exerted huge influences over the ICT diffusion in China at the private sector.  Some 
leaders can be defined in both positional and behavioral terms such as Hu Qili, Minister 
of the Ministry of Electronic Industry (MEI) and the first key challenger against the
monopoly of China Telecom.  
The definition of China’s leadership includes some liberals in the executive body 
of the state from a positional perspective, but most of them are influential entrepreneurs 
and social activists from a behavioral perspective. From a constellation of leaders in 
China, I have chosen about fifty IT elites to study in order to test their potential role on 
political changes in China. The people I interviewed fit into the overall elite structure, 
and share some of their same features, but have unique features as well.  They are
representative of this leadership group. I choose this sector to study because IT brings 
7about new concepts of openness, transparency, and pluralism.  Thus to study the leaders 
behind the technological diffusion would be meaningful to discern if political changes 
can start from the middle, unlike the top-down or bottom-up paths in the Communist 
transitions in Eastern Central Europe.  
In this dissertation, those who guide and hold sway or set the trend in the current 
IT infrastructure restructuring, applications and content in the process of ICT diffusion in 
China are termed IT leaders. In the information age, IT leaders possess new attitudes, 
new knowledge and new skills gained through their unique experiences (Wilson 2004b, 
858).  This is a group of people who play a motivating and foremost role in the diffusion 
of ICTs.  They are elites because of their high educational and professional status and 
comprise a critical group of entrepreneurs, advocates, scientists, and liberal officials.  
They are also technical and social innovators.  
There are two categories of IT leadership herein the dissertation—“digital 
leadership” and “leadership in the digital age” respectively (Wilson 2004b, 858-9).  
“Digital leadership” refers to leadership in the core sectors of information technology—
Internet service providers, Internet content providers, Internet application providers, and 
other technology-based areas such as computing, communications, and content.  Some of 
these “digital leaders” are in the private sector, e.g. IT entrepreneurs such as Jasmine 
Zhang of Infohighway, Michael Wan of Net China, and John Wang of 6688.com.  Some 
are in the research sector, such as Hu Qiheng, Qian Tianbai, Yan Baoping, Qian Hualin, 
Mao Wei, and Hou Ziqiang of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS).  Some have 
been liberals in the public sector such as Hu Qili, former Minister of Ministry of 
8Electronic Industries (MEI), and Peng Peng, former president of China Railcom.6
“Leadership in the digital age” refers to elites in public or private institutions who 
advocate or make good use of information technology towards transforming China into a 
knowledge society.  Most of these “leaders in the digital age” are social scientists, 
journalists or NGO leaders such as Guo Liang, a philosopher on Hume from the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS); Fang Xingdong, a lecturer at Tsinghua University 
who write numerous books on China’s digital revolution; and Zhaxi, an environmentalist 
who uses the Internet to help protect Tibetan antelopes.
Both groups of leaders belong to a “strategic group” and should not be 
considered a “class”, “interest group”, or “stratum”.  This distinction is made to indicate 
that the power of these IT elites stems not only from their self-interested motivations, as 
is the case with the other terms, but also from their symbolic importance to push for a 
connected and networked China.  They possess new values, one of which being a mission 
to help the state become an agency of development and modernization as well as help 
create a free and interactive civil society in China (Heberer 2003, 1, 69, 341).  However, 
before we go in-depth into the specific characteristics of these IT leaders, their roles in 
the ICT diffusion, and their possible impact on political change, it is important to look at 
current theoretical strands concerning the political roles of social elites (mostly 
entrepreneurs and business elites) as a start to study the political impact of these IT 
leaders.  
6 Although this dissertation is prone to study IT leaders as social elites, it is important to know that external 
forces need internal support to push forward any reform in the ICT sector.  Thus, even though leaders in the 
formal governmental institutions are not the concern of this dissertation, some of them, especially the 
brother and sister, Hu Qili and Hu Qiheng, who made enormous contributions for the ICT diffusion still 
deserve our attention to gain a complete picture of the process of the information revolution in China.   
9The Political Role of Social Elites in Chinese Politics—a Literature Review
The reason I am interested in actors’ role in affecting political changes is that it 
provides analytic tools to penetrate and dissect the internal dynamics of the ICT diffusion 
period, reflecting regime change at the political level (Bratton and van de Walle 1997,
26).  The study of political agency focuses on the possibility of innovative outcomes at 
the hands of skillful individuals that break with habit and routine.   Goran Hyden called 
this actor dimension “the creative potential of politics,” especially “the ability of leaders 
to rise above the ordinary, to ‘change the rules of the game,’ and to inspire others to 
partake in efforts to move society forward in new and productive directions (Hyden 1992, 
8-10).   Political changes come from actors’ bargaining and compromises.  Especially, 
during the regime transition where no grand design is available, “individuals, groups, and 
government leaders constantly alter their course of action in the light of specific events 
and conditions in other sectors”(Chazan 1992, 123).  Charismatic leadership and 
craftsmanship of social actors become crucial for political changes to shape the process 
of interactive power struggles between incumbents and innovators and determine the 
final rules and institutions that all parties agree on (Willner 1968; Linz and Stepan 1986).  
In a word, the actor’s dimension calls attention to the willful strategic choices of principal 
political agents in shaping specific political outcomes.  
Theoretical Models  
There are four theoretical models of the role of social elites in effecting political 
change as I synthesized them from most recent theoretical tools to study Chinese politics.  
10
These are the “autonomous actor model”, “parasitic actor model,”  “symbiotic actor 
model”, and the “negotiating actor model”.   Social elites are those who enjoy a high 
position professionally or economically, but are not those who occupy a high position 
within the political establishment.  Some schools of thought are optimistic on the role 
social elites to effect political liberalization.  Others are pessimistic on this.  Each school 
has its strengths and weaknesses. 
Table 1:  Four Theoretical Models on State-Society Relationship 
Model Argument Strengths Problems
Autonomous
Actor
Model
(Aristotle, Martin 
Lipset, Ronald M. 
Glassman) 
1. independent
material resources
2. mass 
organizations due to 
urbanization 
3. free social space
4. better education 
and liberal views 
1. political freedoms as 
necessary to protect their 
economic freedoms.  
2. horizontal relationships 
for  collective political 
action and representation 
3. an important linkage to 
democracy
1. no coherent political 
ideology
2. unspecified path
3. weak organizations
4.state strategies to pre-
empt independent 
attempts. 
Parasitic 
Actor 
Model
( Philip 
Schmitter, and 
Jean Oi, David 
Goodman)
corporatist links 
between the state 
and the business 
sector, strategies to 
co-opt social elites 
and entrepreneurs 
into the Party  
a stable state-society 
relationship in lieu of 
institutional or formal 
channels, exchanges 
between allocation of 
resources and political 
loyalty
personal ties of reciprocity 
highly detrimental to 
organized impact of the 
middle class, lead to 
corruption and organized 
dependence 
Symbiotic 
Actor
Model
(Peter Evans, Joel 
Migdal, Andrew 
Walder, Viviene
Shue )
effective ties 
between state and 
society to empower 
both sides
Mutual 
empowerment of 
state-society synergy
the transformative capacity 
of social elites to interact 
and intervene in a series of 
events so as to alter their 
courses
 societal actors, especially 
so called “red capitalists”  
gradually lose their 
independent pursuit of 
social interests; reliance 
on the same hierarchies to 
generate their wealth 
Negotiating 
Actor 
“auto-organization” 
of social integration 
social actors’ step 
into the vacuum of 
regular exercise of the 
people to communicate 
horizontally and form 
cooperative bodies.
1. enhance infrastructural 
power, fine-tune 
government policies 
instead of qualitatively 
11
Model 
(Timothy Brook, 
Anthony Saich)
into the vacuum of 
newly emerged or 
ignored areas (e.g. 
environment, 
women rights, birth 
control)  and 
developed strategies 
to evade state 
intrusion 
cooperative bodies.
direction of horizontal 
relationship in society; 
heed those previously 
ignored areas or fulfill 
functions that the party-
state has failed to do so.
instead of qualitatively 
push for political rights.
2. not brave enough to 
cross the “thin red line” to 
vie for political power as 
opposition parties in the 
democratic countries. 
Sources: author and Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue, eds., 1994.  
The Autonomous Actor Model 
 The first model “autonomous actor model”, represented by Ronald M. Glassman 
(1991), adapts the middle class theory to study China’s emerging social stratum of 
business elites out of reform.   These new entrepreneurs are seen as the vanguard of an 
emerging civil society, a prerequisite for political development and possible 
democratization in China (White, Howell, and Shang 1996; Unger 1996). This approach
has its theoretical roots in Aristotle, who noted that the rise of the commercial middle 
class was accompanied by a rational scientific worldview, the disruption of traditional 
property arrangements, and the growing desire on the part of the middle and poorer 
classes for political participation (Glassman 1991, 3-6). More, recently, Seymour Martin 
Lipset (1959) posits that “… the more well-to-do the nation, the greater chance that it will 
sustain democracy.” He highlights the formative role of economic development in 
creating conditions conducive to democratic government (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 
21).  Lipset uses wealth, industrialization, urbanization, and education as indicators of 
economic development.  Economic growth contributes to moderate world-views for the 
emerging middle class because it fosters liberal attitudes of modernization and toleration.  
At the same time, wealth provides the middle class abundant independent resources for 
12
political activities to protect private property and individual freedom. With unfolding of 
industrialization and urbanization, mass organizations are built in cities that provide the 
social basis of democracy.7
Bernard (1993) argues that the bourgeoisie was the vanguard in the development 
of social autonomy in Western Europe.  They have increasingly gained their influence 
and autonomy as capitalism reduces the state’s role in the production and distribution of 
goods and thereby enlarges the “social space” within which individuals and groups may 
pursue private interests and public activities independent of state control.  He refers to 
this social space as a sphere of autonomy from which political forces representing 
constellations of interests in society have contested state power.  This theory is partly true 
for China’s IT elites as they are products of the emerging market economy with much 
more income and material resources as well as wider social spaces similar to the 
bourgeoisie class in the West (Figure 1).
Figure 1: The Autonomous Actor Model 
Independent material resources 
Better education                                                       Collective Action
Urbanization       (aggregate interests into political action)
Free social spaces
Source: author
7
 Schumpeter (1942) states: “History clearly confirms…(that) … modern democracy rose along with 
capitalism, and in causal connection with it… modern democracy is a product of the capitalist process.”  
Both Dahl and Berger posit that a market-oriented economy is a necessary though not sufficient condition 
for democracy.  Berger asserts: “if capitalist development is successful in reaching economic growth from 
which a sizable proportion of the population benefits, pressures toward democracy are likely to 
appear.”(Dahl 1992, Berger 1986).
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Therefore, for the autonomous actor model, with its modernization/middle class 
thesis, there is an important linkage between business elites and liberalizing political 
change.  These elites demand that both resources and decision-making power be put in 
the hands of these non-governmental social actors, thus they deem political freedoms as 
necessary to protect their economic freedoms (Pearson 1997, 24).  With a keen awareness 
to protect their property rights and other freedoms, they began to form horizontal 
relationships with their independent resources and have a freer social space at their 
disposal.  Coupled with a rising consciousness for collective political action, they develop 
a complex of autonomous social organizations such as political parties to aggregate their 
interests and push for representation in the government.  
However, this direct relationship between economic reform and political change 
via the agents of the middle class is fraught with serious problems.  The first is that these 
nouveau riches do not have uniform political ideology and will to pursue.  They may 
avail themselves of more opportunities out of a freer social space to achieve their diverse 
interests, but it is far from clear what political ideology they would adopt.  It is also 
unclear whether they will allocate their economic resources to achieve their political 
goals of inclusion.  The heterogeneity of the business elites also determines their diverse 
perception of self-interest.   Some business elites may believe in genuine democracy to 
bring about their prosperity, but others may deem it unnecessary.  It is true that a 
modicum of private entrepreneurs joined the 1989 Tiananmen Movement to pressure for 
greater democracy and less corruption, but these activities are not at all common-place 
for business elites in China.  In China, as well as in other developing countries, business 
elites’ attitudes towards political activity are highly diverse.  “The very position of the 
14
middle classes, in between the elites and the masses, made for considerable ambiguity in 
the perception of their class interests regarding the desirability of full democracy” 
(Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, 185) . Leigh A. Payne, in her study of Brazilian industrialists,
suggests that self-interest leads to totally different political ideologies among Brazil’s 
business elites in the 1980s—some quite authoritarian and others quite liberal (Pearson 
1997, 29).  In Latin America, business elites even called upon military forces to take over 
governments in order to manage economic unrest.  This is in tune with Rueschemeyer’s 
finding that “the middle class would favor their own inclusion, but would be ambivalent 
about further extensions of political rights, perhaps swinging to one side or another on the 
basis of possible alliances”(Rueschemeyer et al 1992, 6). It is therefore unlikely to expect 
China’s business elites to display the type of attitude homogeneity that is assumed by the 
autonomous actor model.
The second problem with this theory is the missing link between economic power 
and political power.  The mechanism by which these business elites transform their 
economic resources into political power is quite unclear.  In China, many businessmen 
curry favor to local officials for favorable business deals.  In exchange, they attached 
their political loyalty to these local officials.  There are little data to suggest that the 
Chinese business elites use their economic resources to advance political democracy.  A 
study of the middle class in Shanxi concluded that, “Shanxi’s new middle classes of the 
reform era have most definitely emerged from within, and remain to a large extent part of 
the local ‘establishment’; and they espouse values consistent with their origins in local 
society and culture as well as from elsewhere” (Goodman 1999, 259).   Thus, these 
wealthy individuals do not have independent political pursuits outside of the Communist 
15
Party.  In short, a key problem of the autonomous actor model is the highly ambiguous 
political ideology of these rising social and economic elites and the lack of a clear 
mechanism to translate economic power into political power.  Even Mao Zedong in his 
study of Chinese social classes in the 1930s concluded that national industrialists were 
only half-hearted advocates of democracy.  They belong to the “On-Top-of-the-Wall” 
Party—when a democratic revolution was useful for them, they turned to the side of the 
proletariats.  Once not in their favor, they changed to support the existing regime.  
The Parasitic Actor Model 
The second model, the parasitic actor model, challenges the view that emerging 
business elites are harbingers of democratization in China.   Under this view rising 
economic and social elites use personal ties for their self-interests and are unwilling or 
unable to form strong horizontal ties to bargain with the state for the sake of their class 
interest.  “For the most part these entrepreneurial managers and bureaucrats not only 
maintain their links with the party-state, but much of their successful, entrepreneurial 
activity is based precisely on exploiting those links” (Goodman 1999, 245).   The patron-
clientelist tie between the business elites and the state is oiled via informal channels of 
personal relationships (guanxi).  These personal ties of reciprocity between bureaucrats 
and business elites are characterized by mutual exchanges between allocation of 
resources and political loyalty.  
In addition, although the state established or helped establish semi-independent 
organizations or trade unions to represent the interests of different sectors of industry, 
they are carefully designed to pre-empt the emerging autonomous business organizations.   
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Simultaneously, the state has devised corporatist strategies to deflect business elites’ will 
to act and pre-empt their growing pressures from below for political power (Pearson 1997, 
30-31). 8  Bruce Dickson finds that the party adopts a “two-pronged strategy” of creating 
corporatist links between the state and the business sector and co-opting individual 
entrepreneurs into the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Dickson 2003, 169).   These 
business elites are far from being alienated from the Communist rule and seeking their 
independent space against state intrusion.   They remain in close proximity with the state 
through close cooperation. 
Figure 2: The Parasitic Model
The State
Patron-clientelism state corporatism
(favorable deals )             (political loyalty)
Individual business elites associations or People’s Congress
      Individual business elites
Source: author
The strength of the parasitic actor model is that the rising autonomy of new social 
elites does not obscure the fact that a fundamental feature of Chinese politics is still 
hierarchical.  Because Chinese politics is a classic example of patron-clientelism and 
state corporatism, the emerging business elites are unlikely to actively engage in an 
8 Philippe Schmitter defines corporatism as “ a system of interest representation in which the constituent 
parts are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered 
and functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a 
deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain 
controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports” (Schmitter 1979, 13).   
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organized confrontation against the central government.  Because of the hierarchical 
nature of their informal ties with the state, these rising elites lack horizontal ties that bind 
them together and facilitate collective consciousness and collective action.  “China’s new 
business elite has failed to transform its economic position into political power because it 
is uninterested in doing so, because there is a viable clientelist option, and because the 
socialist corporatist strategy of the state is designed to prevent it” (Pearson 1997, 139, 
141).  However, the weakness of this argument is that this institutional analysis is too 
static and can hardly capture the innovative forces latent within the system that would 
push for change.  It seems that the system can determine everything, but actually actors 
can get rid of these institutional constraints and develop a strategy to gain more power 
versus the state through negotiated paths.
The Symbiotic Actor Model
A third model, the symbiotic actor model, concentrates on the dynamic 
relationship of mutual empowerment between the state and emerging social elites.   Xu 
Wang argues that the state needs society to achieve its objectives (Xu 1999, 231).  
Migdal, Kohli, and Shue argue that effective ties between state and society may empower 
both sides (Migdal, Kohli, and Shue 1994).  This necessarily means that political and 
social actors are disposed to form cooperative relationships.  Talcott Parsons defined 
power as the general capacity of a social system to get things done in the interest of 
collective goals.9  His contribution to political thinking is that power need not be treated 
as a zero-sum game between state and social actors.  Both sides can reach an agreement 
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that is mutually beneficial.  Later, Anthony Giddens redefined power as “the 
transformative capacity of human action, the capacity of human beings to intervene in a 
series of events so as to alter their courses” (Giddens 1995, 214). Under this model 
although power may always entail coercive subordinations of the establishment over its 
subjects, it is also true that state and social actors may also benefit from cooperation to 
enhance their joint power.  An example is that the Korean government has sanctioned and 
granted monopoly representation to peak business associations such as the Korean 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Federation of Korean Industry (FKI). It has 
promoted business conglomerates ( chaebol such as Daewoo, LG, and Hyundai) and 
helped them grow into dynamic business with significant influence (Pearson 1997, 147).
Vivienne Shue argues that after many years of compartmentalization and 
“cellularization” through all kinds of work units, the state gradually lost its genuine social 
support from social actors.  Thereafter, the state was confronted with a lack of interest 
from social forces to push forward its economic and political programs with the 
development of local protectionism and patron-client factionalism.  Thus, the Communist 
Party tried to mobilize and recruit a variety of social elites into the political arena to 
revitalize its own bureaucratic body as well as the social supports necessary for further 
development.  This new arrangement not only creates new power resources within 
society, but also strengthens the party-state itself “in its information gathering, policy 
planning, and even in its policy implementation modes” (Shue 1994, 65).  Examples in 
sub-Saharan Africa and India suggest that the state may be powerless if the links between 
the political center and social periphery are too weak.  Naomi Chazan finds that state 
9 In his words, “power then is generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations by 
units in a system of collective organization when the obligations are legitimized with reference to their 
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formation and construction have paralleled with a vibrant and autonomous activities of 
social forces.   She concludes that, “developments at both societal and state levels were 
mutually reinforcing” (Chazan 1994, 258).
Figure 3:  The Symbiotic Model
State                                                                                Social elites
(mutual empowerment)
source: author
The key critique of the symbiotic actor model is that the societal actors who are 
recruited into the political establishment would gradually lose their independent pursuit 
of social interests.  They will favor the status quo rather than challenge the party state.  
“They will support and reinforce the policies of reform and opening, but seem to have 
little interest in more ambitious democratization” (Dickson 2003, 170).  These social 
actors have acquired the title “red capitalists” for their pro-market and pro-Communist 
attitudes.  In a word, these scholars argue in some cases, that state and social actors can 
cooperate with each other and strengthen each other.  But under what conditions will 
state and societal actors cooperate?  How do they resolve their conflicts?  These issues 
remain unanswered need further study.  
The Negotiating Actor Model
  The fourth model, the negotiating actor model, posits the emergence of new 
horizontal relationships in society as social actors start to step into the vacuum of ignored
or newly formed areas (e.g. environment, women rights, birth control).  These actors then 
negotiate with the state to take responsibility over these new issues.  Timothy Brook 
bearing on collective goals” (Parsons 1986, 103).   
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points out the “auto-organization” of social integration when people regularly 
communicate horizontally and form cooperative bodies (Brook 1997, 23).  Instead of 
arguing that the Party-state compartmentalizing society to frustrate genuine pluralism, 
Tony Saich discovers that a vital social space starts to emerge and reveals a pattern of 
negotiation between state and social actors (Saich 2000, 124-5).  There are three main 
reasons for this.  First, the state has increasingly limited power of formal control over 
society with so many new and conflicting issues.  Second, these social organizations and 
actors can actually enjoy a reciprocally beneficial relationship with the state.  Third, 
social actors have also devised strategies to evade state intrusion and maximize their self-
interest (Saich 2000, 125).   He argues that since the Deng’s economic reform has 
unleashed so much individual creativity, it is quite possible a desire for them to require 
accountability over officialdom and voice their desires and objectives in the political area.  
These actors engaged the state in a constructive process of discussion and negotiation.  
Thus they helped the state leaders changed their mind from their initial instrumental 
calculation of national interest, to a heated discussion of possible changes to make things
better, and to the final stage of norm internalization to accept new concepts and rules in 
policy making (Figure 4).
Figure 4:  The Negotiating Actor Model
Instrumental calculation   Discursive/communicative understanding             Norm internalization
Source: author
  An example of this was an energetic and charismatic social elite-- Liang Congjie, 
a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, who set up an NGO 
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called Friends of Nature that helped save many gold-hair monkeys in Yunnan Province, 
China.  He mobilized student vigils and brought media attention to bear on the local 
Yunnan government to ban illegal logging.  Liang was successful in extracting a decision 
from the local authorities to ban logging activities in order to save the golden monkeys’ 
habitat.  Another example comes from the editors for the magazine Rural Women 
Knowing All which publishes articles about the sexual health of rural women, the high 
suicidal rate of rural women, and discrimination against migrant women.  These stories 
were quickly adopted by major official newspapers and became important policy issues 
for decision-makers.   The most interesting example, however, comes from the members 
of the China Family Planning Association, who gradually broke its ties with its official 
governmental organ to run a number of innovative projects on sex education and women 
issues.  It later rejected the selection of retired officials to be placed in its own posts.  The 
association successfully pushed the government to change its target-driven quota-based 
system to one that is more client driven, offering more choices and combining it with 
education (Saich 2000, 137).     
The most important contribution of the negotiating actor model is that it points 
out the active role of societal actors to substantially protect human rights and the 
environment through bargaining and compromise with the state.  They were co-opted 
first and then embedded themselves with the state in order to acquire legitimacy and 
viability (O’Brien 1994, 101) .  Then over the veneer of formal compliance, social actors 
developed operating strategies of evasion and circumnavigation of the state.   But the 
problem is that they are still operating under the basic guidelines and policies of the Party.  
This is a fundamental departure from the autonomous actor model because their work is 
22
within the limits of Party toleration.  All they have done is to heed those previously 
ignored areas or fulfill functions that the party-state has failed to do so.  They are fine-
tuning government policies instead of qualitatively pushing for political rights.  These 
organizations still don’t dare to cross the “thin red line” to vie for political power as 
opposition groups/parties in democratic countries.  
All these four models have their respective strengths and weaknesses.  Some 
models impute a political character to these social and business elites, rather than 
focusing on their specific will and motives to playing political games.  The conventional 
wisdom of these theories tends to be based on a series of “black-box” assertions that 
obscure the ways these elites might truly produce a political outcome.  Proponents of the 
“autonomous actor model” see these elites as leading to the downfall of an authoritarian 
regime, but the mechanisms through which this might occur are rarely specified. The 
“parasitic actor model” is an institutional approach with its parsimonious elegance to 
characterize the prevalent pattern of state-society relationship, but it fails to weigh the 
political challenges these social elites face and their potential confrontations against the 
state in time of change.  The “symbiotic actor model” is an overly optimistic picture that 
state and social actors may mutually help each other without considerations of power 
asymmetry and potential conflicts between state and society.   The “negotiating actor 
model” rests on anecdotal evidence, drawing primarily on isolated examples of successful 
stories in Chinese society. Subsequent assertions about the political effects are usually 
made without consideration of sources of change that new actors may play a role  as 
meaning makers and the interaction of agent-structure to push for new directions of 
change.  In addition, these models still do not tell us where the innovative ideas that make 
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political changes possible come from.  They do not detail the mechanism that social elites 
use to mobilize and impact the state.   So building on the literature view, I further the 
study to investigate the sources of change, tactics for innovation, and political outcomes 
of actors’ efforts in the sector of information and communications industry.
The Role of IT Leadership
The study of IT leadership has four advantages for us to discern the political 
impact of the rising new social elite in China.  First of all, the study of IT leadership may 
help us to know the origins of the innovative ideas for ICT diffusion.  This is the first 
process of change—awareness building and vision creation.  By tracing the origins of 
their innovative ideas and visions we can understand the belief system that is responsible 
for ICT diffusion in China.  Vision building is a process used to convince ordinary people 
as well as political elites to attend to the new ICT.  The second, resource mobilization is 
vital for their success in pushing political deals in the process of ICT diffusion.  These IT 
leaders form political coalitions within and without the government to “obtain and deploy 
valuable resources, whether money or high-level political support, to spread ICTs more 
widely” (Wilson 2004b, 859).  The four-sided “Quad” relationship between the public 
sector’s institutions, enterprises, research centers, and non-profit organizations is 
essential for an effective pro-diffusion political coalition.  These societal actors actively 
cooperate with each other to push for legal, regulatory, legislative, and organizational 
policies that are necessary for a wider diffusion of ICTs.  Their unified collective interest 
includes ending the monopoly of China Telecom, building up national information 
infrastructure such as Golden Bridge, enacting the Digital Signature Law, and favorable 
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value added taxes for software.  Third, through the study of IT leaders we get to know 
what their role is in enhancing the institutional performance of the state.  Through the 
study of IT leadership, we get to know in detail how they help design the way to break up 
China Telecom, protect Internet security in China, control and regulate the Internet, and 
undertake the National Information Evaluation Center (NIEC).  Fourth, the IT leadership 
may also be capable of subtly challenging the state via trend setting.  Though they are 
still working under the strict surveillance of the government, they start to create a new 
communal culture based on networks outside the mainstream Communist propaganda 
(similar to “parallel polis” in Eastern Europe).  
Vision Building
One vision, the tradition of educational excellence coupled with an experimental 
spirit in the reform era, help guide these IT leaders with a vision to stay a particular 
course.  In the ICT context, vision is a body of arguments or doctrine that conveys 
effectively and coherently the ways that ICT services can advance the core values and 
goals of a given group, institution, or society.  An ICT vision describes the preset, offers 
an attractive image of the future, and provides a way for people to move successfully to 
that future.  It advances a broader societal and institutional agenda through the use of 
information and communication technologies.  It is repeated in speeches, articles, and 
manifestos over a period of time.   It provides a matrix for making sense of a complicated 
and chaotic world.  A strong vision has emotive as well as analytic content.  The vision 
glorifies Chinese civilization and possesses a keen awareness toward catching up with the 
developed world.  This helps them pump their resources into this ICT sector.  The word 
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“informatization” characterizes an ideal that entices scientists and entrepreneurs to help 
China jumpstart its national strength.10  Innovative visions like his give people ideas to 
pursue a networked China through building a robust national information infrastructure.  
This type of vision building in China is akin to the transformational leadership 
discussed by historians.  In 1978, James MacGregor Burns introduced this concept and 
made a fundamental distinction between transactional and transformational leadership.  
Transactional leadership “occurs when one person takes the initiative in making contact 
with others for the purpose of an exchange of valued things” (Burns 1978, 19).  This is an 
economic tradeoff between goods or other valued political leverages, a kind of business 
relationship as occurred in price bargaining.  However, transformational leadership 
“occurs when one or more persons engage with others in such a way that leaders and 
followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality” (Burns 1978, 
20).11  Bass argues that transformational leadership possesses four basic attributes.  First, 
they have charisma, or idealized influence.  They are convicted with strong values, 
purposes, commitment, and ethics (Bass 1997, 133).  Second, they cherish an appealing 
10 For example, a vision of building dense networks and public institutions to advance design, diffusion, 
and the use of innovative technology is cherished by IT leaders such as Edward Tian.  Edward Tian wrote 
in the journal of China Netcom: “Our dream directs our direction of efforts.  I remember Chinese in the 
1960 and 70s, at that time, people not only lacked food and clothing, but knowledge.  In that era, the 
Chinese did not have dreams.  We dream a broad future.  We dream that China will have 300 to 500 million 
Internet users, the largest country with Internet, an online China.  We dream that in the network economy 
and in the sea of information, the dignity of the Chinese will be recognized and respected because of our 
strong network economy and successful enterprises. China will become a leader of new economic 
civilization and progress. These dreams are leading the way for the China Netcom.  The future has 
entrusted us with responsibility to speed up the construction of the infrastructure of the broadband of China.  
It calls for us to take all the opportunities.  Our dreams are everlasting for the 21st century” (brochure of 
China Netcom in November 2002).
11 He cites Mohandas Gandhi as an example whose moral aspiration of Satyahata (truth force) of non-
violent means of struggle elevated himself to this transformational leadership.  Here, leaders can have the 
potential to radically alter the motives and morals that govern a group.  Abraham Lincoln is another 
example that he set free the slaves.  Bernard Bass and Ben Avolio, and Robert House and Boas Shamir also 
suggest charisma is a general factor related to transformational leadership.
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vision of the future and encourage followers to search for it for life’s meaning.  Third, 
such leaders are intellectually sophisticated to push followers to consider new departures 
of views and articulate their ways.  Finally, they take into consideration the needs, 
capacities, and aspirations of their followers.  Later, House and Shamir argue that a 
vision for a brighter future for followers is vital.  This vision is often interconnected with 
values such as freedom, wealth, or prosperity.  These leaders build a positive image to 
appeal to the followers.  Sometimes leaders may seem to deviate from group norms and 
produce even more rewards for the group.  This idiosyncrasy credit makes leaders 
meaning makers for the group.  For example, Richard Nixon’s visit to China may seem to 
contradict his vocal opposition of Communism, but it served higher goals for the United 
States.   In this sense, leaders may steer the group towards novel directions or 
unconventional paths when they find they have sufficient credit to deviate group 
traditional norms.  This is leads to a constructivist approach to leadership.  Leaders 
possess power because they can tell moving stories to the audience about their proper 
identity.   Effective leaders tell stories about themselves and where they were coming 
from and where they are heading to (Gardner 1995, 14).  Thus these IT leaders 
sometimes even utilize revolutionary slogans to encourage their followers to help China 
leapfrog and catch up with developed countries in a new era.  
Resource Mobilization
Throughout the world political leaders often come from a specific social stratum 
(Quandt 1970).  In the case of IT leaders, Wilson found these “information champions” 
came from professional middle class families, the children of technicians, teachers, 
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doctors, and engineers (Wilson 2004b, 860).  They were generally exposed to Western 
education, have passionate commitments, charisma to attract audiences, respect for their 
subordinates, and sagacity for a brighter Chinese future.  Because these leaders possess 
unique attitudes, novel knowledge, and adaptable skills, they can convince others to 
follow their ideas on ICT diffusion.12   Many Chinese IT leaders share similar overseas 
experiences, possess high incomes and social reputation, have higher education, and 
share common goals to challenge the natural monopoly of China Telecom. 
The study of leadership looks at how leaders network and build social capital 
throughout their career.  They demonstrate a pattern of “Quad” cooperation between 
governmental officials, private entrepreneurs, scholars, and societal groups (Figure 5). 13
The assumption that decision makers are fully aware of the stakes in the IT sector is too 
subjective and unreliable for us to decide.  Thus it is these IT leaders who go to 
universities, join social groups, graduate from professional institutions, move through 
civic and public associations or organizations, and make friends with decision makers.  
There are two areas where IT activists converge in Beijing: one West and the other in the 
East.  Zhongguancun at West Beijing possesses a rich network of supportive ICT 
institutions such as the Information Network Center of the Chinese Academy of Science, 
Sea Dragon Software and Hardware Supply chain, Tsinghua University, a number of 
other top universities in China, and local IT companies such as Legend (Levono).  In the 
East, near the buzzing streets of the Central Business District (CBD), the Kerry Center 
12 Later in the mid-20th century, the behavioral approach swept across the study of leadership.  Particular 
attention was paid to relationship between leaders and followers and to the implications what type of 
leaders actually does the job.  The finding is consistent and statistically significant:  consideration for the 
followers in the workplace is crucial, as was strong task orientation.  Effective managers are highly 
concerned for people and for production.
13 This is similar to “iron triangles” in American politics and it conveys an established idea of corporatism.
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and the China World Trade Towers house numerous IT joint ventures and foreign 
companies such as Motorola, PCCW, Hewlett-Packard, and Qualcom.     
Figure 5. “Quad” Coordination between the Public, Private, Academic, and NGO 
Sectors
Source:  author and Kathleen G. Huang
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Thus resource mobilization is a key element for these IT leaders to affect political 
outcomes.  These leaders actively lobby policy makers for coordination and control.  
These reformers actively undertake investigations, write new rules, popularize changes, 
and publish justifications for the new order.  Clearly, they caution policy makers and tell 
them that much remains to be learned about what modes and degrees of state involvement 
and intervention in ICT diffusion are desirable.  Thus they are pushing for the opening of 
the political establishment to pluralistic voices.  For example, Gao Hongbing, after his 
visit in the US in 1996, raised the e-security issue to the Chinese leaders.  Stating that 
almost all routes of the Internet have to go through the US, China needs to have its own 
routers and cn. domain name. This started the initiative for China to build up its domestic 
national information infrastructure.  He also cautioned that the Chinese government has 
to step up its liberalization process in the ICT sector in order to catch up with the global 
economy.
Then they challenge the monopoly of national telecommunications companies by 
pointing out their hypocrisy on safeguarding national security.  In other countries, there is 
such a process of resource mobilization.  In the US, although the Pentagon deemed the 
breakup of AT & T a threat to national security, other actors such as U. S. Department of 
Justice led anti-monopoly investigations to restrict AT & T in 1956 to stay out 
information services.  By the late 1960s, an entire school of Japanese scholars raised 
concern on “johaka shakai” (information society) and involved Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI) to discuss the importance of the information infrastructure.  
President Valery Giscard d’Estaining cautioned the importance of information 
infrastructure in a statement that an information society is a key to resolve national crisis 
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and internal tensions so as to control the fate of the French nation.    In China, IT leaders 
such as Edward Tian, Gao Hongbing, Jasmine Zhang, Michael Wan and Ou Yangwu, 
conducted a thorough investigation on the cost and profits of basic telecommunications 
services.  They proposed to the Chinese government that in order to speed up China’s 
economic improvement, competition is crucial to build up China’s national information 
infrastructure.  This gave China Telecom a heavy blow and provided the central political 
leaders with concrete statistical proof and reasoning to break up China Telecom (Figure 
6).
Figure 6.  Divestiture of China Telecom
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Institutional Performance
The third contribution of IT leadership is their effort to improve the institutional 
performance of the state.  Putnam argues that a high-performance institution should be 
both responsive and effective: “sensitive to the demands of its constituents and effective 
in using limited resources to address these demands” (Putnam 1993, 9).  Samuel 
Huntington also argues that the level of institutionalization of any political system can be 
defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organization 
(Huntington 1968, 12).  An important insight from China’s IT leaders as different from 
Russian entrepreneurs is that the former start with state building-- build a strong national 
information infrastructure and help design new rules and regulations for the ICT. In 
contrast, what accounts for Russia’s derailed path from market to democracy is that so 
many political elites purchased political support from “oligarchs” of Russian business 
men, thus the governing elites tolerate corruption, patronage, and rent seeking behavior
and neglect state building for a market democracy (Roberts and Sherlock 1999, 478).
Russian business elites got rich by acquiring state assets and engaged in rent-seeking 
activities with public officials.  Political leaders in Russia, in order to secure their 
positions in the government, made these “business oligarchs” interest a primary priority.  
Thus they have contributed to an enfeebled state and more opportunities for criminals 
creating widespread corruption in Russia.  It is ironic to find that the crucial problem with 
Russian political economy lies in weak political institutions, a contrast with its 
predecessor, the gigantic Communist state-- the Soviet Union.  
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IT leaders in China, by contrast, build the state infrastructure and their wealth is 
not created through predatory behaviors on state assets.14 This kind of “embeddedness” 
or “symbiosis” with the state made these IT leaders national “heroes”.  They persuaded 
the political leaders of the great potential of the Internet and tried to alleviate their 
worries by demonstrating to them that there are technologically feasible ways to control 
the Internet for security concerns.  The power they possess is their ability to effect rules 
and institutions that govern these outcomes.  In other words, they attempt to strengthen 
the governance in the ICT sector by helping the government regulate the newly emerging 
areas that have great significance for China’s development.  This has much to do with de-
centralization and the non-hierarchical governance of the ICT sector.  
The examples of the ways they improve the institutional performances lie at their 
efforts to push for competition and decentralization in the ICT reform in China.  At the 
efforts of Minister Hu Qili and Edward Tian, the monopoly of China Telecom was 
broken and competition in the ICT sector became institutionalized.  Examples will be 
illustrated in chapters hereafter, but two important efforts are also worth mentioning:  one 
is the institutionalization of price hearings for telecommunications services and the other 
is the evaluation of the levels of “informatization” of state-owned enterprises and 
governmental organs.  At the behest of Jasmine Zhang and Michael Wan, price hearings 
became a prerequisite for any price change in telecommunications services.  This marks 
the first opening of grassroots voices and citizen participation in national 
telecommunications decision making.  They fight over rules and practices to advance 
14 Of course, some of these IT elites may also attempt to bypass the state control to maximize their 
individual interests.  But their relationship with the state is not collusive as to hurt the public interests.
33
political participation and public deliberation.15  Jiang Qiping, former official at MII and 
now a research fellow at CASS, invited private capital to undertake national information 
evaluation issues.  His team designed concrete questionnaires and statistical tools to 
evaluate e-implementation at private enterprises in China.  He also organized meetings 
for CIOs (Chief Information Officer) of key enterprises to exchange ideas on how to 
make information technology an integral part of their management.  This has helped the 
government gain a concrete and accurate understanding of the functioning of ICT in 
public and private sectors.  
Trendsetting
The fourth contribution of these IT leaders is that they set civil society trends and 
help establish a new morality among the people. This is a normative power.  These 
leaders make use of this highly interactive network to revitalize a sense of community 
and influence public deliberation.  They contribute to a rising new interest and identity 
among ordinary people.  This is akin to Alexander Wendt’s concern for the issue of 
identity and interest formation—“a cognitive, inter-subjective conception of process in 
which identities and interests are endogenous to interaction, rather than a rationalist-
behavioral one in which they are exogenous” (Wendt 1992, 393-394).  These leaders help 
create conditions for citizen participation on human rights, social justice, and 
environmental issues.  Tang Xiyang, founder of Green Camp in China, expounds a 
15 The past ideological justification is that the state has a moral and political obligation to provide basic 
services to its citizens.  Government ownership could provide national security, protect national 
sovereignty, and create a greater sense of unity among the Chinese people.  State plays a variety of roles 
from monopolistic direct ownership and control of production to more arm’s length regulatory and 
informational activities that promote and protect private entrepreneurs.  
34
powerful message online.  He argues that “without real democratic life, there will not be 
everlasting green rivers or mountains”(Tang 2002). These leaders also make the Internet 
important platforms to educate people and raise public awareness about environmental 
protection and sustainable development.  This environmental discourse has important 
characteristics.  The most salient one is a series of new “green” lexicons in Chinese 
media such as green Olympics, green food, green campus, sustainable development, 
white pollution, recycling, ecology, endangered species, animal rights, global warming, 
desertification, deforestation, anti-logging, anti-poaching, global village, Earth Day, 
biodiversity, bird-watchers, and more.  Many environmental NGOs have set up their own 
websites, including Green-Web, Greener Beijing, Friends of Green, Green Angel, Green 
Dalian, Green Earth Volunteers, Green Forum, Green Plateau, Green River, Green 
Xinjiang, and Green Zhejiang.   These websites have one goal in common; they follow 
the “language of Rio” to “think globally” and “act locally”. 16
Impact on Political Change
The first step toward measuring their impact on politics is whether they have 
uniform ideological and political goals to pressure the government for political changes.  
The second way is the organizational coherence to break away from state control to 
push for political deals.  The third way to measure their impact on political change is to 
see whether they can avail themselves of the new technology-especially the Internet to 
create necessary and sufficient conditions for political changes. However, before we 
come to their political impact, we can look at their traits first. 
16
 Courtesy to Yang Guobing and Craig Calhoune
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These IT leaders are best characterized by their amphibiousness.  This term 
denotes that the leaders are bridges between the West and China, state and society, and 
past and future.   But the term also connotes their dual character.  They are caught 
between a desire for a transparent and liberal political regime and a pragmatic 
dependence on personal ties for self-interest.  They are like a tadpole that has grown legs 
but still cannot breath outside of the water.  They have the ability and desire to hop on 
land, but must stay in the pond for their survival.  Chinese IT leaders dream of 
decentralized government and a market economy, but they rely on the Chinese 
Communist state for their existence and privileged position.  They strengthen the 
“infrastructural power” of the state while are cautious to challenge its “despotic power”
(Mann 1986, 6-7).  Despotic power refers to the distributive power that state actor can 
impose upon social actors.  This is the power controlled by the hierarchical political elites 
without consultation with social actors.  Thus the monopoly of China Telecom is this
kind of power that social forces contest against and these IT leaders try their best to
bargain with the state.  On the other hand, social actors may also cooperate with the state 
or help the state to develop or strengthen the state via taking charge of issues unattended 
by the state before.  Thus they are helping the state on its infrastructural power-- the 
institutional a capacity of the state to penetrate society to implement its decisions.  They 
helped the state for a collective power that the development of state and society can be 
both enhanced through a more coordinated type of arrangement. Therefore, these IT 
leaders are helping the state for innovative changes at ICT sector, but they are not willing 
to nor intending to challenge the power of the Communist regime.  This important 
finding is in tune with the historical role of Chinese business elites.  The essence of the 
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merchant-state relations pattern was “neither wholly autonomous nor state-dominated but 
instead sat, Janus-like, between state and society, and at times even blended socially with 
the official class and carried out “public” (gong) works” (Pearson 1997, 44).  
Even though China is far from a democracy, the way to assess the political impact 
of these IT leaders is to see how much closer (or further) they have moved Chinese 
politics towards the basic parameters of democracy—“the continuing responsiveness of 
the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals” (Dahl 
1971, 1).  From the roles I discussed on the importance of IT leadership in China, we gain 
some insights of these IT leaders in bringing innovative ideas into China, promoting 
public discussions, and enhancing balanced interactions between governmental officials, 
private entrepreneurs, NGO leaders, and researchers.  This may suggest an emerging 
pluralism in Chinese politics.  Their impact upon political change is evaluated mainly in 
two dimensions: state responsiveness and civic participation (Dittmer 2003, 904).  Have
they actively participated in the rules and regulation of the ICT issues?.  Do they help
nurture a culture that brings mass publics into the political equation—a process involving 
a dialectic between the emancipation of the masses to participate more actively in politics 
and a liberal trend towards the creation of a new civility?  These are key dimensions I 
investigate for this dissertation project. 
While acknowledging their contributions in bringing about better institutional 
performance of the public sector and engagement in the civil society, we should be very 
cautious about our claims of their contributions to political change.  They still have a 
vested interest in state stability and the causal mechanism of their impact on political 
change needs to be specified more clearly.  
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First of all, they belong to the “non-critical realm” of society, created by the 
market dynamic of reform.  Consistent with the “symbiotic actor model”, they seek to be 
partners of the state, not challengers.  They feel that the state is an important source of 
their power.  Thus almost all my interviewees indicate that they support a stable political 
regime—an elitist perspective derived from a longstanding feudal tradition in China.  
Some leaders (i.e.Liu Chuanzhi of Lenovo) are actually joining the central committee of 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), thus being co-opted by the state.  Thus, the non-
critical realm of society does not pose direct opposition against the state, but helps it fine-
tune its policies and regulate the supply of goods and services.  As shown by these IT 
leaders, they reinforce the state’s decision to liberalize market forces by designing ways 
to destroy monopolies in the ICT sector, reduce the state’s interference in economic 
issues, and grant favorable policies for ICT diffusion (Tong 1994, 334).  
In contrast, the “critical realm” of society directly pressures the government to 
encourage public involvement in the selection of political leaders and accountability over 
state actions.   Thus the “critical realm” of society fights for institutional guarantees for a 
democratic government.   These indicators include—freedom to form and join 
organizations, freedom of expression, the right to vote, eligibility for public office, right 
of political leaders to compete for support, alternative sources of information, free and 
fair elections, and institutions or making governmental policies depend on votes and
other expressions of preference (Dahl 1971, 3).  However, the inclusion of these IT 
leaders into the policy process reflects that these IT leaders are not deemed by the state as 
members of the critical intelligentsia that threaten the Communist monopoly on state 
power.   Their motivation to participate in the policy or rule making process stems largely 
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from their business interests.  They do not have organized and coherent political goals as 
the “party reform circle” in Hungary which turned into a strong anti-establishment force 
to dissolve the Socialist Worker’s Party in 1989.  They are also different from young 
elites in Taiwan. The lesson from KMT’s efforts to recruit educated youth into the 
political system also tells us that this co-optation strategy of the state has strengthened the 
state via their expertise and technical skills.  However, these co-opted young talents 
gradually changed the institutional goal of the Taiwan political system: from reclaiming 
the mainland to an independent Taiwan state.  Unlike KMT elites who were exposed to 
Western political systems, these IT leaders in China generally lack the understanding of 
alternative political values and the experiences of democratic institutional arrangements 
so as to be a “critical realm” group.  They belong to a “non-critical realm” of society,
unlikely to be harbingers of democratizing reforms, although they may create a more 
liberalizing condition in favor of such attempts.  As the state and IT leaders get closer and 
closer, they may actually reinforce the status quo because both of them benefit from the 
preservation of such a symbiotic relationship.  This may even lead to a more efficient 
form of new authoritarianism.  
Second, even though many of these IT leaders desire formal channels of 
complaints, they still resort to personal relationships to improve their business.  They 
have not developed into a coherent, independent, and powerful social class for political 
liberalization.  Occasionally these IT leaders are invited to participate in the process of 
policy making and implementation, and the corporatist-style framework provides arenas 
for institutionalized interactions between state elites and powerful social actors.  They 
play active roles to help transform the policy making style from “mandatism and 
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decretism” to “concertation” (Carlos, Marvall, and Przeworski 1992).17 Even Jasmine 
Zhang says that revolutionary people within the establishment have been weeded out and 
people outside the system lack resources for social mobilization.18  Therefore, those IT 
leaders’ influence on political change is more normative than substantive.  Thus even 
though most IT leaders probably share broad visions of a networked and open China, we 
cannot assume the prior existence of a normative consensus or objective common 
interests among various IT elites.  Various IT elites are not always aggregative and 
inclusive, leading to a hegemony of fundamental ideas.  Therefore, there is a logical jump 
from belief to behavior, and from behavior to policy change.  Many IT elites possess a 
willingness or vision to transform China into a more open society, but these visions may 
not be transformed into political behavior.  Even though some may have demonstrated 
significant levels of participation in the political process, these behaviors may not be 
translated into substantial policy results.   Thus we still lack direct evidence how these 
leaders’ aggregated belief systems and behaviors produce substantial results of policy 
innovation, rules or institutional improvement and active civic engagement.  The 
anecdote stories in the dissertation only suggest possible pathways that emerging social 
elites such as IT leaders may enhance state responsiveness and public participation. 
Third, the state still remains strict control over society, thus pre-empting open  
actions against the state via the Internet by IT activists.  Even though the state may grant 
leeway for these IT leaders to participate in the course of policy-making or rule making, 
this kind of power may be used by the state to increase its despotic power.  Thus on one 
hand, we see the Internet is rapidly growing, while the state also maintains more strict 
17
 The executive  imposes reforms from above through decrees or other tough measures.  
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control of the Internet through newly developed technologies.  The Internet, as developed 
by these IT leaders and the state, may serve the purpose of the state by enhancing its 
power to co-opt, preempt, subordinate, and control social activities.  Therefore, the power 
of these IT leaders still largely hinge on state implementation.  They may encourage 
some public contestation online, but are still within the maximum tolerance of the state.  
The state intentionally allows some freedom online to show that it gives people lots of 
freedom.  But actually, it still controls lifelines and many fundamental freedoms, such as 
the freedom of vote, association, and free speech are far from realized in China.  These IT 
leaders fine-tune state policies for development, but they fail to address the fundamental 
problem of the Chinese political system--one party rule without significant checks and 
balances on the state power.  
There are significant numbers of responses from these IT leaders in favor of more 
political transparency, interaction between state and society, and more inclusion in the 
decision-making process.  But, there is little evidence to suggest that they push for 
qualitative political changes openly. Politically speaking, those outside the establishment 
who want to push for political changes lack the resources and organization to achieve the 
purpose and those within the establishment have been brainwashed and distilled of their 
liberal efforts.  Their coalition for ICT diffusion could hardly touch the hard core of the 
Communist rule—one party dictatorship.  They encourage people to use the Internet to be 
engaged in more public contestation, but they are still quite wary of their personal 
security.   Thus when the government decided to ban the report on Gao Xingjian’s Nobel 
Laureate in 2000, the IT leaders at sina.com immediately deleted all of the messages, 
18
 Personal communications on October 27, 2004 at Capital Hotel of Beijing
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only retaining a link with Norway.  Even though there are so many BBS (online forums)
in China that people can freely talk about many sensitive issues, this openness on the 
Internet is a deliberate state policy to allow some public complaints and to make a show 
of the government’s ability to let its people enjoy freedom of expression.  But the state 
can actually screen all differing ideas online to gain a “better adapted form of control 
over the political forces unleashed by economic growth” (Steven-Yang 2001).  These IT 
leaders may openly complain about economic failures or mismanagement, but the 
complaints about root cause of many of their economic problems, the socialist system, 
cannot be tolerated by the government.   Thus, political openness for public contestation 
is still quite constrained despite the expansion of the Internet. 
These IT leaders introduce concepts such as networked society into China and 
help more consultations between the state and civil society.  Therefore, they create some
necessary conditions for political inclusion and public contestation.  But they are not 
sufficient conditions for political changes in China.  The Internet they possess or push 
forward is unlikely to lead to the decay of the authoritarian state of China.  In other word, 
the Internet does not always lead to liberal or democratic practices.  Some of its most 
celebrated political incarnations can be an instrument of intense Chinese nationalism 
(such as in the wake of the April 2001 EP-3 incident).19  Drake, Kalathil, and Boas argue 
that in none of the democratic transitions over the past two decades could one find that 
the Internet played “an important—much less crucial—causal role” (Drake, Kalathil, and 
Boas 2000).  There is a logical jump that with the flow of information, the Internet will 
automatically transmit those democratic values and practices into the Chinese practice.  
This is an argument entirely based on faith, “a classic black box explanation in which a 
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cause is said to produce an outcome through mechanisms that are entirely unclear”
(Drake, Kalathil, and Boas 2000, 2).  Many studies on the impact of the Internet in 
developing countries show that the Internet does not bring down authoritarian regimes
(Harford 2000, 255-262; Rohozinski 2000, 334-338).  Even though these IT leaders may 
use the Internet to increase demands of political transparency and accountability and end 
corruption, the state may counter these pro-democracy attitudes and voices with strict 
censorship.  We cannot conclude that the authoritarian regime is in jeopardy just by 
observing some anti-establishment messages online.  
Because the Internet is embedded in the social, cultural, and institutional 
background, its political effects will depend on the interplay with off-line political 
dynamics like shifting elite preferences and coalitional dynamics, wider structural forces 
and economic conditions, and pressures from international pressures.  Thus, these factors 
are sufficiently independent of any IT leader’s Internet activity, or their use of the 
Internet may only play, at best, an intervening or facilitating role.  These IT leaders’ 
efforts for political opening may be a necessary condition for political change, but far 
from sufficient conditions for political liberalization.  For them to become a sufficient 
condition for political change, this class of IT elites should at least (1) actually emerge as 
an economically independent and powerful social force and (2) it will take an active 
interest in politics, much less the politics of opposition.  
Research Focus
This study critically examines the impact of IT leaders in China’s governmental 
policies and other political outcomes, adopting an approach that avoids the pitfalls of 
19See Edward Yang, pp. 23.   
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conventional wisdom.  First of all, it aims to break down and analyze the traits and social 
origins of these IT leaders, taking a comprehensive look at how they emerged during an 
era of reform.   So as not to contribute to the rash of black-box explanations, I examine 
causal mechanisms that connect their activities to their potential political impacts.  I also 
situate their behaviors in different institutional contexts (i.e. public sector, private 
enterprises, academia, and non-governmental organizations) in order to see whether there 
are repeated processes and outcomes.  I use this method to test whether leadership is the 
variable present in all cases contributed to the rapid ICT diffusions in China.  
Alternatively, I identify winners and losers in specific sectors in order to find the 
strengths and weaknesses of these IT leaders, and out of five dimensions I explain later—
autonomous, symbiotic, parasitic, negotiating and amphibious, which one is the most 
salient.  This approach avoids the potentially inappropriate generalizations that can arise 
from isolated anecdotal stories.  
This dissertation project tests the political impact of these IT leaders in both the 
ICT diffusion and political development in China– whether they are conducive to 
increasing state responsiveness and a rising civil society.  It does not seek to prove that IT 
leaders will help undermine the Communist regime, nor does it argue that they are merely 
obedient servers of the government.  Rather, it implements a framework that allows us to 
think about these leaders and their implications for political change in China.  As this 
strategic group of IT leaders develops further and more evidence is accumulated in the 
future, this framework will, hopefully, prove instrumental for measuring long-term social 
and political changes in China.  Therefore, a single strand in comparative politics (e.g.
modernization/civil society/ middle class model, state-corporatism model, or embedded 
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autonomy) may not be able to capture the complexity of the power struggle behind ICT 
diffusion.  By witnessing  the interplay of all parasitic, symbiotic, and confrontational 
relations at work simultaneously, I intend to test the hypothesis that IT leadership 
contributes to political changes in China, which is built upon my evidence of 
investigation.  
Research Design and Parameters of evaluation
The purpose of this qualitative study is exploratory, uncovering topics about 
which little has been written, known, or studied.  I attempt to draw a new picture based 
on new discoveries (Creswell 2003, 21).  Historical events on breaking up China 
Telecom, introducing new competitors such as China Unicom, China Netcom and China 
Railcom, and building national information infrastructure are covered in many 
publications .  But the locomotive of these changes, power struggles and people’s 
strategies behind these changes, were not examined clearly in the past.   Thus a "thick 
description" of this process of ICT diffusion is instrumental for us to understand the 
political struggles behind in order to identify and assess the political impact of those IT 
leaders behind this exciting process (Geetz 1971).20  My research will highlight the role 
of leadership in the difficult process of ICT diffusion in order to fill the gap between 
known and unknown by uncovering new materials and by stimulating new perspectives 
20 Madame Song Ling, ex-Director of the Office for Promoting Informatization at MII, was frustrated at the 
twisted recount over the history of ICT development in China.  Some Western sources are also flawed for 
their authenticity.  The example is David Sheff’s China Dawn.  In this book, he regards Peng Peng as the 
Vice Minister of MOR, but he was only the director of telecom bureau under MOR (147).  He also implied 
that Hou Ziqiang, a scientist who presented to Premier Zhu on the potentials of IP networks, got support 
from Vice President of CAS, Yan Yixun.  According to one of the insiders who joined all the discussions of 
China Netcom, this version was not true.  Yan was at odds with Hou and this caused Jasmine Zhang and 
Gao Hongbing to back down from China Netcom at its inception.  Hou Ziqiang was later given an honorary 
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in telecommunications reform in China.  Eventually, I suggest the possible political 
changes by these IT leaders based on the solid empirical findings relating to the topic. 
This data was collected through six research visits to China over the past four
years (2002-2005).    I identify the IT leaders through a reputation approach by looking at 
their social and political status.  This group of people usually has a high reputation in the 
political, social, and economic realms.  Like a snowball rolling, the interviewees also 
introduced me to other IT elites during my interviews.  These leaders are known by the 
interviewers to be at the top of the ICT field and/or close observers of it in business 
circles, the press, universities and research centers. These respondents helped me identify 
many top people in the ICT field who were most responsible for the ICT diffusion. 
My questions, first of all, are focused on whether these leaders have differing and 
innovative ideas and visions to introduce into the ICT and political arena.  Second, I 
carefully examine their coordination from the public sector to the private, from research 
institutes to non-governmental organizations to see whether they have an impact on ICT 
diffusion.   Third, I cautiously asked their political penchant and their approach to the 
state and society in an attempt to assess their role in the current state-society relationship. 
I asked open-ended questions, which were based on the questionnaire I 
designed, but did not strictly following it.  The reason is that interviewing can be “an 
open-ended process of discovery in which one encounters unexpected insights” and new 
kind of information (Walder 1986, 256).  Nevertheless, there are some basic questions 
that I ask every IT elite I encounter.  I avoid searching for answers fitting into a 
position as a chief engineering consultant, not even a formal position at the Board of Directors (see Chapter 
4 for details).
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preexisting theoretical model.  Thus my questions evolve and are revised, the focus of 
inquiry narrows over time, and I develop, test, and refine new concepts and explanations 
to form inchoate theoretical frameworks in the course of the inquiry.  In this way, each 
interviewee can tell me their special interests that are well worth documenting.  Almost 
80% of interviewees are in their mid-forties.  They experienced the Cultural Revolution 
and traveled abroad.  They have a high income, good education, and admirable social 
status.  These important questions are on:  (1) their social background and issues 
intrigued them into the ICT business; (2) whether they believe the current information 
revolution is not just a technical revolution, but a social and political revolution; (3) their 
views on economic reform and the role of the middle class; (4) the impact of their 
overseas education or experience; (5) the way they approach political issues; (6) how 
they believe that ICT diffusion is related to politics; and (7) whether they have an impact 
on political development in China.   To do this, I focus on three aspects of their 
characteristics.  1. Creativity—do they have different visions?  Are they vanguards to 
push for new norms, discover new ideas for development, and reinvent politics for civil 
society?   2.  Craftsmanship— what capacity do they possess to strike political deals 
through viable channels, devise strategies to evade state intrusion while at the same time, 
obtain support from both the state and society?  3.  Courage—do they have the bravery to 
enlighten the people in darkness and dare to challenge existing monopolies and 
irrationalities?  Two important aspects of China’s IT leadership need to be highlighted: 
one vision, and the other capability.   In simple words, I want to show what do these 
leaders want to achieve, what can they achieve, and what they cannot achieve.    Thus a 
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first cut is to discern whether there is a complex linkage between modernization and traits 
of these IT leaders.  
The best way to approach this group of people is the immersion into their IT 
culture —how they network and have their communal activities.  As Putnam argues that 
the “immersion sharpens our intuitions and provides innumerable clues about how the 
institution fits together and how it adapts to its environment” (Putnam 1993, 12).  I attend 
their conferences, have workshops, and hold seminars with them to understand the way 
they improve the institutional performance, invigorate civil society, and pressure for state 
responsiveness.   The success for ICT diffusion is not simply a question of using 
imported content or hardware, but an issue to help create an eco-system that can nurture a 
knowledge society culture.  The challenge is for national leaders to foster a new set of 
attitudes, expectations, and values that encourage people to lean toward the creation and 
diffusion of knowledge.  Thus by frequent contacts with them, I gain understanding how 
these IT leaders foster a knowledge culture  that is organic and open-minded within a 
particular structural context.  For example, China’s showpiece Zhongguancun develops a 
special culture nurtured by leadership, institutional commitment, and availability of 
values, attitudes, and behaviors that can support China’s Silicon Valley.  Just as the 
indigenous local cultures of Santa Clara and Cambridge could be manipulated by IT 
leaders to support innovation, diffusion, and local ICT sustainability, the Internet creates 
a local ICT-enabling environment that draws on traditional and modern thoughts.  This is 
a hospitable environment for creating a continuous application of intellectual energy, 
transforming it into knowledge, and distributing it and redistributing it again to more and 
more potential users.  This is the great insight of Manual Castells (1998): the information 
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revolution is a process by which institutions, groups, and individuals interact to redesign 
the production and distribution of ICT services.   These interactions cannot be mandated 
or forced but can be guided and facilitated with vision and leadership.  
To enhance the reliability of my interview contents, I asked different people in the 
ICT sector the same questions to get a differing perspective.  According to Karl Deutsche, 
truth lies at the confluence of independent streams of evidence (Putnam 1993, 12).  Thus 
a wise investigator needs to rely on the diversification of his evidence to magnify his 
strengths.  This diversification has two meanings: one that provides breadth and the other 
depth.  Breadth means to continue to probe new pieces of information, fresh perspectives 
on an old subject, or a newly revealed dimension of an issue.  In this dissertation, I 
attempt to cover individual, social, and temporal dimensions of these IT leaders as 
explicit as possible to probe their social origins, education, economic views, political 
behaviors etc.   Depth implies the deeper analysis and evaluation of their potential impact 
on politics with two or three focused case studies.   Therefore, Chapter 2 is more on the 
width of these IT leader, the beliefs, traits, and behaviors of these IT leaders.  Chapters 3 
to 5 are three case studies tracing the process as they influence China’s ICT diffusion and 
possible political changes via their activities on ICT diffusion at the public, private and 
non-governmental organization level.  
Case Selection and Comparative Methods
I employ both “method of similarity” and “method of difference” research strategies 
to compare cases across various ICT sectors and within each case study.  For method of 
similarity method, I use it in contrasting different IT elites in different social backgrounds, 
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the public, private, and non-governmental organizations in order to find whether 
leadership is the most convincing variable that contributes to ICT diffusion.  For the 
method of difference, I use it in testing which model (autonomous, parasitic, symbiotic, 
negotiating, and amphibious actor model) accounts most for different political outcomes 
of different leaders in similar settings.  This is a method that I hold constant of most 
social background variables in order to locate the variables that differ which might be 
considered key candidates for investigation as causal or explanatory variables (Satori 
1997; Pennings et al. 1999, 203).  
I develop three cases.  The first case concentrates on the role of the IT leaders in the 
public sector—how they strengthen the institutional performance in China.  I look at the 
way they devise strategies to build national information infrastructure and break up China 
Telecom. The focus will be on their active efforts in introducing new norms of national 
information infrastructure and anti-monopoly efforts on competition and pricing policies 
on telecommunications service and regulations.   I compare five important figures, Hu 
Qili of MEI, Liu Cai of MII, Edward Tian of China Netcom, Peng Peng of Railcom, and 
Gao Hongbing of Informatization Office by the method of similarity to find key insights 
over their successes and failures in the ICT reform in China.  Through testing the 
theoretical models, their potential impact on the state will be discovered along a range of 
parameters.  Within this case, a method of similarity is used to find how different 
political outcomes can be achieved even though they are all in the public sector.  Some 
leaders were successful while some were not.  Some achieved in some circumstances, but 
lost their political career.  These are interesting examples for us to test the hypothesis 
whether they can and how much they can impact upon political system. 
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The second case study will be on the leadership in the private sector.  I test the 
political beliefs and behaviors of entrepreneurs in the ISP, software, and e-commerce 
sector.  I will focus especially on three IT entrepreneurs: Jasmine Zhang of Genesis 
Capital, Michael Wan of Net China, and John Wang of 8848.com.  They are successful 
business men and women, but they took different political outlooks and achieved 
different outcomes.  
The third case will be a test on the role of leadership in the non-government 
organizations, specifically the impact of the Internet on human rights and environmental 
issues.  I choose three content providers: Liu Jun of sina.com, Shan Chengbiao of 
people.com, and Zhaxi of Tibetan Antelope Information Center (TAIC).  They make use 
of the Internet to vent their voices over political injustices and environmental degradation.  
But some made big impact while others did not.  Though these cases are only marginal 
for political change, we can still discern their subtle struggle with the state and the 
“ratchet effect” for changes at civil society.  
Limitations of the Study
Nevertheless, there are limitations on my research.  By merely listening to their 
account of visions and self-portrait of their capability to influence the political decision-
making or civil society formation, it is still difficult to evaluate their true impact on 
political change.   But there are many different voices being heard among the political 
elites, and it is hard to determine whether it was the IT leaders’ voice that finally 
predominates.   Thus although my interview followed the pattern from belief, behavior, to 
policy change, the causal mechanism is not easy to establish.  For example, a director at 
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China Railcom complained that the real problem with his company was due to the 
inseparable link between business management and political intrusion.  Although he 
recognizes this as a serious problem of China Railcom, he could not do any thing to 
rectify it.  As we know, later China Railcom detached from the Ministry of Railway in 
mid-2004, but such a decision is unrelated to these beliefs or behaviors of these IT 
leaders.   This is a serious challenge for my dissertation.  
Another shortcoming of the study is that in the search for the correlation between 
leader attributes and outcomes, it is difficult to discern the intervening variables or 
condition variables that influence or constrain those outcomes of leadership.  Even 
though these IT leaders were involved throughout the reform process of ISP market entry, 
their influence over the outcome should not be exaggerated. There are two crucial 
intervening variables—bureaucratic politics and elite rationality that may, for example,
determine the final outcome of the private ISP licenses.   Jasmine Zhang believes that the 
current telecom reform reflects the interest replacement between old bureaucratic 
tycoons and new political aristocracies. Previously Premier Li Peng controlled most 
lifeline industrial sectors such as electric power and telecommunications.  Now President 
Jiang Zemin’s son was behind the scenes of many telecommunications decisions and 
pushed for establishing new competitors such as China Netcom against China Telecom.  
Therefore, the new aristocracy of Jiang naturally replaced Premier Li’s dynasty and 
succeeded in the market initiatives as the ISP sector as Jiang Mianheng was trained in the 
US with a market-oriented mentality.   In addition, their views were acceptable to some 
liberal officials, but were music to the ears of incumbents.  The choice of telecom reform 
may be largely based on elite rationality influenced by structural imperatives of the WTO 
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and other new outlooks as a result of their learning.  Political elites themselves—both the 
old guard and the newly recruited, may or may not undergo a normative transformation.21
  
Chapter 1 defines IT leadership and offers a theoretical framework of study.  
Chapter 2 describes the traits of these leaders by dissecting their beliefs and 
behaviors into five dimensions: autonomous, parasitic, symbiotic, negotiating, and 
amphibious dimensions.  Then it assesses their potential impact on political changes via 
studying their visions and capacities in pushing forward ICT diffusion.  
Chapter 3 is a case study on the role of leadership in the public sector, especially 
their efforts at national information infrastructure building and dismantling monopolies. 
It emphasizes thevisions, craftsmanship, and courage of several IT leaders such as Hu 
Qili, Edward Tian, Peng Peng in designing national information infrastructure and setting 
up the first competitive carrieriers against the monopoly of China Telecom.  Gao 
Hongbing’s experience helps us gain an insider’s view on the process of specific 
decision-making at MII and other senior posts.  It is also an example of political coalition 
built upon achieving common goals of ICT diffusion.  
Chapter 4 is a case study on the private sector--ISP market entry and e-commerce.  
This chapter focuses on private sector efforts for ICT diffusion.  Three IT leaders are 
21
  Conditional variables (contextual variables or moderator variables such as work environment, group 
task or followership characteristics) also influence the effectiveness of leadership.  Independent variables of 
traits do not easily translate from situation to situation.  A leader like Churchill who was decisive, fearless 
and courageous on the battlefield may end up an utter failure in domestic elections.  Jasmine Zhang was 
successful in mobilizing resources to set up the first ISP in China, but was forced to resign from the CEO 
position due to mismanagement.  We are still uncertain why some people are leaders in one situation not 
another.  The situational leadership approach attempts to resolve this.  John Gardner, the founder of 
Common Cause, discovered that the type of leadership for a social movement is often different from the 
leadership needed for military action.  
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emphasized:  Jasmine Zhang of Infohighway, Michael Wan of Net China, and John 
Wang of 8848.com are important examples of how ordinary entrepreneurs approach 
political issues and push for policies like the Digital Signatures Law.  
Chapter 5 looks at content providers (ICPs) and IT advocates in the non-
governmental organizations and discerns their impact on society.  It focuses on Liu Jun, 
Shan Chengbiao and Zhaxi to trace activities by scientists, intellectuals, and NGO groups 
to establish online forums ICPs to express their own opinions and create a “second 
culture” and revitalize civil society.  I also look at state strategies to control these online 
activities.  
Chapter 6 summarizes key findings and insights of China’s IT leaders and 
compare their importance with othere developing countries.  It also integrates the China’s 
IT leaders into a Communist transitions in order to test whether possible changes can start
from the middle level as compared with the top-down or bottom-up revolutions as 
evidenced in the democratic transitions in East-Central Europe. 
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Chapter 2.  The Amphibiousness of China’s IT Leaders:
an Overview of Traits and Behaviors
As politics is “a great and civilizing human activity”, this Chapter addresses the 
autonomous, symbiotic, parasitic and negotiating dimensions of China’s IT leadership 
(Crick 1972).22 It uncovers their upbringing and background, both psychologically and 
sociologically, in order to understand their autonomy of beliefs and behaviors.  Especially, 
the focus is on ways they organize themselves to take advantage of existing structures 
and opportunities to involve themselves in the process of policy making as symbiotic and 
negotiating actors with the state.  In this chapter we also look at how these leaders make 
use of personal ties within the state and exploit a comfortable parasitic relationship with 
the state for favorable deals.  Finally, it discusses their amphibious character as both a 
bridge to link the West with China and as advisors, not challengers, of the regime.  
The Autonomous Dimension : Traits and Beliefs
As a result of change and development in the modern world, society inevitably 
places a premium on new skills and talents.  From this standpoint, China’s IT leadership 
is a heterogeneous and independent group of social elites. First and foremost, timeless 
22
 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan have described the process in which actors press for change as political 
“crafting”, which has three components: the nature of the crafters, that is, the political alliances that 
coalesce for and against change; the process of crafting, namely, the dynamics of contestation and decision 
making among these groups; and the finished craftwork, that is, the rules and institutions that all parties 
come to agree on.  Political actors who grasp economic and political opportunities became crucial for 
changes at a time of transition (Linz and Stepan 1996).
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and universal characteristics of leadership holds true for IT leaders.23 Trait theory, 
represented by Bernard Bass (1997), searches for those traits of good leaders.  Bass 
believes that leaders are superior individuals different from other people because of skills 
and capabilities that came to them through inherited social status or fortune.  In the 1930s 
and 1940s studies were devoted to study those hereditary properties such as height or 
intelligence.  These works tried to study the correlation between leader attributes and 
leadership outcomes.24 Like leaders elsewhere, the stated or implied assumption is that 
leaders may share high educational or social background.  Even the most non-
quantitative, non-behavioral study of politics is likely to stress the importance of some 
social backgrounds facts such as:  the old school tie in the British cabinet; the dominant 
role played in Israeli politics by Central European and Russian emigrants; the 
implications for future Chinese politics of the advanced age of the top leadership; the 
growing influence of technically trained bureaucrats in Communist systems; and the 
Alawite origins of Syrian Baathist leaders.  For virtually every country, some similar 
insight based on social-background facts can be found (Quandt 1970, 181).25
23 The earliest study of leadership may start from Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic theory.  In his book 
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), he highlights the strong emotional attachments 
between leaders and followers.   Ideas are important for leadership and a colorful and forceful presentation 
may even be more helpful.  Thus the leader enjoys prestige and influence because he helps his group to 
reach its goals.   Later after World War II until 1975, trait theory, the behavior approach, and situational 
ethics dominated the research agenda of leadership.   After that, power and influence theories, group 
relations, and constructivist approaches prevail.  
24 Stephen Covey’s popular book Seven Habits of Effective People lists a number of attitudes, traits or goals 
that people should yearn for to become a successful leader.
25 These 50 interviews are balanced into four broad categories.  
1. Public Sector: Liberal officials such as Minister Hu Qili, Liu Cai and other functionaries of regulatory 
state organs, such as the State Information Office, and Moftec; managers of state-owned enterprises such 
Peng Peng of China Railcom;  ups and overs, including Gao Hongbing (China Link), Zhai Jun (China 
RailCom), etc.
2. Private Sector: private entrepreneurs with domestic education, including Jasmine Zhang, Michael Wan, 
John Wang, and other ISPs; overseas Chinese who have overseas education or resources, including Charles 
Zhang, Edward Tian and Zeng, Michael Wan, and Wang Yan.  
3. Academia: natural scientists or university professors at research institutions, including Prof. Qian Hualin 
of CAS, 
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Their autonomous character is derived from their good education and relatively 
high income compared with ordinary Chinese people.  Of the 50 people I have 
interviewed, 52% have a bachelor’s degree, 34% have a master’s degree, and 14% hold a 
Ph. D. or will get one in the year to come.  More than half of them experienced the 
tragedies of the Cultural Revolution.  Their age ranges from 25-45, only 10% are above 
that age group.26  These IT leaders belong to a rising middle class in China in terms of 
income, education, social status, and professional expertise.  In January 2005, the 
National Statistical Bureau publicized its first clear numerical income definition of the 
middle class in China, “60,000 to 500,000 yuan is a standard for the middle income 
family household (three persons per family average)”27.   Scholars like Zhang Wanli 
holds that “middle class” should not be only an economic concept, but involves social 
and political connotations.  According to her view, education and professional standards, 
consumption for more spiritual needs, and impact upon public issues are vital for this 
definition.  Even from this view, we can see these IT leaders belong to an emerging 
middle class that start to impact public affairs.  It is also worthy to note that these IT 
leaders rise to prominence neither because of inherited fortune, like the “Party of the 
Princelings” (Taizidang)—children of senior cadres, nor due to speculation and 
profiteering like “oligarch” tycoons in Russia or “sudden riches” (baofahu) in China.  
4. Content providers and Non-governmental organizations: Liu Jun of sina.com, Shan Chengbiao of 
people.com, and Zhaxi of greenchina.com; media workers, such as Xu Zhiyuan, editor of Economic 
Observer who write regularly on the Internet development; NGO leaders who use the Internet for advocacy 
like Greener Beijing which has not officially registered as an NGO; and NPOs such as China Network 
Information Center (CNNIC), and China E-Commerce Association and China Internet Society.
26 See Appendix I for specific names of interviewees.
27
 This standard is calculated according to the starting point of GDP of global middle-income class (World 
Bank) from $ 3470 to $ 8000.  see Huaxia Times, Jan. 19, 2005, cited from URL: 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2005-01-19/02074875044s.shtml, such calculating method includes the 
conversion from US dollars to RMB, average GDP to average income, and the purchasing parity. The 
report projects that in 2020 the group of the middle class will rise from 5.04% to 45%.  
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Some of these new leaders were even from humble families.28  Most of them base their 
business on providing a more connected and efficient technical and social service to the 
Chinese government or its citizens.   
The upbringings and experiences of these IT leaders are primordial forces that 
shaped their autonomous world outlook, providing a foundation of their independent  
pursuit in the process of ICT diffusion.  Robert Dahl stresses that some factors—exposure, 
prestige, and consistency with previous beliefs and experiences—that help determine 
particular beliefs of particular individuals during a specific time (Dahl 1971, 180).  A 
person is likely to accept a certain idea if the idea has been formulated and diffused to the 
individual’s environment.  Most people acquire their beliefs when they are particularly 
receptive, e.g. youthful socialization.  Whether they would accept an idea depends on 
what are thought to be its achievements.29    An individual will acquire an idea if it is 
consistent with his present beliefs because the culture one is brought up in usually 
provides the conscious and unconscious assumptions against which new beliefs are 
tested.30   The remainder of this section will elaborate on the experiences of IT leaders 
and their education to test the degree of their autonomy in the political realm.  We will 
28 For example, Wang Jiangmin, No. 1 KV (kill-virus) software developer in China was born with polio.  
He could not walk well and his legs suffered another accident again.  But he was courageous enough to try 
to take a bike, climb the mountain, and swim in the sea.  As no company could hire him, he learned to 
assemble radios, wireless receivers and recorders when he was quite young.  
29
 An example is that the American Revolution encouraged Europeans to think that the liberal ideas of the 
Enlightenment were successful.  See R. R. Palmer, 1959. 
30 According to Robert Dahl (1971, 185-186), the chance that an actor will acquire  particular belief during 
a period of receptivity seems to depend on: 
----The amount to which the actor is exposed to the belief, which in turn a). requires that the belief has been 
formulated and diffused to the actor’s environment; and b). depends on the amount of influence that the 
bearers of the belief exert on processes of socialization.
----The relative prestige of the belief, which depends on a). the personal prestige of its advocates and 
antagonists; and b). the successes and failures of the people, organizations, and institutions that symbolize 
the belief. 
----The extent to which the new belief is consistent with the actor’s perceptions of reality as these are 
shaped by a). the actor’s present beliefs; and b). the actor’s experiences.   
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see how their traumatic past, early curiosity, oversees experiences, missionary fervor, 
socialist blending, and political penchant shape their values, beliefs, attitudes, and their 
understanding of their own roles in the Chinese system.  
Traumatic past 
As many of these IT leaders were born in the tumultuous years of the Cultural 
Revolution, many of them cherish an ideal to find new paths for the development of 
China outside the governmental directives.  Their individual understanding and 
independent pursuit of China’s future constitute an important autonomous dimension as 
leaders.  This makes them a bridge between China’s past and future. Most interviewees
were born into middle stratum families neither highly privileged nor greatly 
underprivileged.  Their parents were often professionals, such as physicians, scientists or 
engineers, who tided over the ordeals of the Cultural Revolution.  The Chinese who 
suffered from the Soviet-style plans for rapid development of heavy industry and 
collective communes understand well enough the problems of a planned economy.  The 
1958-1960 Great Leap Forward raised people’s hopes for national transformation through 
rapid industrialization of rural areas.  Despite limited success in small-scale water 
conservancy and irrigation projects, the Leap failed to reach its goals.  It decimated 
China’s forests, experts were ostracized, and uneducated peasants were put at the service 
of utopian projects.  Eager to redress the backwardness brought about by the Cultural 
Revolution, a new fire of aspiration for rejuvenating this nation  was lit after the Gang of 
Four were dethroned.  
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Edward Tian (Suning), Vice President of China Netcom, is a n example of a 
person born in the Cultural Revolution. His first name, Suning (literally “remembering 
Leningrad”), reminds us of the years when his parents first met in Leningrad in 1954 at 
the Forestry Technology Academy.  He let us know a poignant history of his family when 
he was young, which indirectly, directed him to pursue his future career.  It was a time 
when relations deteriorated with the USSR, his parents were assigned to work in desert 
areas of northwest China.  He then lived with his grandmother, a middle school principal.  
Then when the Cultural Revolution hit, his parents were denounced as “cow’s demon and 
snake spirit”.   They were forced to the countryside for “rehabilitation through labor”. At 
the age of five, the Red Guards came to his grandparents’ house to force them to 
surrender their collection of world literature and set them ablaze on a bonfire in the 
courtyard.  Panic-stricken, Tian ran up to a guard and tried to rip a book out of his hands.  
“These are my grandfather’s books,” he yelled, but the guard knocked Edward to the 
ground (Sheff 2002, 25).  “Now, with broadband (networks), nobody will ever be able to 
burn up the network. These changes will make that impossible, I hope..."  It seems that 
the broadband network is a new solution for his own country. 
Overseas experiences 
Overseas education and work experiences constitute another important aspect of 
their autonomy. This generation was encouraged to be educated in the West in order to 
remedy the nation’s brain drain. Giovanni Sartori argues that political change is less 
likely in societies composed of people who have never been exposed to alternatives to 
compare with existing life styles.  “Innumerable people cannot prefer something to 
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something else because they have no 'else' in sight; they simply live with and 
encapsulated within, the human (or inhumane) condition they find” (Sartori 1993, 103). 
These idiosyncratic experiences may play a decisive role.31
Charles Zhang, the CEO of sohu.com, is a “poster child” of globalization.  He is a 
role model for young Chinese who wish to go overseas, return home and accomplish big 
things in China’s tumultuous e-world.  By 1993- 94 Zhang was finishing his dissertation 
in materials sciences at Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Physics Department, and 
in l994 he won a post-doctoral fellowship.  He pushed hard for the Internet in Cambridge 
and at home, but always with (almost) accepting the limits.  He told many people that his 
success lies in his psychological understanding and that his roots are in China.  At that 
time to come back to China was outrageous for many people, but Charles Zhang was 
quite clear on what he was doing.  Similar to Zhang’s zeal to bring the Internet back to 
China, Michael Wan, Wu Jianping (Tsinghua), Qian Tianbai, Qian Hualin (CAS) were 
also well aware of the benefits of the Internet.  “We were so young and full of passion, 
but we did not realize that we have chosen a difficult opportunity and became pioneers”, 
Wan commented.  Edward Zeng names his company “Sparkice”, implying a notion of 
courage against hardships with the enlightenment from the Internet cafes. 
Missionary fervor
Psychologically speaking, the IT leaders have a strong missionary fervor and want 
to help their own country out of backwardness and underdevelopment.    Nevertheless, 
they are autonomous from both governmental ideals and the parochial pursuits of 
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ordinary people. The leaders promote the general idea of the importance of the global 
information revolution to his or her followers – a promotional leadership.32  Some leaders 
stake out a particular position on one or two ICT issues (such as distance education, 
privatization, access, or universal service).  When they returned from abroad they were 
impatient with their country’s slow pace of technological changes.  They recognized that 
China risked being left behind in the information revolution as it was in the industrial 
revolution.  They wish to bring some advanced Western concepts into the Chinese 
practice. Gao Hongbing, former vice director of Informatization Promotion Office of MII 
from 1998, was in charge of designing informatizing strategies, drafting policies and 
regulations, and assessing indices of informatization.   He told me that his trip in 2000 
gave him an everlasting impression over the operations of telecommunications companies 
in the US such as Qwest, Globalcrossing, Level3, Exodus, and Abovenent.  He found that 
these companies had only four-year history, but their market value is very high.  He 
realized that a hierarchical industry has become horizontal and the commercial value is 
created out of it.  For example, AT & T used to do all businesses from transmission 
network, switching networks and applications, but the quality of service was poor.  That 
it now only provides service for the customers by linking the customer with one trunk 
line.  The other branches of the trunk lines are subcontracted to other companies.  Thus it 
intrigued him to set up his own company, ChinaLink, as a data exchange center (IDC).  
This is a clear example that how globalization directly affects commercial models in 
China (Yamin and Mingli 2001, 28).
31 For example, the development of Gandhi’s doctrine of Satyagraha (“truth force”, nonviolent resistance) 
was due to his unique experiences in South Africa an a strike in Ahmedabad in 1918.  See Erick H. 
Erickson, 1969.    
32 This is where vision enters to link the call to arms with broader needs and goals.
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Their views on globalization and the Internet also demonstrate their autonomous 
beliefs. Xie Wen, General Manager of ChinaLabs.com who got his Sociology Ph.D. at 
Columbia University, is an example of an overseas Chinese who attempts to construct a 
new world through his Internet enterprise.   Now General Manager of homeway.com.cn, 
the largest online stock trading company, he said: “Email system began to integrate with 
the world and reconstruct the world outlook of the Chinese people. The Internet brings 
forth a conceptual change. ‘Virtual economy’ and ‘digital divide’ are in President Jiang’s 
speeches”.  He regards overseas Chinese and multinational corporations as the “third 
force” to push the milestone changes of China’s IT industry.  Foreign capitals and 
venture capitals started to influence the Chinese official policies.  Accompanying this, 
foreign concepts come into the Chinese side. These large joint ventures require China to 
open its market and loosen control.  Once, the government had required registration of 
encryption and IBM led the protest against this registration.  As a result the government 
had to cancel this regulation.  These influential multinationals started to exert influences 
to get rid of irrational problems.   At the same time, the Chinese officials are learning the 
new models, new social organizations and rules of games from other countries.  For 
example, they organized several official tours to Bangalore at India to study their 
software industry.  He was quite optimistic that the globalization would have a 
“contagion” effect on the Chinese political system. 
Socialist Blending
In contrast, their political beliefs are more conservative and less autonomous from 
their beliefs on ICT development and future China.  These leaders also are rare blendings 
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between their innovative pursuit of IT business and traditional revolutionary ideals. The 
individual experience also parallels the larger story of the merger of two worlds:  one 
developed over forty years along state socialist principles and one introduced practically 
overnight from the outside.  The experience of this group in the new system provides a 
window into the conflict of a new value system and a deep-seated political culture.  The 
best example of this is Liu Chuanzhi, former president and managing director of Legend 
Group Limited (now renamed Lenovo Group Limited).  The firm was established in 1984 
with funding from CAS, and quickly rose to a domestic monopoly on the Chinese 
character input.  With the CAS name behind it, Legend raised funds in Hong Kong to join 
the international OEM market in 1988.  With more cash inflow from CAS in 1994, 
Legend took a lead in building the e-government infrastructure in China.  When the firm 
started its global Internet strategy in 1999, it chose the ancient city of Xi’an for the 
opening ceremony, indicating its commitment to link even a remote area of China to the 
world (Hughs 2003, 821).
It is not surprising why Liu was promoted to the top office at Legend.  Born in 
1944, he was trained at the Military Telecommunications Academy in Shaanxi Province
in 1961-67.  After his research on military defense in Chengdu for a year, he moved to 
CAS in 1970, after his hard labor at Zhuhai during the Cultural Revolution.  He was later 
stationed in the cadre section of CAS and appointed to the National People’s Congress in 
1998.  In short, Liu and his Legend was cultivated by the state as a showcase of powerful 
Chinese firms to be competitive in a global market after China joins the WTO.  
He sums up a vision of his firm’s development from a small IT enterprise, 
through a national enterprise, to a global flagship corporation.  He also uses militaristic 
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metaphors, such as moving through three stages of “speedboat mode, ship structure, 
flotilla mode” (Hughes 2003, 822).  He stated his “Three Factors of Management”—
organize the troops, fix the strategy, lead the team.  His language is reminiscent of the 
revolutionary slogans imposed upon his generation by decades of political indoctrination.  
Lenin himself would not have blushed at the idea of building a core of
leaders who share common ideals, unite co-operate and possess the strength to 
engage in “struggle”.  Mao might well have recognized the call to “fix the 
strategy” by calling on cadres at all levels to be aware of the general situation, 
consider the long-term, then break down the main objectives into particular tactics 
while always being able to adapt.  Deng Xiaoping would have approved of 
“leading the team” by creating a special culture for the enterprise, consolidating 
the strength of its personnel, creating an atmosphere of professionalism, 
cultivating leaders and establishing a firm base for the future.  He would also have 
approved of Liu’s belief that his thinking is distinct from foreign management 
theory due to its emphasis on collective leadership, consensus building and the 
need to enter into a kind of contract with the firm to prevent the extremes that 
might arise from either individual leadership or factionalism (Hughes 2003, 822).  
Liu envisions his enterprise as flotilla sailing out into the world and constantly 
renewing itself in a competitive global market.  He is constantly seeking a balance 
between hierarchy and leveling in his strategy to build a globally powerful enterprise 
through trial and error.  Especially noteworthy is his efforts to try to establish a workable 
relationship between collectivist ideals and individualism, and to maintain organizational 
continuity through different phases of strategic restructuring.   Liu’s case demonstrates a 
shift of management style, a new relationship between collective and the individual, a 
newly fashioned world outlook and lifestyle in today’s China.  
Political penchant
Even though many IT leaders wish for a more transparent and democratic 
government, they are quite cautious about their personal involvement and collective 
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action because they worry that social disruption would undermine their business interests.  
The interviewees showed a higher degree of political awareness, compared with a high 
degree of political apathy or disinterestedness among ordinary businessmen.  Compared 
with their liberal views of economic reform, they are active and mature in their thinking 
on Chinese political reforms.  They desire formal channels of complaint and 
acknowledge the irrationality of guanxi personal relations , yet recognize its critical 
importance for business.  Generally, they call for a detachment from political interference 
into their economic transactions and decision-making, but are uncertain how this could be 
achieved.  
Following an awareness of closer bonds, some IT leaders nevertheless desire 
political participation.  But their way of participation seems to be fine-tuning 
governmental policies, not directly challenging it.   The newly educated business elites in 
Communist countries, having never experienced political democracy, nonetheless came 
to desire it.  Liu Dong, director of Beijing Internet-Networking Institute and who was 
educated in Japan, told me that in the Chinese tradition, an educated person is supposed 
to do something beneficial to society.  Zhao Wenquan expresses optimistic views 
gradually better-off people would choose freedom.33  But this is based upon a projection 
of an ideal picture, not reflecting the immediate reality.  As Deputy General Manager of 
the Beijing Blue Focus Co. Ltd., a leading IT consulting company, he believes that since 
reform, there has emerging nouveau riches class.  But a real middle class stratum has not 
yet emerged.   He believes that a strong potential of social awareness of these well-off 
33 He is also deeply involved with the Yabao Net, China’s eBay.   Zhao was a political science major from 
Beijing University.  In 1996, he and other people of Yabao Net set up the Beijing Blue Focus Public 
Relations Co. Ltd.   It is a public relations service provider, which provides strategies for IT companies 
such as CISCO, EMS etc.   as well as governmental relations.
66
people may be translated into concrete participation in political actions partly because 
this is a group of rich people who do not really enjoy all the privileges their wealth may 
bring.  And there are also two important reasons for them to participate in politics—one 
is the Confucian tradition to encourage successful people to go to politics and the other is 
that the Party is adapting itself to changing demands of the people
There is a Confucian tradition for people to go to politics.  According to an old 
Confucian proverb-- “a person who is good at studies should participate in politics”, more 
and more business and social elites are recruited into the Communist Party, thus 
gradually changing the legitimacy of the Communist Party.  Since Jiang’s theory of 
“Three Represents”, the Communist Party has become a party with all kinds of people.  
The Party has a corporatist strategy to set up institutional links between state and the IT 
entrepreneurs.  
In contrast to the Western emphasis on individual freedom and rights, they stress 
political stability and viable institutions with stories from the specific Chinese historic 
and cultural background.  One interviewee remarks the feasibility of Chinese democracy 
through existing frameworks: 
Some American friends told me that the Communist institutions might be 
dismissed as tools of an authoritarian system, institutions that in practice may be 
cynically manipulated to serve the purposes of the state.  But China appears to be 
an authoritarian system that is democratizing, and these institutions could well 
form the framework of a democratic system if the processes and practices of these 
institutions continue to develop along some of their present trajectories.  We have, 
in fact, already evolved to a point where we are far more democratic than at any 
time in Chinese history.  The government has come to tolerate and even 
encourage far more criticism through “official channels”, such as the “walk and 
visit” system, direct elections at the village and street level, surveys of people’s 
concerns, public opinion polls, official complaint bureaus, letters to the editors, 
wider media coverage of the miseries of the lower strata of society, and 
discussions in work unit meetings.  34
34
 Interview by the author in Beijing on December 20, 2002.
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In this regard, they are not naïve enough to transplant Western democracy to 
China. 
Summarizing the findings, these leaders have fresh and autonomous ideas on 
future China’s development.  They cherish a revolutionary zeal to make China catch up 
with advanced countries in the world.  But politically speaking, they are still conservative 
in pushing forward political changes.  They are not, and do not intend to be, harbingers of 
political development in China.  They are optimistic that with the introduction of the 
information revolution, the current regime will be more transparent in its decision-
making and responsive to both global pressures of marketization and domestic demands.  
Yet they are quite cautious of possible turmoil that might entail their loss of business and 
create labor unrest.  In addition, some of these IT leaders, like Liu Chuanzhi, were 
reminiscent of the collective rulership under Mao.  Therefore, they feel comfortable with 
the current regime even though they believe this political regime needs reform.  
Therefore, their autonomous beliefs do not necessarily translate into concrete political 
behaviors.   The following part will further elaborate on their personal ties with the state 
which create dynamic changes in the ICT reform without breaking the stasis of the 
hierarchical state-society relationship.   
The Symbiotic Dimension:  IT Leaders as Bridges
These IT leaders became important bridges to help the Chinese government  
promote informatization through their skills, attitudes, knowledge, experiences, and 
ethics fitting together in a mutually reinforcing “package” (Wilson 2004b, 860).  These 
leaders believe that the Internet can transform the Chinese economy toward greater 
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efficiency, bolster its national security and simultaneously shore up the administration of 
the country, through a process termed “informatization” (Lovelock 1996).35 Their 
symbiosis with the state lies  in the normative perspective—the process they introduce 
new concepts to political elites and formulate new rules for the IT re-regulation.  They 
realize the importance of state building in China.   These leaders try to persuade the 
Chinese officials that high-tech and science, especially information technology such as 
the Internet, will lead China through prosperity and make China a strong power in the 
global economy. Peter Lovelock argues that the Internet became an essential component 
of the Chinese government’s efforts to use information technology to decentralize 
decision making while continuing to control it centrally (Lovelock 1999, 19- 35). In a 
March 2000 speech the Chinese President Jiang Zemin said, “Internet technology is 
going to change the international situation, military combat, production, culture, and 
economic aspects of our daily life significantly” (Lovelock 2000).  The Chinese leaders 
seem to agree that, “for better or worse, Internet capability among nations has become a 
key element in calculations of political power, diplomatic power, and economic 
competitiveness” (Franda 2002, 4).
Active Lobbying 
An important aspect of this symbiosis is to introduce this technology to the 
government for stronger national administration.  For example, Wang Donglin, Chairman 
and President of the Beijing Scholar Corporation, contracted with the government on the 
35 From the infrastructure power, the Internet is deemed by the Chinese leaders to promote the 
administrative efficiency as well as check the counter-centralization local forces by streamlining 
management  (i.e. Golden Projects) and providing  prompt and adequate information for the Central 
government.  
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infrastructure of the e-government and helped them devised feasible strategies through 
direct business relationship.  Wang is also Deputy Board Chairman of the Beijing 
Zhongguancun IT Association, General Panel of Standard E-State affair.  On the one 
hand, he is an active contractor with the state on e-government, and on the other hand, he 
is willing to contribute to the building of a strong network of IT entrepreneurs of 
Zhongguancun.  Ultimately, IT leaders use active lobbying and form coalitions to 
influence state policies.  
These leaders make numerous attempts to try to persuade political elites to accept 
basic concepts of ICT reform— from monopoly to competition, from centralization to 
decentralization, from public ownership to private ownership, and from domestic 
operation to foreign ownership— to became accepted and ingrained in the mind of the 
Chinese political elites and ordinary people (Wilson 1998).  The role of active political 
lobbying by these IT leaders is also exemplified in David Sheff’s book China Dawn
describing how Edward Tian persuaded Premier Zhu Rongji to adopt policies in favor of 
the IT entrepreneurs.   He demonstrated a live videoconference, showed a sample of real-
time IP-based television piped over the CNC network, and explained the limitless 
potential of bandwidth in Hangzhou. 
Premier, the difference is that China was behind the rest of the world when electricity 
was brought into the country, and we were slow to adapt and accept the technology.  In 
fact, many of our people never took full advantage of it and the entire country suffered.  
But sir, we now have a chance to advance the dream of your generation.  This time we 
are as advanced as any nation in the world.  China no longer needs to follow, but can 
lead.  This technology can transform the lives of our people.  It can help to educate our 
people.  It can bring opportunities for their lives.  Please help us.  Together we can 
achieve the realization of our broadband dream (Sheff 2002, 268).
Zhu was quiet, intently listening, signaling that Edward should continue, “Premier 
Zhu,” he says, “You can help this dream become realized in China by clearing the way 
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for three things to happen.”  First, he asked Zhu to reform the regulatory environment.  
Second, he asked the premier to approve a license for CNC to be able to offer local 
access for broadband so that neither provincial nor local governments nor China Telecom 
can block the progress.  Finally, he requested permission to send multimedia information 
over the CNC network—that is, permission for CNC to enter the content business, which 
is currently restricted.    
Zhu stands, too.  He seems moved.  Approaching Edward, Zhu said, “I am very 
impressed by your work here.  You have very good technology and assembled an 
impressive management team.  I know that your work is very important for China, and I 
will do what I can to help you.  I understand that you need changes in the regulatory 
environment.  We want to make these changes so that you can continue your work.  We 
are getting rid of the government’s strangling influence on commercial ventures, but we 
are not doing it fast enough.”  He looked around and back to Edward.  “I think we can do 
what you need.”  The premier extended his hand.  “Thank you, I wish I could stay longer.  
I hope we have the opportunity to meet again soon” (Sheff 2002, 268-9).
Coalition Formation
  These IT leaders forged networks and coalitions by themselves. Coalitions are 
groups of people who join together to achieve a particular purpose, usually a political one. 
The big bang of external forces and small bang involving internal actors have important 
consequences for the rapid diffusion of the Internet in China.  There is closer and closer 
cooperation between the public, private, research and NGO leaders.  They convince 
political leaders and social actors to obtain and deploy valuable material and human 
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resources that support legal, regulatory, organizational and other changes necessary for 
diffusing the information technology (Wilson 2004b, 859). Like Ghana, Brazil, India, the 
U.S. and other countries, they managed to work well across different institutions.  They
seek allies to push forward the liberal diffusionist agenda.  In Brazil in the mid- to late-
1990s, a small group of innovators actually called themselves the “gang of four” (Wilson 
2004a).  Their social network helped them design an array of policy innovations in the IT 
sector in Brazil, working across university, think tank, private and government 
institutions for two decades. In China, they are quite aware of this kind of communication, 
“goutong” (to use Ms. Yan Baoping’s word, Director of CAS’s Network Information 
Center).  
In the introductory phase of the Internet we witnessed a close cooperation 
between academia and government.  In the anti-monopoly phase, a lot more activities are 
found between “insiders” in the government and “outsiders” in business circles.   During 
the competitive phase, IT entrepreneurs are more mature in pushing forward institutions 
and rules for regulations together with skilled liberal officials.  Finally, in the 
consolidation stage, civil society organizations and NGO groups start to make the 
Internet an important platform for online communities and work out solutions for the 
“digital divide”.  
In the introductory phase, we find the symbiosis between  academia and
government.  The early Internet networks were constructed by people who were 
technically trained and occupied overlapping professions in different institutions, thus the 
consensus on the list of the top three innovators was remarkably consistent.  They were 
built among scientists and researchers such as Prof. Qian Tianbai, Dr. Hu Qiheng, and 
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Prof. Qian Hualin for the interconnection of the Internet within China and with the rest of 
the world.   Individuals in the Information Network Center of the Chinese Academy of 
Science link with universities like Beijing University and Tsinghua University, special 
high-level bodies like the State Informatization Office, and international groups like the 
World Bank and US National Science Foundation.   These early leaders introduced the 
Internet and rudimentary concepts of interconnection to help people to tap into the
tremendous opportunities of the Internet for the country.  On September 20, 1987, Prof. 
Qian Tianbai sent the first email from China “across the Great Wall and communicated 
with the world”, and so began the Chinese Internet diffusion.  At that time, Prof. Qian 
was head of the Chinese Academic Network (CANET), the first computer network in the 
country, and Prof. Qian is almost universally viewed as the “Father of the Internet” in 
China.36   Then, with the support of Dr. Hu Qiheng, this initial academic enthusiasm 
spread from researchers gradually into government circles. 
  In November 1989, the Demonstration Network for Education and Scientific 
Research in Zhongguancun Area (NCFC, named by the World Bank) was formally 
launched in November 1989.  NCFC is a high-tech information infrastructure project of 
the “Key Subject Development Project” of the World Bank, and supported by the State 
Development Planning Commission, CAS, the National Natural Science Funds and the 
State Development Planning Commission. The project was charged by CAS, and was 
jointly implemented by Peking University and Tsinghua University.  The chief goal of 
the project was to consummate the construction of the NCFC backbone network and the 
college networks through technical cooperation with Peking University, Tsinghua 
University and CAS.
36
 http://www.cnnic.net.cn/internet.shtml
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Later on November 28, 1990, Professor Qian Tianbai formally registered .CN -
the country code top-level domain (ccTLD) of China in Stanford Research Institute’s 
Network Information Center (SRI-NIC), and initiated the international e-mail services 
under .CN. From that day on, China obtained its own identity on the Internet. In June 
1993, experts at NCFC reiterated China's requests for being connected to the Internet at 
the '93 INET Conference, and discussed such issue with the global Internet communities. 
After the meeting, researcher Qian Hualin attended the CCIRN (Coordinating Committee 
for Intercontinental Research Networking) Meeting, and won the support of majority 
participants in favor of bringing the Internet connection to China. The conference gave a 
great boost to China's connection to the Internet (Appendix II).  In the mean time, the 
government also sent out delegations or envoys to the United States to understand the 
impact of the Internet.  Wang Daohan, the mentor of ex-President Jiang Zemin, entrusted 
Shen Jian to conduct a thorough survey on the information technology and American 
society.  Shen Jian invited Gao Hongbing, an official at the Office for the Promoting 
Informatization, to visit the US and wrote a report to the senior leaders.  
That article had three parts: The Sino-US Comparison of the Information 
Revolution, National Security under the Information Revolution, and the Government 
Strategies of the Information Revolution.  He claimed that, “the industrial economy is 
changing into [a] digital economy.”  He argues that 
In international relations and international politics, during the transition from a 
bipolar world to a multi-polar world, information revolution will influence 
comprehensive national strength, national security, and the combat capability of 
national defense and the military.  The democratic values of the globe will be 
spread at an accelerated pace (Shen and Gao 2001)
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They also warn that the Chinese economic structure and social system is under the 
commercial model of industrialization, and is unable to cope with the impact of 
informatization.  These were encouraging news that China must catch up with the 
information revolution in order to be advanced to a good society.  When they returned to 
Shanghai and deliver the report to Wang Daohan, he greatly appreciated it and sent to the 
Jiang Zemin, the President37
In the commercial phase, the cross-sectoral symbiosis encompassing the 
government officials, private entrepreneurs, NGO leaders, and researchers are vital for 
the ICT diffusion.  These fluid networks intersect with the more long-standing 
institutions in a variety of formal and informal ways.  In China, the initial networks were 
relatively small.  These people got to know one another when searching for advice on 
technical matters or attending promotional events.  But they are always the work of both 
insiders and outsiders (those inside the government or outside the government).  
“Insiders” such as Minister Hu Qili (MEI) became known as bull dogs that aggressively 
pushed for competition and diversification. 
Hu Qili was a powerful and prestigious member at the politburo before 1989 and 
a strong ally with pro-reform Party Secretary-General Zhao Ziyang. Many people in the 
ICT circle call him the “first reformer of the Chinese telecommunications sector.”  From 
1982 to 1987, he was director of General Office, a member of the Secretariat and a 
member of the Political Bureau of CPC Central Committees. Then he became a powerful 
member at the Standing Committee member of the Political Bureau as well as Secretariat 
member of the CPC Central Committee in two years. When he was made the Minister of 
MEI, He successfully pushed the themes such as “informatization takes the lead on 
37 See detailed case study in Chapter 3.
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China’s industrialization”.  He organized experts, especially He Feichang, Director of 
Telecommunications and System Equipment at MEI, to study the phenomenon of China’s 
telecommunications network.  This group found that the 1.2 billion Chinese have a total 
number of telephones equal to that of Tokyo.  In some places, the installation fee is as 
high as 6000 yuan (800 usd), thirty times that of New York City.  The 
telecommunications service is poor and supply can hardly meet demands.  He proposed 
several changes to senior Chinese leaders.  First of all, there were already several mature 
telecommunications networks for railways, electric power, and military.  The 
telecommunications capacity even exceeds the networks from China Telecom.  Once 
these networks are adjusted, at least one quarter of these capacities can be transformed 
for civilian use.  However, the civil telecommunications are monopolized for years and 
the public special lines cannot be excluded from civilian use.  This is great waste of 
resources.  Second, through their investigations of more than eighty manufacturers over 
eight provinces and cities, they heard that without a competitive environment and equal 
treatment, the national manufacturing industries had no hope because their life lines are 
controlled by China Telecom.  Third, even though there is a huge market for 
telecommunications equipment, the domestic equipment only accounts for 30% of 
consumption.  China’s development and manufacturing capability lags behind developed 
countries for at least fifteen and twenty years.  Much of the key equipment has totally 
different standards, causing a lot of confusion in the domestic market, even jeopardizing 
national security.  Thus the Party committee of former Ministry of Machinery and 
Electronics entrusted Zeng Peiyan and Hu Qili to break the monopoly of China 
Telecom.38
38 This is a “structural leadership” which seeks to redefine the rules of economic structures to make 
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At the same time, “outsiders” such as Edward Zeng help train the people from 
MII, officials start to learn about the Internet.  He set up the first internet café, and later 
came the first physical framework , oicq (instant messages), email and first IP service 
provider.  From then on, there emerged a macro platform for visions of a connected and 
developed China.  These networks reflect the incentives for individuals encapsulated in 
their particular institutions to break out from their organization and cooperate across them 
to form mutually supportive networks.   
The anti-monopoly phase, was a fluctuating mix of top down and bottom up 
initiatives. A greater influx of entrepreneurs, scholars, and liberal officials started to 
devise strategies to destroy the monopoly of China Telecom.  Thus during this anti-
monopoly stage, we see “Quad” cooperation work well, first between businessmen and 
governmental officials, then move to governmental officials and academic scholars.  
Economic and telecommunications experts wrote directly to President Jiang Zemin to 
open the telecommunications market and introduce competitive mechanisms in the 
telecommunications sector.  These scholars include Ma Bing (senior consultant of the 
Development Center of the State Council), Zhang Xun (Professor, Shanghai Jiaotong 
University, senior commissioner of CAS), Feng Zhongxun (Professor, Tsinghua 
University), Zhang Fuliang (President, Chinese Academy of Electronic Design), and Lai 
Guozhu (Secretariat, China Society for Electronics, Telecommunications Branch).  Later 
even municipal government officials such as Guangdong, Shandong, Jiangsu, Liaoning,
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, People’s Bank of China, Daqing Oil Fields, and China 
International Trust and Investment Bank (CITIC) offered explicit support for breaking 
information infrastructure fit current national needs.  Such rules include whether ICT ownership will be a 
public or private monopoly or even in an open market.
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the monopoly.  During the same month (September 1993), Hu Qili directly reported to
Premier Li Peng in order to alleviate the worries about China Unicom as a “Pandora’s 
Box”.  On December 14, 1993, the State Council formally approved establishing China 
Unicom to break the monopoly of China Telecom in the form of State Decree No. 178 (a 
lucky number that sounds like “all get big fortune”).  Thus China Unicom became an 
independently operated limited liability company that can operate long distance telephone 
lines, wireless, and value-added services.  The preparatory committee of China Unicom 
composed three vice ministers: Lu Xinkui (MEI), Lu Yanchang (Ministry of Electric 
Power), and Guo Lin (Ministry of Railways).  
In the competitive phase, these coalitions also promoted the institutional 
performance of the state.  At the same time, the relationships among leaders become
denser and contacts more frequent.  People understood the ICT issues from grander 
national strategies rather than narrow departmental interests.   The first example is that 
some leaders helped bring about a revitalized State Informatization Office in 2001.
According to Jiang Qiping, chief editor of the Internet Weekly, many people opposed the 
downgrade of the State Informatization Office into the MII in 1998.  From a state level 
sector to a department under a ministry, there is a fall of seven hierarchical levels.   Song 
Ling was a leader of this group.  She argued against Minister Wu openly and bypassed 
his approval by writing directly to the Premier Zhu in the name of a Party member.  Then 
many other people raised this issue to Premier Wen Jiabao.  But according to Premier 
Wen Jiabao’s note:  “The Ministry of Information Industries may not be able to shoulder 
the task.”  As a result, the Chinese government realized the importance of information 
technology not solely as an industry, but as a key instrument to restructure national 
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economy and streamline effective governance.  On August 23, 2001, the State 
Informatization Leading Group was reestablished.  Premier Zhu Rongji chaired the 
group.39
  They also helped institutionalize principles of “competition and 
decentralization”, buzzwords in the Chinese telecommunications sector.  A major 
achievement of their cooperation is the establishment of new competitors such as China 
Netcom against the monopoly of China Telecom.  With his success at AsiaInfo in 1993 as 
a system integration and Internet software company, Edward Tian gradually gained the 
trust of the Chinese government. When he was back in China in 1995, he helped the 
government construct the over 100 major networks, which became the backbone for the 
modern networks of China.  Later, he was entrusted by the Chinese government to set up 
China NetCom, whose major shareholders are the Ministry of Railways and the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences.  This company gained momentum with the support of Jiang 
Mianheng, the son of ex-president Jiang Zemin.  With many young talents inside and 
outside the company, Tian successfully helped bring about the breakup of China Telecom.  
During the consolidation phase, they form horizontal ties among interested groups 
of people from public, private, academia, and NGO groups.  Non-governmental 
organizations step into the vacuum of emerging issues where the government has no 
control, or weak regulation, like human rights and environmental issues.  They branch out 
to link the Internet systematically with the current economic environment, seek political 
transparency and support, attempt to change rules, and crave for a knowledge society. 
Sometimes they created forums of like-minded people; the founding of China Internet 
39
 Personal communications with Song Ling on February 5, 2004 in Wanshoulu of Beijing.  
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Society is an indicator of group cooperation.40  Some journals formed close-knit networks 
of advocates, some of whom came together to create a new publication that would serve 
the community.  Individuals were socially aware of each other, met occasionally on IT 
conferences, but did not create an autonomous separate group outside their institutional 
homes.  These are the people who were similarly situated in a variety of institutions and 
networks, who held common values, pursued common goals, used similar strategies, and 
acted in parallel ways to achieve their goals. 
Some IT leaders work their way up through revolving doors—sometime they 
work at academia and later they become officials.   It is commonplace to see these leaders 
shift from one position to another, e.g. Gang of Four in Brazil.  Ivan Moura Campos 
moved from National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) 
over to the federal Ministry of S &T, and Eduardo da Costa shifted from Softex to CNPq 
(or more accurately held both portfolios simultaneously) (Wilson 2004a, 137).  In China, 
Ouyang Wu quitted his job at CASS and went to work for the State Informatization 
Office, and Jiang Qiping abandoned his role as an official at MII and went to work at 
CASS with Dr. Wang Xiangdong. They also publish independent works and books on 
the ICT diffusion and China’s “New Economy” to enlighten people. Wang Xiangdong 
was also collaborating with Jasmine Zhang writing about the emerging “new economy” 
in China, a cooperation between an entrepreneur and a scholar.  According to the “Report 
on China’s ‘New Economy’”, promulgated by Genesis Capital Co., Ltd., and co-authored 
by Zhang Shuxin and Wang Xiangdong, they define the “New Economy” at the Internet 
40
 On May 25, 2001, the Internet Society of China (ISC) was founded with the approval of the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs. It was established under the direction of the Ministry of Information Industry (MII), and was 
formed by over 70 relevant organizations, including domestic ISPs, ICPs, facility manufacturers, system 
integration business, academies and educational institutions.
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era as “an economic entity that is under the background of information revolution and 
economic globalization, characterized by the development and application of the Internet 
and its related industries (e.g. e-commerce), depended on knowledge and talents, with its 
goal to improve the operating efficiency of macro and micro economy” (Wang 2003, 
422).     
  During this period, we witness a close symbiosis between the state and these IT 
leaders.  As the Chinese government crosses the river of reform by groping for the stones, 
it is wondering who can provide the “stones”.  These IT leaders are willing to be partners 
of the state, promoting regime goals of economic growth and political stability, but first 
they have to undermine conservative norms.  They make use of guanxi to erode the hard-
line ideology to achieve four balances. The Chinese government depends upon the IT 
leaders to provide it with clues for reform and modernization.  Through cooperation, IT 
leaders gradually gained legitimacy within the government and have their voices heard 
and accepted by the political elites. 
The Negotiating Dimension:  A Constructive Process
These IT entrepreneurs and advocates have their own visions and capacities, but 
they cannot operate in a vacuum.  Elite acceptance is key to a successful national IT 
policy.  Thus, the approach for most political elites is to first rely on their traditional way 
of understanding—a method for national interest or economic calculation, e.g. to 
strengthen China through technological innovation.  This is the first push for them to 
welcome the ICT diffusion in China.  The Chinese leaders instrumentally believe that the 
Internet can advance their centralized control and the power of Chinese communists.   
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This is because a lack of information is the one of the central problems for the central 
government.    Learning became vital for people to understand the full potential of this 
new technology. As ex-Premier Zhao Ziyang stated in 1983, "The new technological 
revolution or information revolution… may help China skip over some of the stages 
which have been experienced by other developing countries” (Hamrin 1990, 213).  
Chinese leaders gradually came to view IT as part of the necessary phases of political and 
economic development.41  Then while they open their mind to a variety of expert advice, 
they are engaged in constant communicative understandings of China and the World.  
And the last phase becomes a natural process of the internalization of international norms 
of ICT diffusion and institutionalization for competition and decentralization in the ICT 
sector.  This is a socialization and construction process, but once initiated, there is a 
“ratchet effect”—once liberal norms of competition, decentralization, and privatization
entered into the dialogue of political elites, they gradually changed people’s penchant and 
choices, and liberal practices will move forward, never coming back.  
These IT leaders attempt to elevate academic or business interests to a national 
strategic restructuring level.  They function like think tanks, sitting uneasily halfway 
between government and civil society.  They can also articulate the instincts of dissidents 
in the language of the academy, and suggest ideas that bridge the gap between instincts 
41 One example of how they change the instrumental calculations of the Chinese policy makers is through 
the installation fee.  The pretext for China Telecom’s high installation fee (around 800 USD in Beijing) was 
that such amount was used to reinvest in the telecommunications business.  Therefore, China Telecom 
claimed it did not put the money into its own pocket.  Jiang Qiping told me that one IT expert told Premier 
Zhu the way to rebut Minister Wu’s claim to use the revenue from installation for investment in the 
telephone service doesn’t make sense.  Premier Zhu Rongji cleverly told Minister Wu, “Since you used the 
money to return to the state, thus you know there was flood in China, why not use the installation fee to 
help those afflicted by the flood”.  The reason is that since everyone talks about national interests, there 
should not be any departmental interests.   Thus Minister Wu had to back down from charging the 
exorbitantly high price of installation fee (interview on April 12, 2004 in Beijing by author, and this story 
cannot be verified).   
82
for reform and policy.  Thus during this period, leadership is essential to appeal to others 
to convince them to follow a route to a particular set of goals.42
As in the case that eight private or foreign invested ISPs were licensed in 1995, 
these policy initiatives represent a trying period of cohabitation as a response to 
uncertainty.    In the face of the Internet challenge, political elites, the MPT, China 
Telecom and the ISP entrepreneurs all engaged in a learning process to understand policy 
and legal issues raised by the Internet.  The interactions between ISP entrepreneurs such 
as Jasmine Zhang, Michael Wan, Charles Zhang  and government officials, the Vice 
Premier Zou Jiahua and the state in general, was a social learning process in which both 
sides participated.  Through face-to-face dialogues, they were engaging in learning 
collectively about "what to do."  The seminars, symposia and meetings provided forums 
for exchange of information and opinions, precedent -seeking and initiation of new policy 
ideas.  The ISP's direct bottom-up policy activities to reduce leased line charges led to the 
institutionalization of public pricing hearings.  It significantly broke up China Telecom's 
monopoly over the long distance service.  
 These IT leaders gradually helped bureaucrats of MPT (MII) realize that open 
markets were necessary and inevitable.  Thus they made ISPs' market entry possible.  In 
addition, frequent overseas tours by these officials provided first hand opportunities for 
gaining insight of the practices in advanced countries.  These advanced countries serve 
like “role models” for the anti-monopoly initiatives in China.  Under these circumstances, 
policy-making was more of a social learning process.    During ISP licensing, the 
bureaucrats of the Beijing Telegraph Bureau exercised discretion to issue licenses to eight 
ISPs that had direct foreign investment.  Except their personal passion for the Internet 
42 Personal charisma contributes to their persuasive power to achieve their goals.
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development, the new environment also contributed to this courageous and unusual 
discretion.  In this new environment, a market-oriented approach became a dominant 
concept.  However, they were aware of evolving policies as a natural and understandable 
response to the new environment.  
Finally these government officials internalized the norms of competition and 
made an epoch-making policy that allowed the first generation of ISPs to enter the market 
was MPT's open market notice issued on September 14, 1993.  It was the first attempt of 
China’s effort to open the MPT monopolized telecommunications market to non-MPT 
entities.  In September, the MPT opened nine telecommunications service markets to 
non-MPT enterprises, including radio paging, 800 MHz radio dispatch, 450 MHz radio 
wireless, VSAT (very small aperture terminal, a satellite technology), electronic data 
exchange, e-mails, videotex, telephone information, and computer information service
(Cao and Liu, 2170).   The notice established two regulatory methods: licensing and tariff 
filing, and two categories of services: telephony service and information service.  This 
telephone/information service model was after the basic/enhanced service model initiated 
in the U.S. in the 1970s.  This is the first attempt of IT leaders to persuade the state 
officials to accept private participants in the ICT sector.  
The Parasitic Dimension: Patron-Clientelism and State Corporatism
Like other developing countries, the politics of ICT in China used to be the 
politics of patronage.  It meant knowing senior people at the relevant ministry, relying on 
friends at the state-owned telecommunications company, and earning political patronage 
at the local branch office.  Therefore, patron-clientelist or corporatist ties are important in 
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Chinese political culture.  The state devise networked control over interest groups and 
society, and at the same time, members of these groups receive benefits for their loyalty 
by having greater ability to get their voice heard at the top level or decision-making 
process.  However, their ties are not so strong as in the Western sense of patronage.43
Even though there are associations like the China Internet Society and China E-
commerce Associations, these associations are still heavily controlled by the state, not 
only their personnel but their budget as well.  These associations sometimes help study 
and implement state policies.  Such representative organizations serve a function for the 
regime by pre-empting the emergence of autonomous organizations.  They do not really 
play an intermediary function between these IT leaders and the state.  
In contrast to the totalitarian image of the Party, there are positive incentives 
offered by the state for compliance with its policies.  This view is expressed by Andrew 
Walder’s term “Communist neo-traditionalism” ---  “the notion that, from the 
establishment of a Communist regime, political loyalty is rewarded systematically with 
career opportunities, special distributions, and other favors in communist societies are 
uniquely able to dispense” (Walder 1986, 6).  Thus this is a clientelist system in which 
public loyalty to the party and its ideology is mingled with personal loyalty to the party 
branch officials and their clients.  There are many cases were the IT elites seek favor 
from the governmental officials.  They depend on the state to provide them with 
43 Bingshu from HiChina Web Solutions Ltd.,, argues that the reason that clientelism prevails is that, , 
China’s IT entrepreneurs have not accumulated enough wealth to have direct and independent political 
impact through formal channels.  Most of the fortunes and revenues are still from traditional Chinese 
industries.   For example, PCauto Automobile Service Corporation (yuefu) hires thousands of employees 
while HiChina has only 200 employees.  There is a huge gap of fortune. Therefore, wealth still 
predetermines the influence of the China’s IT leadership.   HiChina Web Solutions (Beijing) Limited 
("HiChina"), formerly known as Civilink International Information Technology Co Ltd. (Beijing), is the 
leading web hosting and domain name services provider in China, having registered over 600,000 domain 
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favorable projects or support.  For example, Wang Donglin sought favorable contracts 
with the state for e-government projects.   He also voiced the frustration with the growing 
business elites.  But politically speaking, they are fragile.44  The real problem for the 
Chinese middle class is that there is no growing platform for the exercise of group power.  
Without an organized power, they cannot be an effective force to challenge the despotic 
power of the state.  
Though many believe that a rational and legal institution is vital for China’s 
future, guanxi is still vital for their daily business.  Guanxi is essential to get through their 
career, from getting a license or renting a house, to get governmental orders and all sorts 
of business transactions.  To understand the critical importance of developing guanxi
through doing favors, giving gifts, and cultivating backdoor, one would have to 
experience frustrations of bureaucratic “red tapes” that entail collecting countless stamps 
or documents, standing in line waiting for yet another approval, only to hear that it is “not 
convenient” to deal with the issue at the moment or, more simply, that “I have to report it 
to the senior leaders for approval.”   One IT entrepreneur expresses this: 
You have to constantly invite those leaders from MII or Ministry of Railways to 
dinner, to overseas and domestic field investigations, and to travel and visit the 
Western companies.   Sometimes you have to pay their children to go abroad to 
study.  Even sometimes you have to give equipments to these ministries for free 
trial to gain their confidence in your product in the hope they would buy them in 
the future and regard you as a reliable partner.  Who knows how much guanxi
would cost, but that is for the sake of business.45
names and currently hosting one fourth of all the web sites in China (interviews by author on August 2, 
2004).
44
 There are many examples that business elites are put in jail once they touch the “thin red line” of the 
regime control.  Yang Bing, a realtor who developed “Dutch Village” in northeast China, was sentenced to 
jail and he shouted at the court “It is a political conspiracy.” However, he believes he can become the future 
Chinese president, just as Nelson Mandela Yang Rong, CEO of Huacheng Automobile Inc., was forced into 
exile.
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The Amphibious Dimension:  the Non-critical Nature
These IT leaders’ amphibiousness stems from their work in both the state 
infrastructure and civil society.  Actually, this word has connotes their dual character of 
being caught between a desire for a transparent and liberal political regime and a 
pragmatic dependence on supportive personal ties in the government to serve their self-
interest.    However, these two meanings are intertwined with each other.  
This suggests their dual character – improving the infrastructural power of the 
state while they simultaneously help the community via the Internet.  Some of them 
quietly encourage civic engagement, but this is at best a subtle challenge against the 
despotic power of the state.  They help encourage online communities to vent their pent-
up anger against the monopoly of the Communist Party.  For the sake of their business 
interests, they dare not directly challenge the state power.  Thus they belong to the “non-
critical realm” of Chinese politics because they dare not directly pressure the government 
to encourage public involvement in the selection of political leaders and accountability 
over state policies and actions.   
They desire a transparent and responsive political regime but also a dependence 
on this hierarchical system of personal ties to serve their own self-interest. This finding is 
in tune with the historical role of the Chinese business elites.  The essence of the 
merchant-state relations pattern was “neither wholly autonomous nor state-dominated but 
instead sat, Janus-like, between state and society, and at times even blended socially with 
the official class and carried out “public” (gong) works” (Pearson 1997, 44). According 
to Duan Yongchao, a chief editor of China Computer Users affiliated to CIID Consulting 
Group, many people in IT (especially the run-of-the mill IT elites) are much more 
45
 Personal communication in Beijing on July 20, 2004 by author. 
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interested in selling their equipments instead of concerning themselves with the public 
interest.  There are many conferences each year held by MII, but those entrepreneurs are 
much more interested in promoting their own image as an economic entity.  Duan told me, 
“There is no leadership in its true sense in China.  China is still centered on feudal system 
of governance (hierarchy or guanbenwei).”  In his view, everyone has to obey 
Communist fiats or orders to avoid risks.  Their interest is the market shares of their 
telecom products.  
Edward Zeng (Qiang), CEO of the Sparkice (ISP), is an example of this 
amphibiousness. His effort to push forward the state acceptance of the Internet café and 
e-commerce is also tangled with his motive for show-biz to attract business.  Thus his 
initial contribution for political transparency and state responsiveness ended up with 
political shows for his self-image and business interests. Like other IT elites, Zeng gained 
his reputation as a successful bridge to introduce Western concepts to top political leaders.  
He first relied on his personal ties to promote state acceptance of e-commerce and 
institutionalize their support for the new technology, then spread his Internet cafes for 
social communities.  His father is a doctor and his mother an architect.  He got an MBA 
after he completed his undergraduate studies in applied mathematics from Tsinghua 
University in 1985.  Then he worked for the State Planning Commission, where he 
gained personal contacts with senior Chinese leaders and served as a policy advisor.  He 
helped establish a national macro-economic database, which intrigued him into 
information technology (Wilson 2004a, 246-251). He then moved to Canada to study at 
the University of Toronto, his first overseas stint.  After gaining a master's degree in 
finance in 1990, and then working briefly for the Canadian government as a statistician, 
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he created his own company to link Canadian business with China.  When he returned to 
China in l995, he set up Sparkice Information System Engineering Co. Ltd.  He is an 
example of an overseas Chinese who wanted to make money but at the same time claims 
to help China join the new information and communications revolution. The individual 
education both at domestic and foreign universities combined with work experiences both 
at home and abroad prepared Zeng with a better insight to build up China’s information 
infrastructure with a keen eye.  He later created the first cyber cafes in China and offered 
lessons to senior leaders quite instrumental for the information revolution in China.  
His allies were sufficiently wired to help protect him from the political-fall out for 
sharply criticizing the MII minister.  Zeng has parlayed his knowledge of Internet matters 
into much appreciated advice to senior national political elite who are charged with 
setting national ICT policies. This apparently strengthened his networked “human 
capital” with the people who make the Internet rules.  This positive contribution to 
China’s ICT diffusion does not continue with his efforts for more political transparency 
and state responsiveness.  After he is satisfied with political influence both at the state 
and society level, he is much more interested in his business instead of more political 
pursuit of liberalization.  He then started the first cybercafes to provide individual service.  
With his efforts to construct alliances with new and existing social networks within 
ministries, SOEs, and transnational corporations, Sparkice was chosen by MII to be a 
state e-commerce pilot enterprise in May 2000.  He even demonstrated to President 
Clinton his business model as a show of a successful ISP.  Gao Hongbing later told me 
that he liked all kinds of “shows”—inviting people to exquisite dinners, summer resorts, 
and grand hotels.  In order to attract more influence, he even invited foreign businessmen 
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or officials to a luxurious compound at the Fishing Terrace (Diaoyutai) State Guest 
House, which costs him more than 180,000 US dollars. He spent most of his time 
courting official favor by serving as a policy advisor, teaching at state-run business 
schools, publishing articles in state media and cementing deals with state-owned 
enterprises.  Thus we can infer that his ambition for a connected and transparent China is 
mingled with a motive for self-projection as a national savior or role model.  Thus his 
political ideals end up serving his business interests.  
Political Impact and Limitations of Their Efforts
In this chapter, I consider the possibility that these IT leaders’ pressures yield 
more limited yet important changes in the discourse and behavior of the regime.  These 
include—(1) placing norms of competition and decentralization on the regime’s agenda; 
(2) causing the regime’s adoption of a re-regulatory discourse; (3) changing monopolistic 
policies; and (4) changing political institutions, such as the creation of the State 
Informatization Office.    The first two types of change do not result in any immediate 
improvements in ICT diffusion; however, it would be a mistake to dismiss them as 
insignificant.  They place the current regime at the top of a slippery slope that can 
ultimately result in gradual change as these IT leaders hold the regime accountable for its 
statements (commitments) and regime officials implement some reforms (e.g. price 
hearing, transparent policy making process) to avoid charges of hypocrisy and empty 
promises.  
But these IT leaders have not evolved into an independent social class against the 
despotic power of the state, although they are conducive to certain degrees of state 
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responsiveness and public contestation.  They are characterized by their amphibiousness
—they strive for transparency and openness at the state level for ICT diffusion, but for 
the sake of their business, they rely to personal ties with government officials for 
favorable deals.  They do not have coherent ideologies on politics, nor do they have 
independent organizations that can serve as formal channels to reflect their interests to 
the state.  
In addition, the causal mechanism of their impact upon the state is not so direct.  
There are so many intervening variables that may impact the state that the IT leaders 
might have a small proportion of that influence.   There are lots of things being whispered 
in the party leader’s ears from different people and groups.  Who he decides to listen to 
changes from one point in time to another.  It depends on shifting political forces, the 
political leader’s understanding of the economic situation or other domestic needs, the 
changing international environment, his judgment on the quality of advice, or even his 
whimsy (Fewsmith 2003, 152).  In addition, there are many different decision-makers 
and there appears to be considerably more consultation and bureaucratic input in decision 
making than in the past.  The constellation of people and organs giving policy advice 
varies over time.  Some people or organizations seem to have greater influence than 
others.  Their role in political change still needs more studies. However, this does not 
mean that the study of leadership is meaningless.  It is leadership that plays vital roles at a 
crucial point when market forces have driven political regimes to adapt to rising social 
demands for competition in the ICT sector.  Combined with vision, craftsmanship, and 
courage,  these IT leaders have made bold and wise attempts to make ICT diffusion 
possible.  
91
  
Political changes in the ICT sector do not have a unitary meaning but imply these 
three dimensions: establishing anti-monopoly norms governing the ICT diffusion, 
restructuring basic institutions on national information infrastructure (NII), and 
strengthening the channels for civic participation. 46     There is the possibility that these 
IT leaders’ pressures yield more limited yet important changes in the discourse and 
behavior of the regime.  By systematically studying their autonomous, symbiotic, 
parasitic, negotiating, and amphibious dimensions of these IT leaders, I find that these IT 
leaders represent an inchoate pluralist force penetrating state and society for a new 
direction of China’s development.   
This does not mean, however, that increasing activities of the IT leaders are a 
functional equivalent of rising contestation in the political arena.  These IT leaders have 
certainly not evolved into an independent social class fighting against the despotic power 
of the state, even though they are conduits for bringing about a certain degree of state 
responsiveness and public contestation.   In short, these proto-capitalists are not anti-
Communist.  First, they worry that radical political reforms might entail social upheavals.  
And because they seek economic stability, they are likely to disfavor movements that are 
likely to cause political strife.  Second, they have personal ties that can link them with 
governmental offices to attain favorable business deals.  Therefore, they rarely rely on 
formal channels to impact the state.  Relatedly, the state has established corporatist links 
to pre-empt their independent pursuit of political aims.  Yet, these IT leaders serve as 
catalyst for political change precisely because of their active engagement in the design 
46 Insights from Minxin Pei, pp. 69.
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and implementation of state policies.  Thus, they have an amphibious character47: on the 
one hand, they attempt to strengthen the power of the state by actively participating in the 
process of designing new rules and institutions governing ICT diffusion and do not 
challenge the fundamental legitimacy of the Party; on the other hand, ICT diffusion 
decentralizes power and moves it from the state to private individuals, where business 
firms and other groups can independently control resources away from state control.  
They help create some of the necessary conditions for political change, but they are not 
sufficient conditions themselves.  Their relationship with the state can be summarized as 
neither close nor distant, but instead depends on their business needs and visions of 
China’s future. 
47 According to American Heritage Dictionary, “amphibious” connotes a meaning of a mixed or twofold 
nature.
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Chapter 3. Leadership in the Public Sector:
Building the National Information Infrastructure and Breaking up China 
Telecom
In this Chapter, particular emphasis is devoted to the IT leaders’ visions and their 
craftsmanship in devising strategies to break up the monopoly of China Telecom and 
their courage to fight against incumbents at the public sector.  These leaders adopted a 
complementary strategy of “guerrilla attack” wherein some IT leaders “infiltrate existing 
political institutions to alter their purposes and procedures, while others hammer on the 
doors from outside” (Wilson 2004a, 140).  Like their counterparts in Brazil, Jasmine 
Zhang and Michael Wan (Carlos Afonso and grassroots NGOs in Brazil) hammered from 
outside, while Hu Qili, Peng Peng, and Gao Hongbing (like Ivan Moura Campos in 
Brazil) scaled the wall from inside.   In this way, they successfully battled against the 
monopoly of China Telecom and helped mobilize organizational resources for a freer 
market in the IT sector. Thus, in contrast to modernization/middle class theory, their 
autonomy is not derived from material resources or free social spaces, but their creative 
visions, crafty strategies for resource mobilization, and their courage against monopolies.  
Their symbiosis with the state is also manifested in their individual and collective 
efforts to design rules and institutions for a robust national information infrastructure 
through behind-the-scene lobbying and bargaining.  They provided new and different 
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perspectives. An important example is Minister Hu Qili.  After he assumed office in June 
1993, he started to lobby the senior leaders in China to build up alternative public 
networks and new telecommunications carriers.  He also opposed MPT's  argument that 
building another national network is “redundant construction, a waste of state resource.”
These leaders bring a new type of knowledge to the table, and thus have an impact on the 
way some top elites thought about problems. Like think tanks, they sometimes become 
top leaders’ “kitchen cabinets” to help the politicians tide over ordeals in a period of 
uncertainty.  In the synergy of these IT leaders and the state, some of these leaders 
gradually gained viable trust and got their independent views through to the policy 
makers.  As in divesture plans to break up the monopoly of China Telecom, we can see 
that they have brought foreign elements into the state, grafted on to the evolving 
indigenous root, creating a hybrid program for IT reform.  
The introduction of new norms by these IT leaders goes hand in hand with a 
shifting legitimacy of the State.  These IT leaders are operating in an era when the 
Communist Party changed from a “revolutionary party” to a “ruling party”.  Since 
pragmatism and experimentalism characterized the current post-Deng solution of the 
Communist Party, the PRC leadership relied primarily on incremental “internal 
remedialism” when responding to problems in the state system.  As “efficiency reforms” 
have grown quite strong within the CCP, the IT leaders have also attempted to negotiate 
with the state for more freedom. Thus the expertise of these IT leaders is welcome to
promote marketization, privatization, and the integration of China into the international 
community and raise the standards of living.  
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On the other hand, parasitic elements are also found as the state started to 
incorporate these IT leaders into the political establishment.  It is also a part of the state 
corporatist strategy to increase the number of “red capitalists” to prevent potential 
opposition from rallying popular support and threaten the regime.  It also allows the Party 
to design institutional links between the state and the private sector, allowing for 
exchanges of ideas between government and business (Dickson 2003).  
These IT leaders have also negotiated a path for their independent pursuit of an 
internationally competitive telecommunications carrier. Through the efforts of Jasmine 
Zhang, Edward Tian, Peng Peng and Jiang Mianheng, China Netcom came into being, 
which eventually helped bring about the break up China Telecom into two separate parts 
in the north and south.   But their success is limited as demonstrated by the manner in 
which Party incumbents fight fiercely to protect their own turf and prevent their removal 
from current establishment.  The demotion of Peng Peng from the presidency of China 
Railcom is a clear example that seeking too much independence is a risk to one’s political 
life.  This forces us to think about the leaders’ amphibious nature, their willingness to 
help the state leapfrog to 1st world status and their reluctance and inability to challenge 
the authoritarian political system.  
The Creativity of the Golden Projects
The autonomy of IT leaders in the public sector does not derive so much from a 
material basis or from freer social spaces, but from their sagacious visions for a 
networked and connected China.  As a result of their overseas experiences and unique 
understanding of past, these IT leaders started to devise a blueprint for China’s future via 
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information technology and pushed forward their visions in the political arena.    
Minister Hu Qili is touted as the first man in telecommunications reform in China and is 
undoubtedly an IT leader in the public sector.  His two major contributions are the 
Golden Projects that consisted of the public networks for national information 
infrastructure and the establishment of China Unicom as the first competitor against 
China Telecom.  After he became the Minister of the Ministry of Electronic Industry 
(MEI) on June 6, 1993, he initiated the Golden Projects and visited the United States.  In 
1993, Hu Qili wrote to the State Council that, “to promote economic informatization is a 
milestone strategic choice for the economic development in China” (Hu 2001, 413).  In 
this report, he used the US “information highway plan” as an example for China to follow.  
Since the 1980s, the information sector has become the fastest growing industry with its 
development at three or five times faster than that of average GDP growth.  The revenue 
of the electronic industry increases by 30% each year and the telecom revenue 
experienced a 40% increase.  Thus the development of information industries became the 
focus of international competition on comprehensive national strength according to this 
report.  Later his idea was endorsed by President Jiang Zemin, who was convinced that 
modernization is closely linked with electronics and information industries, and there is a 
pressing need to upgrade informatization to the strategic status.  
On December 10, 1993, the National Joint Conference on Economic
Informatization was formed.  Zou Jiahua, the Vice Premier of the State Council was 
appointed chair.  Minister Hu was made Deputy Chair in charge of daily affairs.  This 
committee was composed of 24 ministries and departments, with a main task to have 
“unified design, joint construction, uniform standard, and combined expertise” as its goal 
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to set up “Three Gold” –Golden Bridge, Golden Card, and Golden Customs projects.  
These projects have greatly improved the telecommunications networks and national 
information infrastructure. At the same time, electronic products have found spacious 
markets.  This has also readjusted industrial structure for high-tech and network 
technology centered on computer software.  Hu also led the initiative to complete the 
Prospectus for the Development of China National Information Infrastructure (CNII).  He 
helped design the “Regulations on the International Interconnection of Computer 
Information Networks of the People’s Republic of China”, which was promulgated in the 
State Council Decree No. 195.   In the meantime, connections were established with 
Global Information Infrastructure Committee (GIIC) and Russian Information Policy 
Committee. 48  With the rapid progress of information industries, the Steering Committee 
for Informatization was established at the approval of the State Council on May 27, 1996.  
Its office resides at the MEI.  What follows are personal communications with Hu. 
NII Initiative 
An important feature of these IT leaders is that they serve as bridges to bring 
Western concepts into Chinese practices.  This is the first component of their amphibious 
nature.  To Minister Hu’s understanding, the American information highway exploits 
information resources to improve the competitiveness of enterprises in international 
markets and create new employment opportunities.  By 1994, the telephone penetration 
into Chinese households has reached 93%, with an annual increase rate for EDI exchange 
48The GIIC is a confederation of chief executive officers of firms that develop and deploy, operate, rely 
upon, and finance information and communications technology infrastructure facilities. Commissioners of 
the GIIC come from firms based in developed nations, as well as in developing and emerging market 
nations.
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of 27%.  The total revenue had reached 179.6 billion dollars in 1993.  Through his visit in 
the US, he found four elements were crucial for American’s successful National 
Information Infrastructure program.  These were: communications network, computers, 
databases, and a large number of human resources (Hu 2001, 250).  There were 10,000 or 
more telecommunications networks such as GEIS of General Motors, Advantis of IBM, 
and ARPAnet of national defense.  The Internet of the scientific community has 5000 
databases and 150 large-scale computers.  There are also many specialized Internet 
networks for health, environment, education, government affairs, and national security.  
These networks are service-based and change the vertical society into a more horizontal 
one. Therefore, his main proposal was to establish Golden Projects to be the national 
information infrastructure for information exchanges and value-added services to the 
Chinese people.49
Quadrangle Courtyard Culture 
In a talk with Dr. Ernest Wilson on October 26, 2004, Hu expressed the closed 
nature of the political system made Internet networking almost impossible.  Thus courage 
is vital for leadership to break the rigid mentalities.  
You understand that Chinese culture is like the quadrangle courtyard closed in on 
all sides. This is a political system with unrelated jurisdictions of central ministries 
and local governments.   In such a closed political system, mentality of the people 
is constrained and coordination is extremely difficult.  As mentioned, in June 6 
1993, the MEI was established.  In just less than half a year, a new wave of 
49 In his report, Hu says : 
Recently, the US House of Representatives had passed an act to allow competition so that cable 
companies and telephone companies can operate in each other’s business domain.  In addition, the federal 
government played key roles in regulating the ICT market.  In the White House, there is a special working 
committee chaired by Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown.  Thus the Joint Steering Committee for  
Informatization in the US may play a role in mediating relationships between government and enterprises 
(Hu 2001, 80).  
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information revolution has spread from Europe and the US.  I believe that 
information technology is quite instrumental for a large country like China.  In 
December, NII published its report to innovate networked system.   In contrast, 
MEI of China still is concentrated on the manufacturing sector.   The Internet is 
still limited in research area.  Thus we need to have some theories to adapt our 
system to the needs of the people.  
Although we have made some progress on circuit integration system and software, 
we are still quite concerned with networks.  Then we realized the importance of 
computers.  For example, in our banking system, we cannot just have POS or 
ATMs.  We need to have electronic remission system.  In the west, a credit card 
can resolve every problem.  But in China, we pay with a suitcase of banknotes.   
Thus this leads us to upgrade our financial system for electronic remission.50
Thus we find that Hu had his vision for a developed country of China and did his 
best to make his ideal come true.  This is an important dimension of autonomy not 
commonly found in the public sector.
Golden Networks 
The Golden Projects is a success initiated by Hu’s visions for a connected Chinese 
economy.  These projects started a new era of public networks that serve different 
purposes for the country’s development. 
So actually on July 2, 1993, I advocated to establish electronic systems and started 
a series of projects of integration.  The Golden Bridge is one of the key projects 
linking 24 ministries together.  We wanted to provide coordinated services 
between these ministries with unified standards service.  Thus we started to have 
our EDI system.  Without an integrated network, our products, equipments and 
software will find no market.  This is endorsed by the Vice Premier, Zou Jiahua.   
Thus our Four Golden projects started involving thirteen ministries and 
commissions.  Golden Customs involves seven ministries and Golden Tax four of 
them.  The effect was substantial.  For example, each year there were billions of 
tax evasions.  Also many people cheated on the tax refund from Customs.   This 
has increased almost 30 billion yuan for the customs, which pleased them a lot.51
50
 Interview on October 26, 2004 in Beijing Hotel by Ernest J. Wilson III.
51 Ibid. 
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In 1993, under Hu’s leadership, a series of Golden Projects to give the central 
government information on and control over the rapid decentralization of decision-
making as it was taking place.  It followed a move to a market economy in the ICT 
sector.  The backbone for the projects, the Golden Bridge, connects ministries and State 
Owned Enterprises (SOE’s) through an IP network and provides support for the other 
Golden projects.  The Golden Card Project aims to promote the use of credit cards by 
providing a credit card verification scheme and an inter-bank, inter-region clearing 
system.  The Golden Tax Project computerizes work unit tax receipts and enables the 
electronic transfer of funds, innovations that been around in the West for sometime.  The 
Golden Gate Project aims to improve the import-export trade management by linking the 
Ministry of Foreign and Economic Cooperation, trade organizations, and the Customs 
Bureau.  It uses EDI and provides access to statistical databases.  These projects greatly 
improve China’s business transaction and link efficiently the domestic market with the 
international market. They help drive China into a transformation of its economic 
structure (heavy manufacturing sector) into a high-tech based industry with much less 
environmental degradations.
Table 2.  The Golden Projects
Name Participants Purpose
Golden Bridge 
(Jin Qiao)
Ministry of Information 
Industry, State Information 
Center, Ji Tong Co
To build a public network backbone and 
international network interface capable of 
transmitting data, voice, image and 
multimedia information
Golden 
Customs (Jin 
Guan)
Ministry of Foreign Trade, 
Customs Department, Ji Tong 
Co
To establish networks capable of handling 
foreign-trade taxes, foreign currency 
settlements, domestic returns, quota 
management systems, an electronic data 
interchange (EDI) and an import-export 
statistical database
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Golden Card 
(Jin Ka)
People’s Bank of China, 
Ministry of Information 
Industry, Ministry of Internal 
Trade, Great Wall Computer 
Co
To establish an electronic-based financial 
transaction system and information service; 
to have 200 million credit cards in use across 
400 cities by early in the next century
Golden Sea 
(Jin Hai)
State Statistical Bureau, 
People’s Bank of China, State 
Information Center
To build a data network linking top 
government leaders with other institutions, 
organizations and offices under the direct 
jurisdiction of the Communist Party Central 
Committee
Golden Macro 
(Jin Hong)
China Export-Import Bank, 
Ministry of Finance, State 
Information Center
To develop a state economic and policy 
support system by setting up a database 
unifying industrial, tax, price, investment, 
resource, capital, energy, transport and 
communication information
Golden Tax 
(Jin Shui)
Ministry of Finance, Ministry 
of Information Industry, State 
Taxation Bureau, Great Wall 
Computer Co
To make use of computerized work unit tax 
receipts and direct bank connections to aid 
the flow and use of funds across China
Golden 
Intelligence 
(CERNET, Jin 
Zhi)
State Education Commission To enable teachers and research professionals 
to have timely and precise information and to 
enable international and local communication 
and cooperation
Golden 
Enterprise (Jin 
Qi)
State Economic and Trade 
Commission
To design and build an integrated enterprise 
target (quota) and distribution system; to 
build a country-wide enterprise and product 
database
Source: Big Brains Limited, quoted from China Economic Quarterly, section 2, 1999, p. 26
Bottlenecks
Hu talked about the reason underlying these projects.  Without these projects, 
there is no way out for manufacturers to sell their electronic products since China 
Telecom is almost the only consumer to decide what to buy
Before these projects, enterprises had a hard time to sell their computers.  For 
example, a factory called the Great Wall used to sell computers set by set.  
However, people have to come back and forth to learn how to use them.  It is a 
waste of time and human energy to do business in such a small scale.  Later we 
had Golden Tax project, one single order would be 2 – 3, 000 sets of computers.  
In 1990, we sold out 500,000 sets of computers.  In 1995, that number reached 3.3 
million.  In recent the years, that number has increased ten fold to reach 30 
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million.   Our Internet users have also reached 87 million.   Thus these golden 
projects are breakthroughs for our time.   
This led us to the competition of telecommunications companies.  By that time, 
telecom users are slaves and China Telecom used to be the superior boss.  Without 
breaking up China Telecom, there was no way out for manufacturing industries 
under MEI.  I have to look for way out for my factories.  In a word, we are 
cornered to fight against the monopoly of China Telecom.  I understand this is a 
new task for technological development, and I personally realize that there is a 
great political risk, because at that time, nobody could openly challenge the 
monopoly of China Telecom.52
He made courageous moves to convince political elites on the importance of 
competition and networked society.  This was at a time that many political leaders 
worried about the potential “bourgeoisies liberalization” accompanied by the information 
technology. Hu made sure to the political leaders that by national information 
infrastructure as a national system that is shaped by technology but that is chiefly a set of 
interlocking institutions that guide and constrain the behavior of consumers, suppliers, 
public officials, and citizens (Kahin and Wilson 1997).
At that time, I advocated using informatization to lead industrialization.  I had to do 
so because such an exorbitantly high price of telecommunications made us unable to 
achieve anything.  Even for our manufacturing industry and equipment production, 
we felt that we must use the information technology to upgrade our traditional 
system.  We wanted to make information industry our backbone industry.  But the 
innovation of informatization needs public network infrastructure.  The public 
network was provided by China Telecom and was extremely expensive.   China 
cannot fail to catch up with the third wave of industrialization of the world.  
Therefore, we had another public network called the National Economic Information 
Network.  The second public network met some of our demands.  But for the way
out of all walks of life, we need more networks for these golden projects.  
We finally realized that the current telecommunications network became the 
bottleneck of our development.  For example, we had more than forty research 
institutes, but they produced little social benefits.   We must have the specialized 
networks for application.   At that time, 1.3 billion people had only one 
telecommunications company.  The installment fee for a single telephone line is 
5000 yuan, more than 700 USD.  With all the “golden” projects, all the research 
52
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institutes started to work to study how to apply modern technology to create social 
benefits and lower costs.  With the breakup of China Telecom and establishment of 
Ji Tong Communications, finally we have spun off the China Telecom’s monopoly.  
I understand my political risks, but the social benefits are huge.  I truly understand 
the needs of consumers.  After eight years of practice, we have understood the 
interconnection of industrial sector, research sector, academic sector and application 
sector.  We have developed our autonomous national information infrastructure.53
Hu was making bold moves to make possible free competition in the 
telecommunications market in China under the structuring plan of the state.  He 
understood the roots of problems and now he began his efforts.  
Globalizing Initiatives
More important, his vision embodied a strong desire and a sagacity to help China’s 
informatization to keep pace with the world.  
The guidelines for China’s informatization (e.g. informatization led industrialization) 
were actually learned from our 1993-1994 reports or talks.  The Party’s directives 
have a lot of words actually drawn from our previous documents.  After many years 
search and practice, we have established so many golden projects with so many 
better off customers.  For example, Golden Card has given the banks each year 2 
billion yuan benefits.  The Golden Customs have produced golden ports and EDI 
systems.   
We have also dramatically made information industry our key industry.  Now 
electronic exports account for more than one third of our total exports.  The total 
output amounts to 140 billion yuan.  This first half year, there was also a 50% 
increase of products.  The total revenue of electronic products has reached 1880 
billion yuan last year.   On the integrated circuit industry, we can produce products 
ranging from 0.13 minimeter to 0.18 minimeters.   In less than ten years, our 
telecommunications income has reached 600 billion yuan.  Our mobile phone users 
have ranked now No. 1 in the world totaling 300 million people.54
Under Hu Qili’s aegis, the Golden Projects made a great success.  The Golden 
Bridge project was implementing Vice Premier Zou Jiahu’s proposal for a national 
economic information network on March 12, 1993.  In 1996, the Golden Bridge started to 
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build a national computer network and value-added service system with satellite and 
Internet backbones.  Ji Tong Communications Co., Ltd. was entrusted with the first task 
to set up EDI networks for foreign trade.  By 1996, in thirty provinces and cities, the 
network was built up with interconnections with MPT.  The Network Control Center was 
established in Beijing and the Internet started to connect with the world.  The Golden 
Card project was also under President Jiang Zemin’s request to deepen financial reforms.  
The joint conference on June 15, 1994 by Zou Jiahua approved the design of Golden 
Card.  From then on, the commercial banks issued 277 million check and credit cards.  
There were also IC cards being sold to the public at a number of 230 million in 2000.  
Table 3. China’s Main Public Networks
CHINANET
www.chinanet.cn.net
Operated by China Telecom, the country’s dominant Internet provider and 
offering services in all major Chinese cities.  At the end of 1999, CHINANET had 
a total bandwidth of 291Mbps (million bits per second), or 83 percent of Chinese  
connections to the global Internet backbone.  Though China Telecom itself is the 
dominant Internet service provider (ISP) for CHINANET, a few small ISPs 
operate by leasing CHINANET resources from China Telecom.  But China 
Telecom’s high leasing fees have effectively prevented these small ISPs from 
becoming significant players in the ISP business.
CHINAGBN
www.gb.com.cn
Operated by Jitong Communication Co., Ltd.  In January 1994, the state-owned 
Jitong was founded to operate the network, but did not launch its CHINAGBN 
services until September 1996 (nine months after CHINANET). Jitong is also the 
main ISP for CHINAGBN and offers IP telephony and other Internet services.
UNINET
www.uninet.com.cn
Run by China Unicom, China’s second telephone operator. Has developed 
extensive cellular and paging services.  In southern China, Unicom is using its IP 
network UNINET for IP applications such as Voice over IP and Fax on IP, but 
plans to offer Internet-access services on UNINET in 100 cities in 2000
CNCNET
Will be run by China Netcom Corp.  Netcom is largely in the planning stages, but 
this new telecom operator will base its network on connections to existing 
broadcasting and railway networks, and it will offer wholesale broadband access 
as well as local Internet service in major Chinese cities.
CSTNET
www.csnet.net.cn
The China Science and Technology Network offers its services to the public, but 
the majority of its users are provincial- and local- government agencies and state-
owned enterprises.  Though some of these enterprises have Internet access, 
CSTNET is not primarily a business-related network.
CERNET
www.cernet.edu.cn
The Ministry of Education’s campus network, linking China’s major education 
and research institutes.  Along with CSTNET, CERNET provides mainly 
scientific research and educational information.   
Source: The China Business Review 2000, 21
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Crafting the First Competitor—China Unicom
The establishment of China Unicom is a combination of both the autonomous and 
symbiotic traits of these IT leaders.  Their initiative for a second competitive 
telecommunications carrier is no doubt an autonomous pursuit of these IT leaders in 
helping the state improve its competitiveness in the ICT sector.  Again, Minister Hu Qili 
plays a vital role here.  Hu wanted to create a second national network not for 
competition’s sake, but for the outlet of electronic manufacturers and retailers for his 
ministry.  Under the monopoly of China Telecom the products of MEI have difficulty 
finding markets.  In addition, China Telecom only purchased foreign products.  Under his 
guidance the national information infrastructure initiatives start to gain momentum.  In 
1994, he led the other two ministries – Ministry of Railways and Ministry of Electric 
Power (MOR and MEP) to establish China Unicom, which started to challenge the 
monopoly of the China Telecom. “MEI, lacking its own telecommunications lines or 
wireless systems, favoured the alliance with the Power and Railway ministries, both of 
which had substantial private telecommunications networks” (Harwit 1998, 189).   The 
MEI coalition contended that the telephone penetration rate at that time was only 1.63%, 
and there were long waiting lists everywhere.  By 1992, non-MPT ministerial networks 
were mature enough to be linked as a national public information infrastructure.55
The key issue in introducing competitive carriers is nation security. Hu’s solution 
was to enhance encryption technologies and restrict the management of carriers to 
Chinese nationals.  With regard to the universal service, Hu pointed to the fact that they 
were exactly covering the region which the public networks did not serve.  The MPT 
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obviously lost.  Zhao Weichen, Director of the Office of Machinery Export under the 
State Council (later made Chairman of the Board of China Unicom), argued monopoly 
was at odds with Deng Xiaoping's theory of socialist market economy.  The MPT's 
monopoly became a bottleneck for national economy (Zhao 1994, 2).  Both Hu and Zhao 
conducted field investigations in the United States before and understood the road to 
break up AT&T in America.56  On September 16, 1993, two reports were completed: The 
Report on Establishing China United Telecommunications Corporation, and The Critical 
Situation of the Telecommunications Industries in China and Suggestions.  On September 
19, Zeng Peiyan and Hu Qili reported to Premier Zhu.  Hu emphasized the contradictions 
under monopoly and surplus resources of other ministries cannot be used to meet the 
huge demand of telecommunications services.  Hu remarked: “we need to pioneer and 
have a try in order to find new developmental guidance.” Zhu agreed with Hu and 
expressed great interest in the proposal to set up China Unicom jointly by three ministries.  
He read carefully this report and stamped his support on it: “It seems to be good and 
contribute to telecommunications causes and ease the contradictions of interconnections 
of telephony services.  Please invite Yanning (Deputy Director of the State Commission 
on Economic System Restructuring), Qingtai (Deputy Director of the Economic and 
Trade Office under the State Council), State Planning Commission, MPT, Ministry of 
Machinery and Electronics, MOR, MEP, and telecommunications regiment of the 
military to jointly discuss the way to set up a limited liability group under the supervision 
55
 For example, MOR owned 35,000 km of open-air lines, 30,000 km of coaxial cable and 300 km of fiber-
optical cable, and numerous microwave links.  MEP owned 27,000 km of digital microwave links. See He 
Feichang, pp. 207.
56In 1974, the government alleged that AT&T had monopolized telecommunications markets (US v. AT&T
CA No.74-1698). From 1984, the Bell Operating Companies for local telephone service , were divested 
from AT&.  AT & T continued its long distance service.  The Bell System, the backbone of American 
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of MPT.”  When he asked Hu’s idea of his comments, Hu was excited and expressed 
great gratitude to Premier Zhu.  
Then Minister Hu played pivotal role as an “insider” against the monopoly of 
China Telecom.  According to the declassified document, the State Council held a 
conference between China Telecom, Ministry of Electronics, Ministry of Machinery, 
Ministry of Power, and Ministry of Railways in September 1993 (Hu 2001, 432).  The 
objection from China Telecom for alternative networks and establishing China Unicom 
are summarized as three: (1) Every country allows only one public telecommunications 
network.  As the monopoly of AT & T was broken in the United States, seven telephone 
companies purchased their own equipment and operated their own networks.  Thus their 
profits could not be used for reinvestment, resulting in higher telephone charges.  Thus, 
in the domestic reform, a unitary telecommunications network and the monopoly is vital.  
Legislature should ensure such monopoly.  (2) All distance and one network characterize 
telecommunications.  The co-existence of multiple networks cannot ensure an orderly 
operation and is technically unable to realize, jeopardizing national security and social 
security.  (3) The proposal from MEI is even more “liberalized” than the US (reminding 
the serious political trend of bourgeois liberalization).  
Hu Qili and other IT leaders such as Gao Hongbing had a systematic study of this 
and responded with three points.  (1) The state keeps a unified management of 
telecommunications, but it does not mean such management must be implemented with 
monopoly.  Monopoly is the largest obstacle for the development of China’s 
telecommunications.  Just because of monopoly, the telecommunication service is quite 
telephone service for a century, cease to exist.  No single company could exercise the end-to-end 
responsibility that AT&T had long held.
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poor.  Its management is very backward and price is exorbitantly high.  Therefore, the 
break up of the monopoly of telecommunications will only benefit all the people and 
promote a healthy development of telecommunications in China.  (2) China lacks 
telecommunications resources, far less to meet the demands of national economy and 
social development.  If we have proper allocation and management, redundant 
constructions can be avoided.  (3) New telecommunications companies will follow the 
regulations of governmental organs in charge and adhere to unified technical standard.  
This will not result in “anarchy” of telecommunications industry.  To break the monopoly 
of telecommunications is a significant measure of the telecommunications management 
system of the state under the unitary leadership of the state council and the Party (Hu 
2001, 432-3).  It is not telecommunications “liberalization”.  
In three years, Hu organized more than 30 briefings, and wrote 500,000- character 
reports to all relevant departments.  He realized its risks and but the positive effect was so 
significant that he could not back up.  On September 29, 1993, Vice Premier Zou Jiahua 
agreed to Hu’s suggestion to have an alternative network, even without funding from the 
state.  He was soon supported by the State Economic and Trade Commission.  When he 
reported to the State Commission of Economic Restructuring, he got warm supports from 
Hong Hu and Gao Shangquan, Vice Directors of the Commission.  They told Hu that 
some departments are against his suggestions not due to personal problems, but because 
of the long-term hackneyed concepts, problems of the old system, and departmental self-
interests.  
Hu’s suggestion aroused the attention of Premier Li Peng, who ordered the 
creation of a task force to study his proposal for China Unicom.  After heated discussions 
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with experts from the State Planning Commission and the State Commission on System 
Restructuring, the task force suggested to give scope to existing non-MPT 
communications networks as alternatives to existing public networks operated by MPT, 
gradually introducing new players into the telecommunications market, while 
maintaining a supervisory and regulatory role for MPT (He 1994, 209).
The success of IT leaders not only lies in their reasonable arguments and lobbying, 
but also in their way of wrapping up support from senior political elites.  Officials 
supported Hu’s proposal for China Unicom as another telecom carrier and MPT backed 
down.  On December 14, 1993, in the name of “reorganizing state's telecommunications 
resource,” the State Council approved the establishment of China Unicom.  The terms 
were:
1. Upgrading the existing private networks of the Ministry of Railways and 
Electric Power to provide long-distance services to the public after meeting 
the demands of internal organizations.
2. Providing local phone service in the areas where the public switched telephone 
service does not reach or where there is a severe shortage of public telephone 
services.
3. Operating radio communications services, including public mobile services.
4. Providing value-added services.
5. Providing other services related to the main business.(Mueller and Tan 1997, 
51)
This is a great leap forward for competition into the telecommunications sector.  
China Unicom is allowed in most telecommunication businesses, not just wireless and 
value-added services, but also the basic services: long distance and local telephony.  Hu 
was touted as the first man against monopoly of China Telecom for his bravery at 
establishing China Unicom.  
  On April 15, 1994, Vice Premier Zou Jiahua presided over the meeting about the 
preparation of work for the establishment of China Unicom.  The meeting decided that 
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China's telecommunications restructuring would be fully managed by the state, not 
through market.  China would take a “phased competition” approach.  Except for China 
Unicom, no new telecommunications carriers would be approved to enter the market.  
China would try a “duopoly” approach first in public telecommunications market. On 
July 19, China Unicom was formally established with RMB yuan one billion capital from 
MOR, MEP, and MEI together with other 13 investors.
Figure 7.   Functional Division of MPT and Entries of New Carriers in 1994
Source: Kathleen G.  Huang and author
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were not always producing optimum outcomes, but were heavily fought against by
conservative forces within the establishment.  Thus the parasitic dimension of IT leaders 
is manifested through their initial setbacks and later through their loss of power within 
the government.  During the second divestiture their efforts achieved great success partly 
because of their creativity and craftsmanship and also partly because of their support of 
Jiang Mianheng, son of the former president.  The complex mingling of all the 
dimensions shows their amphibious nature towards politics: an expertise on innovative 
changes and a conservative stance towards political reform within the establishment.  
There were some important preconditions for breaking up China Telecom.  On 
December 10, 1993, the National Joint Committee of Economy Informatization had been 
formed.  Zou Jiahua, the deputy Premier of the State Council, was appointed the chair.  In 
January 1996, the Informatization Leading Group of the State Council and its executive 
office were established.  Zou Jiahua, the deputy premier of the State Council headed the 
group.  The former office of National Joint Committee of Economic Informatization was 
renamed the office of Informatization Promotion Leading Group of the State Council and 
in 1996 AT & T invited the State Planning Commission to visit the United States.  Four 
delegations were sent to the United States within half a year to study the new edition of 
telecommunications act.  The State Planning Commission, Information Promotion 
Leading Group, MPT, and China Unicom sent their respective delegates to study the 
telecommunications policy on regulating long-distance and local telephones as well as 
cable networks with telephone networks.  In September 1994, the Chinese authorities on 
postal and telecommunications began to enter into the service of Internet.  Two portals 
(exits) were established in Beijing and Shanghai.  On June 20, 1995, the Internet service 
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began its full operation.57  In 1998, The Ministry of Information Industries was 
established to combine MPT with MEI to strengthen a centralized management of IT 
resources for economic growth.  This change had both intended and unintended 
consequences for the ICT diffusion in China.
In the 1998 breakup of China Telecom, the IT leaders started to provide solutions 
to unforeseeable problems in the highly risky reform process and helped the state 
invigorate a national information infrastructure that is crucial for the leapfrogging 
development of China.  They provide new and different perspectives from those provided 
by bureaucracies and bring broad new ideas about policy directions, thereby having an 
impact on the way people think.  There are broader structural reasons that influence such 
decision making, and there are also leadership efforts as sources of tactics and outside 
lessons.  In the UK, broader forces certainly influenced the final decision to privatize, but 
the immediate source of the decision came not from the Treasury, the prime minister, or 
any private sector group—but from two civil servants in the Department of Industry who 
were working on telecommunications liberalization.  In March 1982, they sent a memo to 
the secretary of state suggesting that privatization would be necessary in order to assure 
effective competition.  Secretary of State Peter Jenkin responded to the memo by calling 
a meeting of a small group of civil servants involved in the telecommunications policy 
(Vogel 1996, 78-79).
The core problem facing the newly established MII was, as described in People's 
Daily by Su Jinsheng, was that there was no effective competition in the 
telecommunications sector because China Unicom, the only competitor of China 
57
 See China Computerworld, Nov. 17, 1997, A21.
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Telecom, was too small.58  Wang Xiujun, Deputy Bureau Chief of the 
Telecommunications Management Bureau of the MII, used a metaphor to explain the 
need for the divestiture of China Telecom--  the 500,000-employee behemoth with $ 40 
billion in revenues.  In order to solve the problem of a lack of competition, the State 
Council and the MII worked out an asymmetric management policy.  On the one hand, 
they would break up China Telecom to make the monopoly giant smaller.  On the other 
hand, they would hand in some business to China Unicom to make the “child” bigger. 
But although China Telecom was divided into four functional companies, real 
competition was not yet emerging.  The intended purpose of China Telecom's divestiture 
was to foster competition.  By severing the network of China Telecom, these IT leaders 
were engaged in numerous debates on the plans to share the power of China Telecom.  At 
the time the decision was made at MPT, Minister Wu directly reported it to Premier Li 
Peng.  After Li Peng’s approval, it became effective. 
Liu Cai, the Director of Policy and Regulation Department of MII, devised a 
conservative plan to break up China Telecom according to different functions.  He is both 
a successful and a tragic IT leader, which reflects compromise with the conservatives and 
finally, a sacrifice incurred because of his boldness.  The Liu Cai plan was the least pro-
competition because it kept China's monopoly over the basic service.  Considering the 
MPT's longstanding position of keeping the network integrated, it was no wonder that 
Liu Cai proposed a plan with only limited changes.  
He proposed to divide China Telecom by categories of services: fixed-line, 
wireless, paging, and satellite.  The new company in each service market would be a 
58 See Su Jinsheng, Bureau Chief of Telecommunications Management Bureau, MII, "How does the 
Government Manage the Telecommunications Sector?" People's Daily, 24 July 2000, p. 11.
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network operator as well as service provider.  Although China Telecom would be 
smaller, the plan did not touch the source of monopoly power at all. Liu Cai's plan 
mirrored the longstanding policy position of the MPT: to keep the national network 
integrated.  However, a couple of years later Liu was too bold to even talk about that cell 
phones should charge from one side in a chat room online.  This caused a drastic fall of 
IT stocks on the Nasdaq, and Liu lost his position because he enraged Premier Zhu and 
Minister Wu.  
Another IT leader’s plan was not adopted because some political incumbents 
could not accept a Western approach.  Dr. Kan Kaili, who got his Ph.D. in engineering 
from Stanford, was the main designer of the liberal proposal.1 The Dean of the School of 
Public Administration and Management at Beijing’s Posts & Telecommunications 
University, Dr. Kan, proposed further separation of network operation from service 
operation in fixed line services after China Telecom spun off its wireless and satellite 
businesses at the request of Premier Zhu.
Finally, Liu Cai's Divestiture plan was adopted.  In February 1999, China 
Telecom spun off its paging, wireless and satellite businesses as the Liu Cai plan 
proposed.  China Telecom's paging business was handed over entirely to China Unicom, 
including facilities, personnel and subscribers.  This first divestiture represents a 
compromise between reformers and conservatives.
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Figure 8. The First Breakup of China Telecom in 1998
Source: Kathleen G. Huang, and  author
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had a systematic study of the irrationalities and detailed calculations of cost-benefit over 
the charges of China Telecom.  At the pressure of these three forces, the government set 
up a Group for Telecom Reform chaired by Zeng Peiyan (later vice premier), which was 
composed of leading members of State Planning Commission and the Office for System 
Restructuring at the State Council.  This new division was largely the turf fight between 
Jiang Zemin’s protégés and Li Peng’s underlings.  In the past, Li Peng took charge of all 
traditional industries, including MPT, MOR, and MEP etc. but Jiang used to be the 
minister of former Ministry of Electronic Industry in around 1983-1985.  Under Jiang 
Mianheng’s aegis, China Telecom was successfully broken up.  China Netcom’s market 
entry was an important case of leadership in introducing competition into the 
telecommunications market.
The Adaptability of Leadership over China Netcom
The creation of China Netcom shows how these IT leaders cooperated 
with each other to bring about the second divestiture of China Telecom.  China Netcom 
was an innovative creation by the IT leaders to build an internationally competitive 
carrier.  The vision and “Quad” cooperation between academia, public, private, and non-
governmental organizations were apparent in the creation of China Netcom.  China 
Netcom, the first experiment for a broadband high-speed Internet enterprise, gained 
momentum with support from senior political elites including President Jiang Zemin and 
Premier Zhu Rongji.  The initiative took place in a beautiful suburban scene in northwest 
Beijing, the Fragrance Hills, in April 1998.  The State Commission of Science and 
Technology held a seminar on broadband technology, which could provide high-speed 
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Internet access.  Thus heated debates in search for a technical solution to converge the 
three networks started from science and engineering communities.  Participants included 
scientists of the CAS and engineers from China Academy of Engineering.
One proposal from the conference intrigued Dr. Hu Qiheng, Vice President of 
CAS.  A renowned physicist and a research fellow at the Institute of Acoustics from the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences Hou Ziqiang suggested that, “the broadband Internet is a 
short cut for China to develop advanced network infrastructures.”  His bold prescription 
for China to construct a next-generation Internet infrastructure is to found an independent 
enterprise charged with building a new network to promote competition like those 
companies at Silicon Valley (i.e. the breakup of Ma Bell in the US). Hou’s report 
immediately attracted attention from Jiang Mianheng in Shanghai.  He also found three 
other ardent supporters:  Sheng Guangzu, deputy governor of MOR; Zhang Haitao, vice 
governor of SARFT; Yang Xiong, general manager of Shanghai Alliance Investment.  Dr. 
Hu Qiheng sent a proposal to the State Council and then relayed to MII.  But MII was not 
enthusiastic about this. With their support, Hou's broadband experiment made a success
both in Beijing and  Shanghai cable TV stations. Shanghai’s successful application of 
this broadband technology attracted nationwide attention.  The Ministry of Railways and 
State Administration for Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) showed great interest. At 
that time, the Shanghai government proposed to build the Shanghai Information Port at 
the influential advice from Jiang Mianheng who was keenly aware of the market and 
social value of information and communication technology.  The SARFT has an amazing 
number of subscribers of over 80 million as the possible initial user base.  MOR was also 
interested in the great potential of this broadband technology because it can offer the right 
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of way along its rail system through its well established a national telecommunications 
network. 
 Then Hou was invited by Jiang Mianheng to Shanghai to set up companies to
produce equipment that would serve the cable networks of Shanghai.  It happened that 
CAS was ready to lobby the State Council for building a large-scale national 
experimental network.  Then Jasmine Zhang and Gao Hongbing were invited to talk 
about the plan for product development.  Gao suggested that equipment production was 
only for the near future.  For a better future, they’d better build up a strong national 
network, China’s national backbone network, integrating Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, 
and Xi’an first.  That aroused great interest in Jiang Mianheng.  Then they reported to Lu 
Yongxiang, Chief Director of CAS, and got support from him on January 7th, 1995.  Then 
they invited Peng Peng from MOR and Chen Xiaoning from SARFT to discuss the 
potential national backbone network.  On Februrary 11, 1999 in the meeting with Premier 
Zhu, they systematically studied the feasibility of a high-speed demonstration Internet 
network in China.  This marked the first attempt for the public, academic, and private 
sectors to jointly work on a national network.  
In February of 1999, Hou reached Premier Zhu.  At the end of their talk, Premier 
Zhu recommended that he set up a company to apply this new technology.  Hou 
explained that IP services could solve the delays and poor quality of voice transmission 
through broadband transmission lines.  In addition, he also explained how costs could be 
shrunk drastically if broadband lines were ubiquitous enough.  “I don't want scientists to 
spend millions of dollars on experiments.  If we can put it into practice as quickly as we 
can, why do we bother to wait?”  After this meeting, the CAS quickly worked out a 
119
proposal for a high-Speed Internet project.  The four parties, the CAS, SARFT, MOR and 
the Shanghai Municipal Government invested RMB yuan 30 million (5 million USD).  
On March 18, there was a heated discussion over design and construction of this high-
speed Internet project.  Jasmine Zhang, Gao Hongbing, Lu Yongxiang, Jiang Mianheng, 
Yan Yixun (CAS), Yang Xiong (deputy mayor of Shanghai) attended the meeting, which 
laid the foundation of future Netcom.  
At the suggestion of Peng Peng from MOR, the Board of China Netcom invited 
American trained Dr. Edward Tian (Suning) to be its CEO because the traditional route to 
hire a manager from inside the government did not work.  Yan, Jiang, and Peng believed 
that the new company was a showcase of globalization, thus Tian’s success at AsiaInfo., 
his American education, and ability to keep people focused on the task at hand.  But 
Edward had his worries.  The chief concern was the possible dooming fate in its struggle 
against China Telecom.  The lesson was that China Telecom blocked the interconnection 
with China Unicom and denied its access to vital infrastructures.  Real competition could 
hardly materialize when a competitor had 85% of the market.  Eventually these 
governmental agencies impressed Tian by favoring him with a hands-off policy and 
Western-style management. 
Edward Tian became a bridge between the West and China, and between past and 
present.  He is also typical of a generation of Chinese young men who were called by 
Deng Xiaoping to study abroad after Mao’s demise in 1976.  At the age of 25, Tian left 
China and arrived in Lubbock, Texas.  Later he joined a Ph. D. program in biology, and 
soon he changed to ecology.  Soon after, the opening icons of Macintosh, a smiling face 
at Texas Tech’s university computer lab, intrigued him.  It was a revelation for him to 
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find other Chinese students on the network.  “It was my first glimpse of the unifying 
world of the computer,” he said (Sheff 2002, 31).  He then started an Internet 
organization called Sino Ecologists Club Overseas with about 300 students online.  After 
Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, he was dumbstruck.  “We thought and thought after 
that: How could we sacrifice to help the people of our country?  It became the central 
purpose in our life” (Sheff 2002, 41).  He then thought of abandoning his education in 
pure science to do something that would have an impact.  Edward Tian went to a speech 
by Senator Al Gore after he completed his Ph.D. in 1992.  What stirred Edward Tian was 
Gore’s claim that the information superhighway could transform a nation through 
elevated communication, knowledge, and education.  Tian exulted: “Information! Access! 
That’s what we never had.”  He suddenly felt that it was the Internet that China 
desperately needed.  “Inherent in the technology is the most invaluable in a free world: a 
free flow of information… Information technology has the power to bring a renaissance 
to China” (Sheff 2002, 43, 45).   
Their autonomous pursuit of China’s development is also seen through a 
statement made by the CEO of China Netcom.  In a brochure published by China Netcom, 
Tian has a “dream”:
We dream that bandwidth will not limit our communication: broadband will be as 
popular as electricity in our daily lives.  We dream that good education will not be 
possessed by only a few.  Only fortunate can achieve the top of an Ivory Tower 
and acquire aristocratic education.  Broadband will extend quality education like 
Beijing University, Qinghua University, and Jingshan Middle School to the most 
remote rural and bordering areas, so that people who never left their hometown 
can take a look at the world and enjoy the best education.  Our dream is that the 
best medical care is no longer the privilege of the urban dwellers.  Excellent 
doctors will no longer face only one patient.  The broadband networks will share 
medical care knowledge.  People do not need trek all the way to hospitals in a big 
city, awaiting “final diagnosis” from the doctor.
121
We dream that the life of the elderly will not be passed in lonely memory.  The 
high quality pictures of broadband network transmission have eliminated distance, 
and make it possible for them to communicate with their relatives faraway and 
enjoy the heavenly love.  We dream that in 2008, Chinese is the most commonly 
used language on the Internet.  We dream that in 2008, PC will become a personal 
terminator.  Its sales price is no more than 100 yuan (RMB), and every Chinese 
could afford it.  We dream that in 2008 China can settle the controversies between 
development and environment.  The land will have a blue sky and green field.  
Our field will no longer be under the pressures of transportation and pollution. 
Travel is only for enjoyment and all work can be done through the network.  
We dream that 2008 the Chinese “Silicon Valley” has produced the world-level 
high-tech enterprises.  Thousands of the entrepreneurs of the broadband economy 
are developing advanced broadband operating system, broadband software, 
broadband interconnecting equipment, and broadband websites etc.  In this field, 
we do not necessarily follow the bank at the opposite side of the Pacific Ocean.  
We have our own strategy, technology, and standard.59
The active role of the IT leaders to design the future of China in Edward Tian’s 
words proves that there is an ambition among the China’s IT leaders to use IT to 
enlighten people, transform the national economy, promote leapfrogging development, 
and to enhance environmental concerns by putting his CNC logo green.  
Green is a reminder that the Internet can help China’s disastrous environment, which 
the industrial revolution has demolished.  Bandwidth is clean, grassland, a pasture in 
which much can grow.  In this pasture, countless new companies and countless new 
applications will grow—everything from commerce companies to systems that 
radically improve education and healthcare….  Broadband can do amazing things for 
China, and one of those things is to integrate us into the world in a seamless way.  It 
will help to bring stories into China—stories to make dreams (Sheff 2002, 157, 161).   
In April 1999, China Network Communications Co., Ltd. was established.  The 
broadband high speed Internet unit of the Company was launched in November 2000. In 
August, only six months later, China Netcom entered the market.  Yan became the 
Chairman of the Board of China Netcom.  Hou became the chief scientific consultant of 
China Netcom.  Jiang Mianheng, by then promoted to the Vice Chairmanship of the 
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CAS, also joined the board.  A year later, China Netcom finished its phase I project: 
8,490 kilometers of broadband backbone networks with bandwidth of 40G in the east of 
China.  On October 28, it began operating in 17 cities.60  A network with a 40G 
bandwidth is the technical solution for the convergence of three networks.  Once Chinese 
leaders decided to embrace the Internet its development came quickly and several of the 
key figures became the nation’s leading entrepreneurs.  
When he recalled the dramatic establishment of China Netcom, Yan said: “I went 
there (the State Council) with a proposal to build an experimental network.  I did not 
expect a company.”  Hou said: “I went there with full confidence in broadband 
technology.  I was really surprised with Premier Zhu’s proposal to form a new company 
for the technology.  Premier Zhu was really sagacious.”  Yan also felt to be a historic 
calling for Tian, a chance to build technology that will help China leapfrog the West with 
a state-of-the-art broadband Internet backbone (Sheff 2002, 152).  Edward Tian got this 
message and was enthusiastic about his broadband Internet.
China’s transformations all come down to bandwidth.  CNC is going to be 
China’s Sprint.  The symbol for the information age is our fiber, with its invisible 
digital flow coursing at the speed of light…. Everyone knows that there are many 
people in China who do not have phones, never mind computers.  Yet we will 
bring them high-bandwidth fiber.  What good is it?  They may not use email or e-
commerce anytime soon, but ubiquitous bandwidth will affect their lives when we 
wire not only the cities but the villages—the clinics, schools, and libraries.  A new 
China will emerge.  Since the broadband Internet can be picture and voice run, 
illiterate people can have access, perhaps coming to them on the eight hundred 
million televisions in their homes.  One day every school will be on the network.  
For people who were previously presented with one alternative for their lives, 
broad bandwidth brings a vision of other choices and the means to reach them 
(Sheff 2002, 152).  
59
 Publication from China Netcom in November 2002.  
60
 See "China Netcom Enters Market," The Weekend in the South, 30 November 2000, p.22. 
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Thus the government set up committees inviting officials, professors, and 
entrepreneurs to jointly discuss the divestiture. As interconnection became key for 
different telecom carriers, state regulation becomes vital for their fair play.   MII invited 
Jasmine Zhang and Ouyang Wu to set up the standard as the Western countries.   The 
State Investment Commission issued a notice on interconnection.  The Internal 
Department of the Commission was in charge of this issue.  Experts and scholars from 
different universities joined these heated discussions.  Zhang Weiying, Director of the 
Guanghua School of Management of Beijing University, Zhang Ping, professor from the 
University of Jurisprudence, and Chen Dingtai from the People’s University joined them 
were leading experts then.  Then the director of the Department would preside over these 
meetings and drafted these regulations.  At the same time, they asked for advice from the 
relevant ministries.  Then the Commission would reconvene.  If time permitted, a 
delegation will be sent abroad to learn from experiences from other countries.  A 1996 
invitation by Lucent laid a firm groundwork for the Chinese officials to learn how to spin 
off these telecommunications companies.  In Chinese, Yan Baoping calls it “goutong”--
meaning communications, or get ideas through.  After experts’ research, enterprise 
calculation of cost and benefits in conferences again and again, ideas gradually emerged 
(“chendian”).  
The Parasitic Dilemma of  China Railcom
IT leaders who made possible the market entry of China Railcom successfully 
created a new competitive carrier by using existing railway networks.  However, its 
leaders faced a “double jeopardy”.  Once the company becomes too successful and large, 
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the incumbents at MOR would feel threatened and would resist its growth; once it 
becomes closely knit with the state, its leaders would lose their autonomy and innovative 
momentum.  In order to guarantee the safety of railway transportation, the Ministry of 
Railways had been given the exclusive right of way to build private telecommunications 
networks along with the railways ever since the founding of the PRC.  Each day, MOR
operates 20 thousand passenger cars with an average of three million travelers, and 100 
thousand freight cars.  The railways would not work without telecommunications.  MOR 
possessed 120,000 kilometers of communication wire, 70,000 kilometers of optical fiber 
cable, and a large amount of advanced communication equipment.  It is the veteran in 
providing telecommunications services in China, with the second largest national 
information network with 70,000 employees.  
According to Peng Peng, the ex-Bureau Chief of the Telecommunications 
Department of MOR, the backbone telecommunications network of MOR was so 
advanced that it could compete with the China Telecom’s national network.  The 
technical standards were almost the same with China Telecom, but a lot of new 
technologies were first applied to MOR networks.  “We are the first in adopting coaxial 
cable, microwave, program-controlled telephone switches, satellite communicators, fiber 
optics cable, and even wireless phone.  In 1958, MOR started to use mobile phones 
imported from Soviet Union (TU3 radio transmission phone).  But China Telecom started 
to mobile phone studies in 1982.”61  He was also confident of the overall strength of 
MOR in building a robust national telecommunications network. In mid-1980s, Minister 
Han Zhubin tackled the thorny problems in telecommunications and initiated a three-year 
61 Personal communication, interviewed by author on January 31, 2005 in Beijing Telecommunications 
Museum
125
telecommunications upgrading program.  During this period, fiber optical cable was first 
used in Datong-Qinhuangdao railway for transporting coals from the hinterland of China 
to the port in the east coast.62  This wrapped up support from Premier Li Peng.   
The MOR was active in participating in the MEI coalition for the market entry of 
China Unicom in 1992.  From that time, the MOR had been making preparations to enter 
the public telecommunications market.  It sent many groups to the US, Japan, Germany, 
France and Britain.  In those countries, railway companies had successfully become 
competitive public telecommunications carriers.  For example, in the United States, Phlip 
Anschutz purchased the undervalued Southern Pacific Railroad and lay fiber optic lines 
for his Qwest Communications.  A key insight was drawn that legislature in Japan and a 
fair competition environment predetermined the way its Railcom to enter the market.   
Thus this strengthened the state’s resolve in China to set up regulations first. Another 
important insight was the “Quad” coordination by the government to set up committees 
inviting officials, professors, and entrepreneurs to jointly discuss the plan for division.  
Like in Japan, the Second Provisional Commission (Rincho, established in 1981) was to 
discuss administrative and deregulation issues.  Its fourth subcommittee included sixteen 
members from a diverse group of businessmen, academics, journalists, and union 
representatives.  The pro-reform force chaired by professor Hiroshi Kato (Keio 
University) was a big push for the privatization and breakup of Japan National Railways 
(JNR).  
During China Telecom's divestiture, the State Council was concerned about the 
slow growth of China Unicom. China Unicom entered the market as the second public 
telecommunications carrier in 1994.  It only took a small share of the wireless market 
62 another line from Beijing to Zhengzhou was also the first to use fiber optics
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after five years of effort.  Therefore, the State Council decided to cut out the whole 
paging business from China Telecom and handed it over to China Unicom. 
When MOR’s proposal to enter the public telecommunications market reached the 
State Council, the State Council saw it as another opportunity to strengthen China 
Unicom.  On the one hand, the shortage of fixed-line networks was perceived as the main 
problem hindering the growth of China Unicom.  On the other hand, the MOR has
nationwide fixed-line networks, which China Unicom did not have.  The MOR was also 
one of the sponsors and the investors of China Unicom.  For Premier Zhu, it would be a 
great match to combine the two.  Meanwhile, China Unicom was going to get the whole 
paging business from China Telecom's divestiture.  China Unicom would be greatly
strengthened by absorbing both the network facilities from Railways and the paging 
business from China Telecom.  A strengthened China Unicom should be able to compete 
with China Telecom.  Therefore, using the words of the insiders, Premier Zhu personally 
“arranged a marriage” between the MOR and China Unicom.  The MII, the State 
Economic and Trade Commission, Railways and China Unicom formed a coordination 
group and started the negotiations. 
The negotiation stuck on the employee issue.  MOR hired 69,168 employees in its 
telecommunications section, whereas China Unicom had hired about 8,000 employees.  
Railways’ employees were almost nine times the size of China Unicom.  China Unicom 
worried about being “eaten up” by Railways.   Therefore, China Unicom suggested 
taking all the telecommunications assets of MOR, but not all the employees.  MOR
insisted that employees and the assets were a whole package, take it or leave it.  The MII 
tried to persuade China Unicom to accept MOR's terms because it was embarking on the 
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initial public offering overseas.  It definitely needed MOR’s assets to win the investors’
confidence.  But China Unicom did not yield.  The SETC's efforts also failed because 
neither side would compromise on this issue.  The “marriage” was “arranged” by Premier 
Zhu.  To reject the Premier's decision, the MII had to find a subtle way to turn down its 
superior.  Therefore, MII minister Wu Jichuan conveyed his personal opinion instead of a 
formal report from the coordination group.  Wu emphasized that continuing negotiations 
would end up in bitter conflict.  He suggested starting an independent carrier to enter the 
telecommunications market.  On December 26, 2000, China Railcom was formed.  At the 
beginning, it owned a total asset of RMB 14.34 billion yuan, had a register capital of 10.3 
billion yuan.   Peng Peng, the former bureau chief of the Telecommunications Bureau of 
the MOR, became the CEO of China Railcom.  He summarized the market entry of China 
Railcom: “Our market entry shows the road from monopoly to competition is not straight, 
but winding.  We all need to totally renew our concepts and thoughts.”  Peng sang high 
praise for Minister Hu, saying that he is the No. 1 person pushing for the 
telecommunications reform in China.  He also told me that the first “barrel of gold” for 
China Unicom and China Netcom was from the telecommunications network of MOR.  
But the development of China Railcom encountered numerous problems due to the 
oppositions from the incumbent ministers of MOR.  
Peng got lots of support from Premier Zhu, Vice Premier Wu Bangguo, and Zeng 
Peiyan.  According to Wu Bangguo’s directive, China Railcom should become one of the 
key operators of telecommunications market. It should take advantage of the national 
network and make it large enough to compete with China Telecom and other competitors 
with a new management style.  Peng was enthusiastic with this message and organized 
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delegations to study the experiences in the West. He discovered that almost 80% of the 
anti-monopoly efforts in the West were from the railway sector, Sprint, MCI, and Japan 
Telecom.  These countries had a fair competition environment with a good monitoring 
program.  Peng advocated inviting big consumers, cooperating with local vendors for 
marketing, and creating comprehensive information system to allocate resources.  With 
his effort, China Railcom now has revenues of roughly 10 billion yuan compared with the 
70 billion of China Unicom.  
The parasitic nature of China Railcom soon doomed Peng’s fate.  As MOR 
strictly controlled China Railcom on every key decisions, China Railcom soon lost its 
edge as a competitive carrier against other telecommunications competitors. But Peng 
suffered from a setback with ministers from MOR.  Minister Cai Qinghua was afraid that 
the outgrowth of China Railcom would be out of his control.  He complained: “The total 
budget for annual construction of the railways is only less than 30 billion yuan, while you 
Railcom wants to raise more than 10 billion investment.  It is ridiculous.”  Later, to cater 
to Minister Wu Jichuan, he raised the principle that “China Railcom only serves the 
railway needs, no competition with China Telecom, its surplus resource can go to the 
market, and the growth large revolves around the trunk lines of railways.”  Peng felt 
outraged and reported it to the vice premiers.  This offended the conservative ministers of 
MOR and they decided to demote him from the CEO of China Railcom to the vice 
director of board.  Thus Peng’s vision failed to be realized.  Peng’s case shows that 
leadership vision was important for the initial designs and operation of their enterprises, 
but the political struggles were ruthless and many of them eventually lost power.  Under 
the Communist system entrepreneurial decisions were controlled by Party members and 
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this ran directly against the market principles.  “No separation of political interference 
into business” becomes the core problem of the ICT development.  This demonstrates the 
parasitic dimension of IT leaders: their inability to challenge the bureaucratic turf fight.  
The fundamental cause of this stalemate is that these IT leaders were powerful enough to 
fight against incumbents.  Conservative incumbents become the real obstacle for these IT 
leaders to grow.  
The Amphibious Features of the “Up and overs” 
The “up and overs” refer to those people who shift their jobs from the government to 
business or vice versa (xiahai, jump to the sea) in the ICT diffusion.  They are crucial 
bridges between state and society, a symbiotic representative of both the formal politics 
and informal politics in China.  The up and over phenomenon reminds us that these IT 
leaders may shift from their formal positions at the government to private sectors, thus 
building an informal link with formal institutions.  This “up and over” phenomenon 
reveals a pattern of state-business relationship that is not hierarchically clientelist, but is 
more symbiotic instead. Chinese politics have witnessed a continual clash between 
informal patterns of behavior and emergent institutions (Fewsmith 2001a, 81).63 One 
informal patterns of behavior is that the cadres’ secretaries (Mishu) who go into business 
can indirectly influence formal institutions.64 These secretaries used to play a role as
adviser and office administrator, ghostwriter and servant, personal representative or 
63
 Formal institutions and informal patterns of behavior can be mutually reinforcing, but it is difficult to 
develop formal institutions if informal behavior is destructive of stable expectations.
64
 The relationship between a Mishu and his leader is  patron-client.  The Mishu will figure out the leader’s 
intentions and the Mishu will conduct business on behalf of his shouzhang (leader).  It is interested in 
communication and coordination and dispute settling, to learn from the leader familiarity with the system, 
an ability to deftly manage personal relations and the value of discretion.  There is a lack of any clear 
separation in the career paths of the Mishus and the principal political actors.
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bodyguard, and policy coordinator.  In the British telecommunications reform, Ian Ellison, 
as the private secretary of Sir Keith Joseph, secretary of state of UK, was a committed 
civil servant who support of Joseph’s efforts to desert the equipment industry and focus 
on the needs of the wider community of telecommunications users.  He controlled the 
minister’s door, his appointment book, and his correspondence.  He serves as a double 
agent: he presents the minister’s case to the ministry, and the ministry’s case to the 
minister (Vogel 1996, 73).65
 This up and over phenomenon reveals that patron-client ties remain the sine qua 
non of Chinese politics (Gutherie 2001).66 They move through the “revolving door” 
between the state and private sector.  The up and overs’ proximity to the state cadres help 
them easily have access to enlighten state leaders on the understanding of the global 
information revolution and its potential impact on China. Up and overs historically have 
been able to turn their proximity to power into official power and position.  They outgrow 
the Leninist bureaucratic structures and provide new channels for fresh public opinion to 
reach the relatively close-door leaders.  The central leaders have to use these ties to assess 
changing public expectations.  In exchange for the resources from the Party, these IT 
leaders demonstrate their loyalty to the state via giving advice to the state for the 
administration of the information technology and promising a more stable China is even 
more important than democracy.  In a word, the evolution of China’s political 
development is transformed from within as an unintended consequence of adapting the 
65
 There are some resemblances in Japan.   “Family” manufacturers (amakudari, “descending from heaven”) 
refer to government bureaucrats going to lucrative private business after they retire.  However, not all of 
them are contributive to liberalizations in the ICT sector. Some businessmen are against privatization 
(Vogel 1996, 153).
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political institutions to demanding market initiatives.  Thus these IT leaders serve as 
catalyst for these political changes by actively engaging in the design and conduct of the 
policy-making processes.  
Thus “up and overs” are a good example of this symbiosis.  Because of their 
experience in the government, they have the trust from colleagues or senior governmental 
officials that can grant them licenses easily.  At the same time, they are able to give 
policy input to the government because of their commercial experiences.  Gao Hongbing 
is a good example of a talented new ICT entrepreneur.
 The example is Gao Hongbing, former secretary for Lu Xinkui, Vice Minister of 
Ministry of Information Industries.  His task of drafting, handling, and filing documents 
related to the first-hand activities of conducting policy research, investigating the 
principal, and collecting data for IT diffusion.  He provides inputs from critical sources 
like public opinion and the business community as he watches closely the Internet chat-
rooms, letters to the editor, books and magazines as a barometer of satisfaction with 
government policies.  In Brazil, one of the information revolutionaries “the Gang of 
Four”, Ivan Moura Campos used to be secretary of the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (S & T) and then jumped to the private sector.  
As an eloquent speaker, Gao drafted most of the speeches for Minister Lu.  In one 
article he wrote:
Premier Zhu says:  “Informatization is a deep revolution, an important aspect of 
China’s economic reform and also an important aspect of government reform.”     
Why is informatization so important and what is its relationship with the 
economic system reform? And how does IT promote government reform? 
Nobody has done a deep analysis. President Jiang also says “four modernizations 
66
 although it must also be recognized that rule and law-based procedures increasingly govern recruitment 
and retirement processes
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(industrialization, agricultural modernization, national defense and science and 
technology) could never detach from informatization.”  Modernization includes 
both the improvement of productivity and the readjustment of productive 
relationship.  It is a historical transformation of social relationship.  We need to 
pay attention to a new notion.  New forms of modernization are economic 
globalization, capital freedom, industrial informatization, and information 
networks.  Later it is re-categorized as global integration, political 
democratization, economic freedom, and social informatization.  The 
informatization is called the fourth power to change China.  Apart from power, 
market, and capital, knowledge will become a fourth decisive force which directs 
the flow of social resources and fortune distribution.  It will be a creative force for 
productivity.  67
Gao Hongbing is deeply involved in the government’s decisions on IT policy.  He also 
devised the three major components of the People’s Daily network.  These three 
components are Party news and policies, commercial short messages and advertisements, 
and bulletin boards.  The Strengthening China Forum later became one of the most 
influential bulletin boards in China.  Later he “jumped to the sea” and set up his own IDC 
company, ChinaLink.  Under the authorization of Mayor Wang Daohan, a teacher of 
President Jiang Zemin, he and his colleague Johnathan Shen came to the United States in 
1998 to write a report on the strategies of information in the US.  
The up and overs also reveal a new negotiating pattern in the post-Mao era.  
David Shambaugh concludes that under Deng, a consultative method is an important 
feature of rationalizing the decision-making process, as various advice is sought, pilot 
studies are undertaken, and feasibility reports are initiated. “Decision-making became 
more consensual, consultative, and collective” (Shambaugh 2000, 179-180).  Deng 
Xiaoping advocated the purpose of reform is to “bring the initiative of the masses into 
play and to increase efficiency and to overcome bureaucratism.”  He “placed a priority on 
building bureaucratic coalitions, seeking expert advice, and involving other leaders in 
67
 personal communications on November 24, 2002 in Beijing by author
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policy deliberations” (Shambaugh 2000, 164, 180).  The Chinese leaders, Zhao Ziyang, 
Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao have set up think tanks and research institutes in order to 
draw upon advice from them.  In the United Kingdom, the Department of Information 
Industry also commissioned an economist from the London Business School, Michael 
Beesley, to write a report on the feasibility and to recommend how much competition to 
allow.  He developed a radical plan that potential competitors could lease lines from the 
Post Office and then resell them with or without adding value (Vogel 1996, l75-6).  His 
recommendation, similar to Gao and other IT leaders’ recommendation, is that creating 
competition would have such a positive impact on the incumbent’s productivity that this 
would outweigh any possible cost in terms of lost economics of scale . 
A final product is a world IT infrastructure report jointly initiated by the Ministry 
of Information Industries and President Jiang’s key advisor – Wang Daohan.   In 1998, 
Wang entrusted his secretary Shen Jian to write a world report of IT infrastructure.  Shen 
Jian searched all the people working in this area, and eventually decided to invite Gao 
Hongbing to write this report.  He spent several months drafting the basic structure of the 
report.  And then, together with Shen Jian, Gao Hongbing spent half a year in the United 
States, including the Silicon Valley, Los Angeles, and Washington D. C.  They 
participated in the conferences held by The Global Information Infrastructure 
Commission (GIIC).  GIIC has quite a few members from China, including Lu Xingkui, 
the former Vice Minister of MII and now the general manager of China Electronics 
Technology Group. Other two important members of the GIIC include Richard Li, 
Chairman and Chief Executive of Pacific Century Group and Edward Zeng, CEO of 
SparkIce.  When they returned to Shanghai and delivered the report to Wang Daohan, he 
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greatly appreciated it and sent to President Jiang Zemin immediately.   Here is an excerpt 
from his article.  This article has three parts: The Sino-US Comparison of the Information 
Revolution, National Security under the Information Revolution, and the Government 
Strategies of the Information Revolution.  
The first part deals with the urge to catch up with the world by developing the IT 
sector. 
In international relations and international politics, during the transition from a 
bipolar world to a multi-polar world, information revolution will influence 
comprehensive national strength, national security, and the combat capability of 
national defense and the military.  The democratic values of the globe will be 
spread at an accelerated pace.
In economy, industrial privatization is a manifest trend.  Public ownership shall 
not meet the demand of a digital economy worldwide.  Economic globalization, 
an open market, and the demand for a global market are speeding up.  
In the aspect of society, non-governmental organizations are gaining momentum.  
Any government is weakening the control of the Internet on the regulation of the 
Internet. The private sector is increasing its influence over the management of 
society.  
On technology, with the renovation of the information technology, digitalization 
has resulted in the revolution from atom to byte; it will bring lots of social issues 
for the biotech, generic engineering and cloning.  
Under the information revolution, it is necessary for us to reassess our national 
interests and national strategies (Gao and Shen 2001, 34).  
On the second part, he compared China and the United States under the 
information revolution, and points out the gap (digital divide).  
The new round of information revolution, marked by the Internet, has come deep 
into American mainstream economy.  Emerging e-commerce and dotcoms are 
making the economic transition and resulting in the quantum change of American 
industrial structure and economic structure.  It is a new wave to push the 
American influence to the world to a new peak.  
The Internet users have reached 260 million world wide in 2001 compared with 
less 40 million in 1996.  There are 110 million in the US, accounting for 43% of 
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the global users and Japan has reached 20 million. Major European countries have 
reached 46 million.  
It is estimated that in 2005 the global online users shall be 765 million.  Up to 
2004, the global e-commerce volume shall reach 7290 billion us dollars, 50 times 
that of 1999, accounting for 7% more of total trade volume.  A lot of capital, 
technology, and products shall concentrate in this area, and the global economy is 
increasing unusually and commercial model is undergoing great changes.  The 
industrial economy is changing into digital economy.
The Chinese economic structure and social system is under the commercial model 
of industrialization, and is unable to cope with the impact of informatization.  The 
executive control has its limitations in the global transaction through the Internet.  
Under the impact of the global information revolution, the senior Chinese leaders 
are facing two-pronged battle and dilemma:  on the first front, the contradiction 
between agriculturalization and industrialization, the gap between the east and 
west.  Without keeping a balance, there will be chaos.  The second front, is the 
industrialization and informatization.  The gap between China and the US is huge 
on technology, human resources, market, and management, a big pressure exists.  
Therefore, in order to narrow the gap between Sino-American technology and 
civilization.   It is also very important to maintain military capability, economic 
capability, and cultural information capabilities balances between them.  The end 
of the Cold War demonstrates that the information revolution has broken the iron 
curtain and shaken the psychological trust of the Russians, leading to the collapse 
of the Soviet Union…. Therefore, China should systematically overhaul the 
political system…and locally produce its human resources, capital, and establish 
Silicon special economic zones (Shen and Gao 2001, 34).  
Then he talks about the political consequence of the Internet,
With the Internet, information cannot be blocked any more.  Control is not 
meaningful.  This has a great political impact.  Therefore, we can never treat 
informatization as an ordinary industry.  The controversies and problems can be 
easily dismembered by interest groups if not paid enough attention to.  
The core of the information revolution is the Internet, which is different from 
telecommunications networks.  If only treating the Internet as a means of 
telecommunication, without the national digital nervous system, we are unable to 
cope with challenges if we do not put it as the strategic foundation of the 
economic and social development.…  It will only take 20 years to set up an 
information society compared with 100 years of industrialization.  This 
competition over the Internet for globalization and modernization, is broadened to 
economic, culture, political system and national values.  
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Under globalization and informatization, the political party and the government 
must learn to accept changes, including the values and economic, political 
changes.  It should find resolutions in a greater level of opening and change, adapt 
unsuitable policies and systems that is not suitable for economic development… 
(Gao and Shen 2001, 35)
Still, he criticizes the government policy failures. 
The promulgation of polices regulating the Internet should take full considerations 
of international environment and the images of the Chinese government overseas.  
News management of ICP, encryption software, speeches on the investment on 
the Internet by the MII, the information security reported by the Liberation Army 
Daily reflected a lack of deep understanding and analysis of the Internet.  We 
should choose a favorable way of promoting China’s images by inviting foreign 
investment and equipment.  Though we should development highly independent 
and developed network economy by ourselves, we are in no way forbidding 
foreign companies and foreign advanced equipment from entering our domestic 
market.  (Gao and Shen 2001, 36)
He strongly calls for getting rid of monopoly of China Telecom and introducing 
competitive forces into the IT sector.  
On government strategy, the monopoly of telecom sector has increased the cost 
and risk of the information application, restricted the application of the Internet.  
The application of the Internet cannot obtain effective telecom resources and 
services.  The monopoly system has also increased the cost of enterprises and 
twisted the development of the Internet and the normal facets (Gao and Shen 
2001, 37).  
And, he points out the obstacles facing China’s IT industry.  
Without an effective risk investment mechanism and capital investment, we 
should set up an ecological industrial chain linking technological development, 
enterprise establishment, risk investment, and investment bank operation together.  
The venture capital should have profit and retrieval mechanisms, or else such a 
venture capital  system will not be established.  We should get rid of the 
traditional investment and financing methods to use the planned economy for 
infrastructure building, technological renovation, and bank loans.  
We also lack IT senior management personnel.  The core of a new economy is 
human resources.  We need a huge chunk of management team who are familiar 
with technological development, international capital operation, financing 
management, and commercial models and strategic resource integration.  IBM, 
Microsoft, Lucent have set up research institutes in China to attract local human 
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resources.  We should attract overseas Chinese back to set up new technological 
firms.  
We should also set up a steering committee of informatization chaired by national 
leaders, coordinate the construction of informatization and devise guidelines for 
the development to reduce the limitations of the government towards the Internet 
development. 
We should also reform the telecommunication mechanisms to audit the monopoly 
enterprises and encourage fair competitions in an open telecom networking 
market.  An impartial telecom management organ should be set up to introduce 
the telecom market regulation into the legal channel.   
We should also conduct an overall study of the informatization strategies, set up 
civilian research organizations, and set up offices at the Silicon Valley to improve 
the interaction with the US.
1. we should promote the application of the Internet at the top level 
and encourage the public improve their understanding
2. we should construct infrastructure and encourage the private 
sectors to join in; and open basic telecom market to more and 
more operators and investors
3. expand the interconnection to infrastructure and service, online 
communities and low connection fee 
4. introduce competition and lease international business
5. promote the production of local contents, and set up a legal 
framework to protect intellectual property and copy right
provide a virtual email address and open to universities, 
libraries, and schools (Gao and Shen 2001, 38).   
The most startling finding of their field investigation in the United States is that 
almost all route servers of the Internet (13) are located in the United States.  That all route 
servers are within the US, including two at the military, indicates that all Internet post 
offices are in the US.  This has posed unprecedented security concern for China.  The US 
can easily intercept and decipher the Chinese messages if China does not have its own .cn 
domain name.  This is a serious issue on the independence of a nation’s information.  In 
the future virtual warfare, the attacks and counterattacks will involve data control and 
traffic.  Without an Internet center in China, it could not control its flow of information.  
Therefore, China must shape its independent industries with intellectual properties and 
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networks under its own control.  Thus China must have its own domain name and 
establish its information infrastructure including PCs, .cn domain name, license center, 
and research and development centers.  This is not just a clash of civilization, a conflict 
between the Chinese law and economic system, but another round of “Learning from the 
West (Yangwu Yundong)”.  In this round of reform, China is going to replace its old 
knowledge system with a new one.  China should import not only just equipment from 
the West, but a series of understandings and concepts in the manufacturing and research 
sectors in China.  Now online content in Chinese accounts for only 0.3% of all online 
messages.  But now that China has 80 million Internet users it is quite possible that by 
2010, China will have 200 million users and the content will become vital for the Internet 
development of the world.  With the rapid increase of population, people need more and 
more information.  Most of the information has only access to the US English-based 
websites. Therefore, China must establish its own information and control system.  Thus 
the power struggle in the future lies in an equal strategic arrangement between the public 
and private.  
It is quite possible that China will rise to be the world’s No. 1 country in terms of 
the number of users is has.  In their report to the president, Jiang Zemin, the next 
generation the international competition will revolve around the height of information.  
The possible information threat will pose great world dangers.  In China the IT sector has 
brought about 15% of GDP growth each year.  IT has brought the Chinese improved 
productivity, a new resource at hand, broadband consumption, and a virtual society.   The 
Internet has become a multimedia, starting a new revolution.  However, 90% of the 
Internet users go into the United States.  60% of key decisions of the Internet come from 
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the United States.  Eventually, Gao’s report aroused intense interest from the state and 
was countenanced by Mayor Wang and President Jiang.  Thus these leaders serve as 
bridges between the West and China with an amphibious feature.  
Assessing Political Impact
It seems that the symbiotic dimension most salient among all dimensions in the 
public sector.  The autonomy of these IT leaders are demonstrated by their creative 
visions, clever skills, and unwavering bravery in pushing forward national information 
infrastructure and antimonopoly endeavors to break up China Telecom and introducing 
new carriers.  The policy-making process in this case is characterized by negotiating, 
bargaining, compromising and non-compromising.  Some IT experts were instrumental in 
the design and conduct of policy making such as Kan Kaili and Gao Hongbing.  Some are 
courageous enough to design national strategies to challenge the monopoly of China 
Telecom such as Minister Hu.  Some are able to use tactics against incumbents such as 
Peng Peng.  Others are conducive to communications between the public and private or 
between academia with government such as Hu Qiheng and Jasmine Zhang.   In this way, 
they are innovative forces for change in ICT diffusion.  However, we cannot make a 
jump from their contribution in ICT diffusion to political development.  The regime 
simply does not permit autonomous interest groups to operate.  Instead, the IT leaders’ 
interactions occurred in a series of special state commissions and joint research and 
ministry initiatives, with the state-owned ICT corporations and the state security bureau 
taking growing roles.  Their impact on political development is still limited.  They have 
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not institutionalized channels for civic participation to make the state more responsive to 
social demands. 
On the symbiotic dimension, IT experts like Gao Hongbing, Shen Jian, Dr. Hu 
Qiheng, Dr. Zhou Qiren, and Dr. Kan Kaili actively participate in the process of policy 
making and focus on the unwavering principle of competition.  They keep these themes 
alive in the public discourse, thus contributing to conceptual changes during a period of 
uncertainty in strategic restructuring of China’s telecommunications industry.  Compared 
with policy-making in the case of the MEI coalition breaking the MPT monopoly back in 
1993, the voluntary participation of academia and private sector made the policy-making 
process more open and more transparent.  A caveat here is not to treat the “state” as a 
unitary entity.  There are some officials who are quite liberal in pushing for ICT 
diffusion.  And there are also conservative incumbents against the liberal reform.  
Therefore one important contribution these IT leaders made is to mobilize support within 
the government.  As the regime is reforming itself, political institutionalization heavily 
depends on those designers and trendsetters.  Thus, the input of these IT leaders becomes 
crucial in enlightening people and choosing the right path to go forward.  
On the parasitic dimension, not all of their attempts are successful.  That Peng 
Peng was demoted from President of China Railcom is a lesson that these IT leaders may 
lose in power struggle with incumbents.  This is an important case to illustrate that IT 
leaders are unable to challenge the despotic power of the state, the authoritarian 
hierarchies and its irrationalities against political liberalization.  Qi Mingqiu, the 
president of Ji Tong Telecommunications Co., Ltd. (the company under MEI to 
undertake all Golden Projects), lost the power struggle and was excluded from the 
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leading group at the inception of China Netcom Group when Ji Tong merged with China 
Netcom.  Prof. Zhou Qiren, of the Chinese Economics Research Center of Beijing 
University, contended that the state-run monopoly of network infrastructure have no
incentive to stop charging monopoly pricing, nor any incentives to reduce costs through 
innovations.  Unlike policy recommendation to use state power to monopolize network 
infrastructure or to maintain the status quo, Dr. Zhou's argument on the necessity of 
redundant construction to reduce social cost was not adopted by the policy makers, and 
only at best served as an alternative.68
Their political impact cannot be exaggerated because there is an important 
conditional variable (or prerequisite) for their political influence to become effective—
the acceptance and support of central Politburo leaders.  Apart from the economic 
potential of the IT sector for leapfrogging development, there are two pragmatic reasons 
for the state to initiate IT reform.  One is the inefficient bureaucracy between a 
hierarchical rule of the Central communist government and the honeycomb web of 
informal horizontal ties at the local level.  It is this fragmented authoritarianism that has 
given rise to China’s building of a national information infrastructure.  The other one is 
its ideological control.  The state leaders view a strong information network may actually 
contribute to a better control of society. 69   President Jiang Zemin used to be the Minister 
of Electronic Industry and thus was enthusiastic about ICT agenda.  He argues that IT, 
especially Internet technology, “is going to change the international situation, military 
68
 see Huang 2002, Chapter 4.  
69 In a roundtable discussion in Shanghai (June 30, 1998), “Shaping China for the 21st Century,” President 
Clinton remarked: “In your economic growth you will almost leap over a generation of economic 
experiences that older European countries and the United States experienced [so] you will essentially be 
creating an industrialized and a post-industrial society at the same time. And therefore, more quickly you 
will have to educate more people at higher levels than we did.” See Bell, 1999, Foreword.  
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combat, production, culture, and economic aspects of our daily life significantly” 
(Lovelock 2000).  The Chinese government felt that to promote ICT competition may 
help China leap frog development.70 As a result, many Chinese officials and 
entrepreneurs go to Western countries or invite foreign experts to study the role of IT on 
national economy.  These are factors instrumental for the ICT diffusion in China, which 
are unrelated to the IT leaders’ effort. 
There are other intervening variables that may have an impact on political 
outcomes.  Most important are structural concerns by the top political elites may greatly 
impact their decisions on ICTs.  In China, the decision to break up China Telecom may 
largely reflect broader concerns of joining the WTO.  Thus the advisory roles of these IT 
leaders cannot be overstated.  In Brazil, President Cardoza had staked his 
administration’s reputation on implementing an aggressive and effective privatization 
campaign (Wilson 2004a, 139).  This determined his support for the “Gang of Four” and 
privatization of Brazilian telecommunications services.  In China, the policy makers 
accept some ideas from these IT experts in part to maintain a balance between fang (relax) 
and shou (control) -- to maintain political order while promoting economic growth.  Thus 
these IT leaders helped fine-tune governmental policies to initiate a series of institutional 
adaptations to muddle through.  
  
70 J. P. Singh uses the term “leapfrogging development” to describe how IT can help developing countries 
accelerate their pace of development and connect with the world economy while also facilitating the 
development of social and political dimensions.  1.IT can help developing countries skip over the stages of 
development and become members of a postindustrial society.  2. Leapfrogging is used in "an engine of 
growth" sense that technologies can help developing countries accelerate the pace of development and 
promote sustainable development. 3. Leapfrogging is used in a technical sense to signify skipping over the 
technical frontier or product cycle, see Singh 1999, Introduction.  
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This chapter focuses on IT leadership in the public sector.  The breakup of China 
Telecom and establishment of a national information infrastructure should not be 
interpreted as logical and rational elite behaviors in China, but as the key products of 
autonomous visions, symbiotic strategies, and negotiating behaviors of IT leaders.  I 
leave room for agency in order to free us from the deterministic lockstep inherent in 
inquiries that begin with preexisting structures.  It reveals that new rules and institutions 
in the ICT sector governing competition and decentralization at the state level are active 
pursuit of IT leaders instead of situational reactions to market initiatives.  Thus political 
change towards better institutional performances as the state responds to civic needs is 
often an unintended consequence of men and women in pursuit of their collective 
interests for multiple national information networks through breaking up the monopoly of 
China Telecom.  In so doing, leadership analyses allow the possibility that transitions will 
lead to innovative outcomes that break with habit and routine.  Even though their primary 
motive is for the sake of the survival and interests of respective ministries, they based 
their career on a vision of more connected and competitive ICT networks.  This 
autonomous dimension of IT leaders is vital for the ICT diffusion in China.  
Their symbiotic relationship and negotiating tactics with the state reveals that they 
are fine-tuning state policies as innovators.  Some IT leaders were active in the policy 
process, thus intervening in the specific design and conduct of the regulation in the ICT 
sector.  Some are open to publicize their ideas, devising strategies to dismantle 
monopolies, and bargain with the government over key issues like pricing.   They have, 
intentionally or unintentionally, helped create a more open, more legal-rational, and more 
humane government by engaging the state and society in a mutually constructed process 
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of learning and adaptation.  And  this ambitious group is willing to use their own 
authority and political skills to overcome and circumvent the resistance to reform, to 
bring bureaucrats in line and to lead public opinion by taking firm positions on 
contentious issues.  This counts as an important step toward political change in China.
However, their failures also reveal that the patron-clientelism of the Communist 
regime can put an end of their political career if they go too far.  The “double jeopardy” 
facing the president of China Railcom reveals that the strong resistance from incumbents 
at MOR may derail the reform process if the reform goes too far and challenges their 
vested interests; at the same time, if the IT leaders operate according to standard 
procedures, the new business will lose its competitive edge.  Thus, with a weak 
horizontal tie and a strong hierarchical Communist regime, they are at best a non-critical 
realm of social elites.  In the next chapter we will also find similar replication of this 
pattern in the private sector. 
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Chapter 4: Leadership in the Private Sector:
 Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and E-Commerce Pioneers
This Chapter attempts to discover tactics employed by new private ISPs to 
establish their business and expand their spheres of influence and to explore our 
hypothesis that social background and experiences shape IT behaviors.  The criteria I 
choose as IT leaders in the private sector is based on their influence and reputation to see 
whether they enjoy “autonomy”.  Jasmine Zhang (Infohighway, Genesis Capital), 
Michael Wan (Net China), and John Wang (8848.com.cn and 6688.com) serve as 
examples of the courage, craftsmanship, and creativity that these IT leaders have in 
pushing for the new market entry of e-commerce enterprises.  They are well-known in the 
private sector as pioneers of ISPs and software industries in China.  Compared with IT 
leaders in the public sector, their autonomous dimension is more developed.  The IT 
leaders at the private sector were creative and courageous enough to introduce new 
concepts and technology for the masses.  Some of them have also shown a high level of 
social responsibility by engaging in numerous environmental, charity, and humanitarian 
activities.  While at the same time, however, they are symbiotic with the state and can 
receive favorable deals. For example, they negotiated with the state for pricing reform 
and they sometimes undertake independent research concerning online issues and report 
to state institutions.  This may help the state gain a better understanding of civic needs, 
but these IT leaders are not vanguards of political liberty.  Their primary interest is still 
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their business.  These social inputs are mixed with their motives to be part of the 
establishment, not necessarily aligning with the civil society.  There is no doubt, through 
their efforts, the state becomes more responsive and the rules concerning the ICT 
diffusion were made clearer than before.  However, even though these IT leaders may 
sometimes channel social demands to the state, they are not, and do not intend to, 
establish formal links between state and society. Their amphibiousness character helps us 
understand their dilemma in the ICT reform process.  On the one hand, they seek formal 
channels at state conferences and hearings to start their business.  On the other hand, 
when they are frustrated by these attempts, they rely on personal ties for licensing and 
price reform.  Their publication and advocacy yield limited, but sometimes noticeable, 
pressure for the policy makers to be more responsive to social demands.  Coupled with 
the structural imperative of entrance into the World Trade Organization (WTO), the state 
has adopted measures to open new markets in the telecommunications sectors.  In this 
regard, these IT leaders may be a catalyst for political changes towards a policy of 
transparency and accountability. The three examples presented in this chapter become 
windows for discerning changes in the state-business relationship during the transitional 
period in China.  They represent the first attempts for private sectors to participate in 
face-to-face bargaining with the state voluntarily and actively. As one of the IT 
entrepreneur Michael Wan (ChinaNet Co., Ltd.) says:  "Although we might be the first 
few ISPs sacrificed in the competition against the monopoly of China Telecom, we are 
willing to be pioneers."71
71
 Personal communications on December 10, 2002 by author in Beijing.
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However, there are many private entrepreneurs in the ICT sector who are not 
interested in political issues facing the ICT reform in China.  Their prima facie interest is 
still business.  Even though they attend some symposiums organized by government, they 
only want to make some connections in order to sell their products.  Therefore, the run-
of-the-mill elites are not the concern of this Chapter since the dissertation is interested in 
those leaders who play roles in China’s ICT diffusion so as to test whether they are 
instrumental for political changes in China.  This is a “crucial case” study that only those 
influential IT elites will be studied here.  My goal is to see whether social background 
affects IT leaders’ attitude and behaviors; or putting it differently, how to explain why 
these people act differently. 
This chapter will focus on three well-known ISP leaders: Jasmine Zhang the 
founders of Inforhighway, Michael Wan, CEO of Net China, and John Wang, President 
of Mt. Everest Software Co., Ltd.  Edward Zeng, the founder of Sparkice and first 
Internet Cafés in China, was already studied in Chapter 2. They share similar traits, but 
they also differ in their political opinions and approaches.  An example their creativity is 
that they use the internal calculation methods from China Netcom to provide convincing 
statistics against the unreasonable pricing of China Telecom.  They used China Netcom 
as a way of balancing the demands of all social strata that wanted to check the possible 
corruption of China Telecom.  Under intense social pressure from IT leaders such as 
Jasmine Zhang, the first public price hearing was held.  At the same time the State 
Council also set up an investigation committee to study the pricing issues.  Now the 
question here is: Are China’s IT leaders emerging as agents of socialization and liberal 
reform in ICT diffusion, and does their performance in turn contributed to legitimating 
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the new system? Again, even though all of them achieved business success to a certain 
extent, their approach to politics and the final outcome were still different.  Jasmine 
Zhang  and Michael Wan were more  active in pushing for the agenda of pricing reform, 
while  John Wang kept a distance from politics.   Jasmine Zhang and Michael Wan 
initially  challenged the monopoly of China Telecom, but they  ended up being satisfied 
with the personal ties for business interests. John Wang also got a favorable deal from the 
government at a time the government sought to cultivate some demonstrative work in 
Zhongguancun.  Their symbiotic and parasitic dimensions eventually dominated and it 
remains to be seen whether these IT entrepreneurs would be vanguards for political 
changes in the Western sense. 
The Autonomous Pursuit of Individual Initiatives
Internet access service in China started in 1995 and five different kinds of 
services emerged.  The ISPs provided network accesses and affiliated online services to 
consumers via leased telephone lines from China Telecom. The first couple of ISPs were 
Infohiway and Net China, which were registered in 1995. China Byte became the first 
ICP (Internet Content Provider) on January 15, 1997.  The first IAP (Internet Application 
Provider) on web hosting, WayX Net Solution, inaugurated its business in April 1997.  
With the advent of venture capital in 1998, more and more ICPs joined the fray to 
compete with each other.  Some ICPs mushroomed such as Bookoo.com which sold 
books on CD-Roms and Fudao.net which provided online banking and financial services 
(ICPs will be discussed in Chapter 5).  At the same time, more IAPs entered the market.  
IDC (Internet Data Collection) also came into being.  They provide web hosting, web 
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solutions, and databases to government, business entities, and individual consumers. 
Finally, the first ISPs went to software businesses.  
The First ISP Crusader 
Two days before May 17, 1995, the International Telecommunications Day, 
Jasmine Zhang registered Beijing Information Highway Technology Company (BIHTC), 
the first well-known private commercial Internet service provider (ISP) in China.72 This 
marked the beginning of private Internet service providers and content providers.  
Jasmine Zhang’s story is that of a bright woman who made the first attempt as a private 
entrepreneur to challenge the monopoly of China Telecom.  Brought up in a quasi-
religious environment when “only science can save China”, her growth is a result of her 
education in science, impulse to make a fortune, and a spiritual pursuit for self-
actualization.  She majored in chemistry at China University of Science and Technology 
in Hefei, Anhui Province (east China) in the early 80s.  Leaders are always associated 
with transgressing accepted behavior and their lives are full of exciting moments.  
Zhang’s story is no different.  What distinguished her was that she was made the first 
ever Chairwoman of the Student Council of a top university in China.  During her school 
years, she was active in social activities.  Later she was sent to the graduate school 
without examination as an excellent student at the recommendation of his department in 
1986.  Upon graduation, she rejected a job offer at the China Youth League because she 
was afraid that to climb the ladder of hierarchical governmental establishment would 
sacrifice many precious things in her life.  Instead, she chose to be a journalist at China 
Science Daily.  Later she realized that newspapers were nothing but the mouthpieces of 
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the government.  “The brain does not belong to myself,” she sighed,   “I was disillusioned 
then I got married and gave birth to a daughter.”73 Even though she spent three years at 
High-Tech Bureau of Chinese Academy of Science (CAS), she still felt that she had to 
release her latent energy.  In 1989, CAS was discussing one academy with two systems.  
It was aimed to set up a branch that can apply research to production.  Legend became the 
first successful experiment by prioritizing “trade” to “technology” and “industry” (Mao 
Gong Ji).  When she witnessed the success of market initiatives at CAS, she decided to 
start her private business under the calling from Deng Xiaoping—“getting rich is 
glorious.”  Jasmine Zhang felt that she was not made to be a businesswoman, but the 
commercial circle proved to be the freest space for her to give full scope to her 
capabilities. 
Getting Rich is Glorious
When asked whether China’s business people are only interested in money, not 
politics, she disagrees:  
Not everyone is born a businessperson.  When we went to university, many of us 
did not know if we would go to business.  But our world outlook was shaped in 
earlier experience and we want to fulfill our independent pursuit.  Thus we find 
that the commercial area has most free space, an area that can give us full scope to 
our abilities.  Therefore, when we have made some fortune, we would seriously 
engage in further pursuit of life meaning. Thus, I go to traditional industries in 
order to try to find a way out to utilize the information technology to elevate 
productivity. I find this is a bright future for China, not just for the money’s 
sake.74
At the end of 1991, she “jumped into the sea” (xiahai).  By the time she left CAS, her 
official salary was only 122 yuan RMB (about 45 US dollars).  She complained to her 
72 Ying Hai Wei was named after the Chinese pronunciation for the term "information highway"
73
 personal communications on April 5, 2004 by author in Beijing
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superior that the Communist Party had extorted her extra values.   So the purpose for her 
to do business was simple and straight-forward: earn quick cash.  She went into paging 
service first, which was the earliest open sector in the IT industry.  But it did not last long 
because of the “red tape” with the government.  At that time, paging service needed to go 
through two processes: one is interconnecting lines controlled by the Ministry of Posts 
and Telecommunications and the Frequency, which was controlled by the administration 
of wireless resources at the State Planning Commission.75
In 1994, Zhang visited Los Angeles, amazed by the BBS (Bulletin Board System) 
and e-mails, “my instinct told me that this way of communication had great potential.”  
After this American trip, she sold their paging business.  It was a new way of 
telecommunications to link millions of Chinese people.  In 1995, she got seven million 
yuan (around 1.3 million USD) and registered Beijing Infohighway Communications Co. 
Ltd.  The Internet was unknown to the Chinese then.  Zhang was so enthusiastic as if she 
was bequeathed with a historical mission  to bring the Internet to the ordinary people.  
She exulted, “We are doing something glorious for the future.  I would like the Chinese 
people to enjoy a bright future unfolded by the information technology.”76 Thomas 
Jefferson’s famous motto—“Enlighten the people generally, and tyranny and oppression 
of body and mind will vanish like evil spirits at the dawn of day.”—has its modern 
application to the virtual revolution.   She realizes it is not a separate domain but a set of 
74
 ibid
75 During this period, she had also organized a recital for a rock star, Cui Jian, made some fortune.  Cui 
Jian’s recital was banned for three years since 1992 because in a song he covered his eyes with a red cloth--
“with a red cloth, I can see nothing.”  This offended the Ministry of Culture and it suspended his popular 
concerts.
76
 Personal communications in September 4, 2004 by author in Beijing, She also agreed with Wilson Dizard 
Jr. that the networked society promoted by IT is a work of civilization, comparable to the great cathedrals 
of the Middle Ages or, in modern times, to the Panama Canal and the Apollo moon missions. See Dizard 
Wilson 1997.
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changes that pervade  all aspects of society and reorganize all older relationships.77  With 
the Internet, venture capital came into China and played a pivotal role for the 
enlightenment of local venture capital and development.  
Her ambition to “build up a network for common people” earned her fame as the 
first ISP crusader in China. “At that time we were so naïve,” she complained that she had 
to spend lots of time persuading people to accept the Internet because nobody had heard 
of the word “Internet”.  But she did not realize that the real obstacle was the regulators.  
The decision makers on ICT issues were torn between categorizing the Internet as an 
information service or telephony service.  Finally these IT leaders persuaded to 
categorize the Internet as an information service.  The information service is open to 
market while the simple telephony service is regulated strictly. 
With their efforts, the Infohighway and several pioneering ISPs entered the 
market as information services as identified in the MPT 1993 notice.  Jasmine Zhang
studied the whole industry.  She sought to understand whether the Internet would bring 
changes in the quality of life and whether technological innovations would bring systemic 
innovation.  She began to set up her own physical network and rented DDN and 
interconnecting lines from China Telecom.  What Infohighway offered was a Chinese 
language software package that gave her customers’ access to a variety of on-line 
information, including news, BBS, entertainment information and even online games. 
She also provided a range of services to her customers, including basic ISP services such 
as email, FTP, telnet and web access, and on-line services through her “Information 
77
 The infrastructure industrial society was transportation-ports, railroads, highways, trucks, airports- which 
made the exchange of goods and materials possible.  However, the infrastructure of post-industrial society 
is communication: cable, broadband, digital TV, optical fiber networks, fax, email ISDN (integrated 
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Highway Space” that included news, talk forums, financial quotations, education and 
even online games.  In other words, it was a nearly full-service ISP and ICP with only 
10,000 Internet users.78 Then she bought routers from Cisco PC server from HP and all 
the software system.  With these equipments, she sent her Chief Engineer to visit Bill 
Gates and set up a complete TCP/IP Internet system.  She sighed: “we were just like 
peasants starting from sowing the seeds,” sounding like Edison when he invented the 
light bulb.79
The initial setup of Infohighway was a number of people with outrageous 
ideas.  Bill Gates started with a different idea and persists on that and became 
successful.  But in China we do not have that thoughtful and wise 
people.  Everyone is only interested in immediate profits, and nobody seriously 
ponders what they should do in their lives.  We started with BBS, because we 
believe in a closed society like China, people need interactions. So several people 
just started.  At that time, we want to make money.  But through the interaction 
with the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, I realized all the problems. 
And I started to push to a different direction. 80
Thus the autonomous pursuit characterized the first generation of private IT 
entrepreneurs with their pioneering spirit.  
Political Awareness
These private leaders have their autonomous pursuit of life through the Internet. 
After her initial efforts, she gradually felt as if doing something important, as if a historic 
mission was entrusted on her.  They start to cherish broader concerns for the nation.
systems digital networks, combining data, text, voice, sound, and image through single channel). See 
Daniel Bell, Foreword 1999. 
78She set up an email commercial center to sell email and computers at the time sell modem.  It is a model 
called 1+NET.  Later in 1996, many people saw this promising.  Therefore, she restructured capital 
structure.  China Fortune Group (Zhong Xingfa) had 66%.   In 1996 she got 50 million yuan.  She put up a 
fashionable slogan “how far is the Chinese to the information highway”. Personal communications on 
March 2, 2004.
79
 ibid
80
 Ibid.
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Edward Zeng and Charles Zhang are not the real IT champions, because they only 
want to make money and fame. They do not know strategies and the roots of 
Chinese politics. Charles returned from MIT in order to make a fortune and it 
happened that the Internet becomes a fashion. He might be opening up another 
Hardrock Cafe if entertainment is a fashion.  So these people do not know what 
China really needs and what their historic mission is in the Development of China.I 
have been on the cover of a famous magazine Chinese Entrepreneurs.  I have known 
at 50 tycoons on the Forbes 500 riches.  From what I know they are all cheating for 
money.  Nobody really has any sagacity or resource to pursue a worthy life. Media 
is only interested in reporting or twisting what I mean.  It needs some people to 
seriously think what we should do. 81
She is wary of the broad socio- political context of information technology.  “We 
did not realize that this industry needed a grand eco -system.”  She mentioned the
“original sin” of China's ICT sector.  China has not “informationalized” or reached the 
stage of the information society.  For a country to reach the stage of information society, 
according to Zhang, economic liberalization, political democracy, and post-
industrialization are three necessary components. “China still has many feudal traditions, 
so many aspects of society are controlled, how can China really reach the stage of an 
information society?”  There are many inherent systemic obstacles for China to create an 
information society.  For one, that China cannot leapfrog the stage of capitalism and as 
many as 60% of the Chinese population is poor.  Also, there is no longer a unified 
ideology for the Chinese people that would encourage them to pursue a certain common 
goal, as was the case in during Communist revolution.  In lieu of a unified ideology, 
people attribute everything to the “Chinese characteristics”.  She said: “President Jiang 
Zemin has vulgarized the ideal of Communism in the recent 16th Communist Party 
Conference by saying that to reach Communism is to get rich and better-off.  Is this what 
Marx and Lenin pursued?” 82
81
 personal communications on April 5, 2004, Beijing by author
82
 ibid. 
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She believes that the whole process of political changes adapted for the ICT 
diffusion is like dancing the Tango-- three steps forward and two steps backward.  One 
can make a fortune if she knows how to step forward, but if she does not stop when she 
should step backward, she will be endangered or even put to death. As political outcomes 
emanate from interaction and bargaining, implying a second-best compromise between 
state control and market liberalization.  She understand s that the major improvements of 
the Chinese government is that it has been able to meet crisis with change, but change 
braced by stability, with an emphasis on administrative competence and a political 
culture of consensus and co-operation.  However, the Communist Party’s adversarial 
stance towards transparency and accountability is a challenge facing all new market 
entrants.
Joint Efforts for Licensing, Pricing, and Interconnection
The autonomous character of the private IT entrepreneurs is also derived from 
charismatic leadership because they have new concepts that would make things change in 
a positive direction.  These leaders were persons of great curiosity throughout their lives.  
Many of these IT leaders also had a very creative mind when they were young.  For 
example, Michael Wan has a talent for both technological complexity and social 
activities.  In 1982, he got almost 100% in his mathematics college entrance examination 
and went to the Central China Institute of Technology.  He was active at the Study 
Department of the Student Council and organized numerous discussion forums and 
salons.  Later, he went to Tsinghua University to pursue his graduate studies in the 
Wireless Department.   He became the Chairman of Student Saloon and could present a 
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speech before tens of thousands of people.  His eloquence was not only due to his 
activities, but also because of his readings over all kinds of topics, including Nietzsche, 
and other social, economic, and political issues.  He invited provincial governors to 
Tsinghua University and delivered speeches there, making his academic work quite a hit.  
At Stanford, he completed two years worth of courses in nine months.  At the end of 
1998, Michael Wan, together with Jasmine Zhang, struggled against the monopoly of 
China Telecom by establishing an enterprise alliance to work for the reduction of 
network service fee and achieved a success by starting the first telecommunications price 
hearing at the end of 1998.  
Jasmine Zhang and Michael Wan referred the pricing issue to the Law of Price 
and finally the State Planning Commission agreed to organize such a hearing.  Michael 
Wan was selected as the representative for the ISPs.  With the endless bargaining, the 
monthly rent of 2 M data lines has been lowered from 4 million yuan to 430,000 and 
eventually reached 80,000.  Thus the access fee for the Internet users has been lowered 
from 20 yuan/ hour to 4 yuan/hour.  Now Michael Wan is nicknamed “Player King” by 
consumers because he was easy going and had an optimistic attitude against odds.  He 
invited 50 million yuan in venture capital and owned 60% of Net China shares.  His 
company also offered unlimited access to the Internet at an affordable public rate of about 
35 dollars (RMB 300 yuan) per month.  Michael Wan serves as an “outsider” example 
that opened external challenges against monopoly.  
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The Kafkaesque Sequences 
The barriers blocking these private ISPs from getting licenses was 
revealed during a talk between Michael Wan and Ernest Wilson (Wilson 2004a, 239-
240).  First, a business person needed to apply for a license.  Wan referred to this as only 
a “paper license because it doesn't mean anything; it's just on paper, not in reality.  It 
doesn't entitle you to anything more than to go to the next step.  But even here, you can 
never get even the 'paper license' on the first try, you need to go again and again. And this 
doesn't guarantee that you will get the next things that you need.”  One’s company must 
also submit its business plan to MII/China Telecom. “This is ridiculous, since China 
Telecom is also in the same business as we are as an ISP retailer. This is like giving your 
competitors your whole business plan!”  He added, “What they try to do is to force you to 
team up with them, then they either absorb you or run you out of business. They can 
undercut your every price, and then when you’re finished, they raise the price again” 
(Wilson 2004a, 239).  This marked the initial attempts by private actors to challenge the 
irrationalities of monopoly from external side.  
The next step was for an applicant to get a telephone line. This cost $2,000 for 
installation, and then for ISPs a monthly charge of $300 (Regular commercial monthly 
cost is about $150, and much less for residential).  Then one could apply for a leased line.  
In the U. S. a lease line was about $1,200 per month.  In China four years ago it was 
$80,000 per month.  Later, one must register with Ministry of Public Security. Finally, 
ICP/ISP then must also submit to content regulations, so managers must do a great deal 
of self-policing.  As a result, the customer got bad service, slow speed, no content, and 
very high prices.  Wan reported that such virtual harassment is the main reason that while 
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more than 500 ISP licenses have been issued, perhaps only 10-12 operated an ISP at the 
end of 1999. 
After Wan established his Net China in 1995.  He became one of the pioneers of 
ISPs in China.  He started the 300 yuan/month rental service and provided free training to 
his customers.  In 1996, Wan launched an enterprise coalition and requested to lower the 
network charges.  He also started the structural adjustment of the telecommunications 
fees.  
Dialogues with the Government
In all the countries where the Internet spreads rapidly there is a “big bang” from 
outside of the political system when, like an exploding universe, the perception of an 
information age spreads quickly and widely across all governmental institutions.  There is 
also a “small bang” within the existing establishment when an implosion released years 
of suffocated aspirations for renovation and change (Cowhey 1990).  This guided the 
efforts of private ISPs in obtaining the government’s support for ISP from the State 
Council.  It also coincided with the state’s National Economic Informatization Initiative.  
The leader of this Initiative, Vice Premier Zou Jiahua visited the Xun He Group, the 
parent company of China Online in April 1997.  China Online, launched in Shenzhen, 
became the second private commercial ISP.  For the Internet commercialization, China 
Online in the South and Infohighway in the North quickly spread beyond their local areas 
with much broader national influence and reputation.  But the free market entry of the 
ISPs did not last long.  On February 1, 1996, the State Council issued an interim order on
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Administration of International Networking of Computer Networks.83  The order 
restricted the networks’ access to the global network by requiring all networks to 
exclusively use the international channels provided by the MPT (Taylor 1997, 633).  In 
the West, this order was reported as a government “crackdown” on Internet usage.84
In response to this, Infohighway sponsored many dialogues with government 
officials.  They are what Wilson calls the “Quad” efforts— coordination between liberal 
officials in the public sector, entrepreneurs at the private sector, researchers, and non-
profit organization actors who cooperate with each other have their input in the process of 
ICT diffusion.  On August 17, 1996, they organized a Symposium on the Law and Policy 
Governing the Internet.  They invited government officials from relevant governmental 
organs, including the State Council's Steering Committee of Informatization, the Legal 
Bureau of the State Council, and the Education Science Culture Committee of the 
People's Congress, the Intellectual Property Rights Office of the Supreme Court, the 
Legal Bureau of State Publication Bureau, the Ministry of Public Security, and the MPT.  
An official explanation for ISP licensing from Beijing Telegraph Bureau, is that the new 
order was to ease the free market entry of the ISP under the umbrella of information 
service rather than information control over the ISPs.  It greatly relieved the tensions 
between newly emerged private ISPs and the government.  The significance of this 
Symposium was a first attempt for direct contacts between the private sector with public
83
 On December 11 1997, the State Council approved it.  The Ministry of Public Security implemented this 
order later.
84
 According to a report from Reuters, "The regulations cover a wide range of crimes, including leaking 
state secrets, political subversion, and spreading pornography and violence." "China's Net Regulations 
Begin," Reuters, 30 December 1997. The U.S. Embassy in Beijing reported, "Chinese government 
sensitivities about control of information coming into China are reflected in the strict controls it maintains 
over publishing, broadcasting, and electronic communications, including the Internet."  US Embassy, ”New 
PRC Internet Regulation”; available from http://www.redfish.com/USEmbassy-China/sandt/sandt.htm; 
Internet; accessed 11 January 1998.
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officials from the ministries, the legislature and the judicial branch.  This symposium 
served as a channel for information sharing and opinions exchange on policy and legal 
issues.85  As to the impact of the symposium, it contributed to closer private-public 
coordination.  Liu Zhengrong, director of the Internet division of the Media Bureau of the 
State Council, acknowledged the importance of these interactions. “For every policy and 
regulation over the Internet, we hold discussions between the ISPs and us.  We either 
went to them or they went to us.  They can call me directly...  We also study Internet 
regulations developed in the West as our references.”86
Thus Jasmine Zhang and Michael Wan attempted to reduce the cost of the leased 
line from China Telecom.  The monthly rent for an interconnecting line from China 
Telecom was 6000 yuan (800 US dollars), when she left the company was only 168 yuan
(20 dollars).  She told me the company was losing money all the time.  She stormed into 
the office of Leng Rongquan, general manager of China Telecom and accused him of
being the chief criminal of China’s information industry.  He laughed, saying that their 
financing was controlled by the Ministry of Finance.87  The leasing fee constituted about 
70% to 80% of the ISPs' costs.  From 1996 to 1998, through media and direct lobbying, 
the ISPs repeatedly appealed for reduction of the leasing fee.  The State Council’s 
Steering Committee of the NII twice invited Infohighway to discuss the pricing issue.  
The MPT officials even directly asked for specific pricing numbers under which 
Infohighway could survive. 
85
 See "Briefings of ISP Discussion in Beijing," IT Industry Weekly 10, (1996), 16.  (Weekly is an internal 
publication by Infohighway)  
86
 In 1996, Lucent invited officials to study policies of ICT regulations. Personal communication, 
November 19, 2001
87
 personal communications on April 5, 2004 by author in Beijing
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On December 29, 1997, the People's Congress passed the Pricing Act.  Article 23 
requires government agencies in charge of “utilities, or production under natural 
monopoly conditions” to hold public pricing hearings with consumers, producers and 
other relevant parties.88 At the request of Michael Wan, the table for the hearing was 
round and included public, private, and academic groups along with consumers. Wan 
told every participant that it was a historic first for China to adopt a Western approach for 
price hearings.  And he also proposed that a principle of “Democratic Centralism” would 
be applicable.  This is to ensure a free and open discussion at the round table while 
disputes were kept from outsiders.   In this way, the MPT officials had to act in a fair and 
just manner to implement reforms without losing its face to the public.  At the request of 
these IT leaders, the leasing fees for the ISP were reduced several times in 1997 and 
1998. Although the leasing fee is a narrow issue that only affects the individual ISPs 
involved, their lobbying efforts led to the institutionalization of public hearings on 
telecommunications pricing.  This is an important public policy that has a broader impact 
in society.  By raising questions and establishing direct communications with government 
officials, the ISP entrepreneurs contributed to a more transparent and consultative policy-
making process on the important policy issues. 
During the discussions, Michael Wan proposed to establish a trade association as 
a regular link with the government and he received a positive response.  After the 
meeting, the first ISP association was organized in 1997.  The significance of this very 
loosely organized and short-lived trade association cannot be underestimated.  The 
voluntary nature of the association and its aim at promoting the collective interests of 
business companies made it a departure from previous norms.  It started to report the 
88
 See Pricing Act of the People's Republic of China (Beijing: Legal Publishing House, 1998), 9.
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opinions of the ISPs to the government, who readjusted industrial policies and organized 
international exchanges.  In 1999, he promoted Free PC, and advocated the development 
of Linux, which aroused the attention of the government.  In 2000, he promoted the 
network security and application and joined the government networking project.  Even 
though their efforts do not result in direct and concrete policy outcomes in every aspect, 
their autonomous and creative pursuit certainly helped the coordination between the 
public and private sectors.  
Tapping New Turf of E-Commerce
Leverage for Traditional Industries
After early successes, these leaders learn from their past failures and start to move 
in new directions.  Jasmine Zhang, suffering from a shortage of investment, quit her CEO 
position at Infohighway in 1996.  She thought hard and turned to the capital market when 
she set up Genesis Capital in Hong Kong.  As an investment consulting and venture 
capital firm, Genesis Capital’s mission was to create a world-class Chinese enterprise, 
and growing with them.  The focus of her business becomes the “New Economy”.  
We think that it will be difficult to understand the Chinese “New Economy” if we do 
not put it in a broader social context—economic reform and development, market 
opening.  This environment has been here for over 20 years now.  The truth is that the 
development of “New Economy” in China has not taken a path that we have seen in 
the developed economies such as the US with a full-fledged linkage to the global 
economy.  On the contrary, the transition to market economy and the efforts to become 
part of the global economy has not yet finished.  As the biggest developing country in 
the world, China has a hard time to get rid of the residual shackles from transition.  
Building up a business in the Chinese “New Economy”, one should not lose sight of 
such facts.  Business models that are simple copies from those successful ones in the 
West do not automatically translate into success.  
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The New Economy with the Internet at its core is a knowledge-based economy.  It is 
characterized by worldwide deployment and applications of information technology 
and Internet, especially e-commerce.  Amidst the development of the new economy, 
we have witnessed a steady improvement of economic efficiency and productivity.   
With the advent of the Internet and its widespread deployment, economic globalization 
has also deepened.  An entity has to embrace innovations in order to keep abreast of 
the economic tide.  
At the core of “New Economy” lies the further development of informatization.  This 
line of development has taken a grand design (rapid growing size of fixed line 
telephone, wireless, cable, Internet, PC, and TMT sectors) in recent years and 
technology investment has become a key component of China’s GDP.  China has 
become a significant player of this sector in the world.  The Chinese government in 
recent years has promulgated “Industrialization Driven by Informatization” and this 
has signaled a clear direction for the Chinese “New Economy”.  We are well 
positioned in going forward under this direction.  89
The Chinese characters of Genesis Capital –Lian He Yun Tong  reflect her core 
ideologies.  “Lian”-- “Connect” by building an open platform and framework for 
partnership and cooperation; “He”—“Harmonize” by creating the best place for attracting 
the best people to excel: “Yun”—“Opportune” by capitalizing our accumulating 
resources; “Tong”—“Create” by providing a channel for “local & overseas, technology & 
market, capital & business, policy & economics”. 
Then she realized without a broader understanding of the information society, she 
could hardly make a difference.  But she soon she found a way out of predicament.  She
points out how IT can integrate traditional industries to give scope to greater potentials of 
the “four modernization” of the Chinese development.  Efficiency is manifested not only 
through its quantitative way of energy-saving in communications, but also in its 
qualitative change of initiating profound technological and social transformations.  IT 
creates value-added services and increasing returns to scale and is often capital saving in 
the next substitution (i.e. fiber optics for copper), uses less capital and produces a more 
89
 A brochure introducing this company Genesis Capital obtained by author in September 2004.
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than proportional gain in output.  “The real impact of the Internet upon Chinese industries
is to enhance the restructuring current industrial system”, she told me. The role of IT 
leverage is two fold: one is the information technology development itself, the other is 
the industrial restructuring and readjustment as a result of informatization.  Advances in 
the information industry and traditional industry renovations are a mutually promoted and 
integrated process with social reform.  
However, she cautions on the obstacles of the Chinese IT industry.  “If we are to 
compete globally, we must apply ICT as a new leverage to upgrade all organizations and 
companies. But not everybody appreciates this need first.  We had to go to industry and 
help them recognize the problem and to introduce new procedures and processes.” 
Therefore, she realized the importance to penetrate traditional industries with the 
information technology.  
As you know the policy “informatization leading industrialization” is put forward 
in the Chinese national guideline.  How to implement this strategy is a serious 
topic.  The real issue is property rights.  China is still a planned economy, most 
industrial resources are monopolized.  Therefore, there is a potential increase 
from the emerging market.  Many productive resources and factors are semi-
closed and cannot free flow or be fairly restructured.  Our traditional economy is 
not marketized, therefore, without a fair, open, free-flowing and orderly resource 
environment, the role of information for restructuring cannot be implemented.  
The most important issue for informatization or new economy is based upon the 
renovation of traditional economy.  In the coming five years, most industries will 
position themselves in global economy.  Informationization should become the 
core productive force in the traditional industries.90
90
 Personal communications in April 4, 2004 by author in Beijing.  She is keen to make the Internet 
enlighten people.  This reflects her feeling to catch up with post industrial society.  She was quite aware of 
a roundtable discussion in Shanghai on June 30, 1998.  In the speech, “Shaping China for the 21st Century,” 
President Clinton remarked: “In your economic growth you will almost leap over a generation of economic 
experiences that older European countries and the United States experienced [so] you will essentially be 
creating an industrialized and a post-industrial society at the same time. And therefore, more quickly you 
will have to educate more people at higher levels than we did.”  See Daniel Bell, “Foreward 1999”.  
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Zhang is an example of a private IT leader who constantly sought new meanings 
for her career and the future of China’s development.  Even though she is in the world of 
business, she is fully aware that business is only a free space for her ambition to make a 
difference in history.  Thus she represents extraverted and outspoken IT leaders with 
autonomous beliefs and pursuits in the ICT sector.  In contrast, John Wang is a more 
introverted, a down-to-earth software businessman who understands that politics must be
approached neither too closely nor too distantly.  
 Local Government Supports for Software Industry
An early pioneer of e-commerce is John Wang, who organized the largest online 
wholesale transaction platform in China.  In 1962, Wang was born in Fuzhou, Fujian 
province.  Nicknamed Lao Rong “Old  Banyan” ,  John Wang, former CEO of 
8848.com, believed it was a piece of cake to study Chinese and mathematics in late 
1970s.  He skipped the fourth grade at primary school and instead traveled throughout 
China at the age of eleven when he would only pay 1/4 of an adult train fare.  This trip 
imbued him with the aspiration to become a great man.  At that time, only students who 
were three years older than him could take part in the national college entrance 
examination.  The principal of his high school consented to his taking part in the 
examination only if he could rank among top three of senior high school students.  He 
was ranked first at the end of the year.  People praised his “talent” and he replied, 
“Actually maybe I was gifted at first.  But I do not think talent really makes that much 
difference.  I feel that the most important factor for my later growth was that I was 
interested in almost everything.  I wanted to understand everything if I do not know them 
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(Lao Rong 2003, 3)”.  In 1978, he went to Harbin Institute of Technology (HIT) to 
accomplish his bachelor’s degree in the Department of Computer Sciences.  In 1982, he 
got his B.S. degree and was assigned to a job at former Ministry of Aerospace and 
Astrology.  He had to deal with computer and other network related technologies.
Silicon Valley
The overseas experience also contributed to his later of pursuit of e-commerce.  
Wang claimed that his experience in the Silicon Valley was quite instrumental later in 
life.  He recalled that after he was assigned to work for the Ministry of Astronautics, he 
was sent to the Silicon Valley to learn computer technology and networking systems, 
possibly for the F16 fighter in 1987.  He read quite a few books (especially the one 
named “Winning the Game”) on the celebrities of information technology in San Jose, 
which stimulated his interests in opening up his private business.  He named his company 
8848, the height of Mt. Everest, to make sure that his company could become the most 
advanced e-commerce company at that time. Wang had a faith that IT can bring about 
leapfrogging development.  Just because the Internet is from abroad, it became a testing 
ground on whether the government could control it or not.  He said, “The most important 
issue is that the Internet is a new field and nobody in the government realized its full 
potential, thereby they did not quite care about its future impact on the Chinese society….  
As it was a new field, there was no monopoly, and a group of people saw this space and 
nobody really thought highly of it.”91  MII started to talk about value added service of 
information, but it was Charles Zhang and Ding Lei (CEO of Netease e-commerce 
website) who really started to tap the commercial value of it.
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 He also investigated the software industries at Bangalore in India.  Software 
production from companies in Bangalore yielded annual exports worth $300 million USD 
as of 1994.  Approximately 150 of 600 Indian firms operate on global contracts, but 
before 1989 few Indian firms worked internationally.  Now most of them have 
international business.  Foreign companies like Citicorp, Microsoft, Oracle, and others 
now have the software operations in India.  The same effect is also manifested in Chinese 
economy.  The telephone lines in China increased at 21.3% from 1983-1993 annually 
while its economy was growing at 10% per year (Talero 1997, 28).  Thus he believes in 
Joseph Nye’s assertion:
Knowledge, more than ever, is power.  The one country that can best lead the 
information revolution will be more powerful than any other.  For the foreseeable 
future, that country is the United States.  America has apparent strength in military 
power and economic production.  Yet its more subtle comparative advantage is its 
ability to collect, process, act upon and disseminate information, an edge that will 
almost certainly grow in the next decade (Nye and Owens, 20-26)92
  In 1989, John Wang became a director of a joint venture in Shenzhen.  In 1992, he 
became the largest salesperson in computer products and books, his annual sales 
surpassed more than a hundred million yuan.  In 1993, he joined the chained organization 
of Lianbang computer networks sales.  In 1998, he undertook the preliminary experiment 
to set up “software port” online to sell software.  In 1999, he has become the vice 
president and CID, chief manager of e-commerce department at Beijing Union Software 
Inc.  In July 1999, he assumed the position of the president and board director of Beijing 
Mr. Everest E-commerce Service Corporation (www.8848.net).  In November, he 
91
 Personal communications in November 30, 2004 by author in Beijing.  
92
 Arquilla and Ronfeldt also argue that two poles are associated with “information strategy”—one 
technological (cyberspace safety and security), the other political and ideational.  “Information strategy is 
seen as a way to harness and express the ‘soft power’ of American democratic and market ideals, to attract, 
influence, and lead others”(Arquilla and Ronfeldt, ix-x).  
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became the Board Director and Chairman of the company.  In March 2000, the company 
has signed to become the chief distributor for 3Com.in China.   
His autonomous pursuit is different from others.  “The main problem of the 
Internet enterprises is that many people produce the same thing as others.  In the line of 
the Internet, you usually have something first, not second.  Successful enterprises always 
think of what others are doing, or what other have said but nobody has achieved” (Hou 
and Kong 2001, 320).  He hopes to compete with Amazon.com and other Internet 
companies.  He does not cover his ambition to build an e-commerce empire.  He speaks 
openly at Davos, aiming at becoming the first e-commerce enterprise in China.  
According to his recount, the internal networks of sales were important for 
entrepreneurship.  That is, those people who understood IT and loved IT helped them get 
the first barrel of gold.  In the 1980’s and early 1990s, fortune was accumulated through 
information asymmetry.  At the preliminary stage, there was no Corporate Law.  It was a 
time of enlightenment for the computers and IT sector.  People at that time did not know 
how to use CAD.  So it was quite lucrative.  A computer would give a computer vendor 
more than 10,000 yuan profit (USD 1200).  Then he cooperated with the User’s Friend 
software and started chain stores to sell PCs.  In a single year of 1995, he got a profit of 
840,000 yuan.  By the end of 1998, the United Software had 386 software chain stores.   
He then pushed for favorite policy together with other IT elites at conferences   
Government Support for the Software Industry
Wang’s case illustrates that markets require supporting institutions at the local 
level.  This is emblematic of the parasitic dimension of these IT leaders.  They definitely 
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need government support for property rights and tax favors.  From Wang’s case, we also 
learn that a symbiosis exists between the public and private sectors.  “Much of Beijing’s 
success was a result of the growing interaction between independent non-governmental 
entrepreneurs and local officials”(Segal 2003, 52).  In April 1984, the Beijing 
government was ready to make Haidian District “China’s Silicon Valley” because of its 
dense networks between state, private, research and university.  “The local government 
trumpeted inter-organizational organization and entrepreneurial activity as the basis of 
‘innovation network’ linking enterprises, research institutes, and universities to each 
other and to the local government” (Segal 2003, 58).  
 The early start-up companies were managed by fearless entrepreneurs who could 
risk safe jobs within the establishment.  They wanted to establish a company wherein 
they could enter an environment in which one can develop oneself.  Mutual feedbacks 
between these enterprises and the government became routine, even though discord 
appeared during interactions.  Stone and Legend declared they were dedicated to the
service of China and revitalizing the nation.  These entrepreneurs presented to the 
officials ambitious plans.  They wanted to globalize, move into the stock market, increase 
the scale of production, become conglomerates, industrialize, and financially diversify. In 
1988, the Torch Plan sought to broaden the sources of funds for private start-ups.  As a 
result of government support on tax break and tax holiday, these companies enjoyed 
golden ages of development from 1980 to 1992.
Thus Wang develops an attitude towards politics just like a Chinese proverb:  
“neither too close nor distant.”  Though many IT entrepreneurs try to keep the 
government interference at arms length, he does not reject governmental communications.  
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He was glad that the Chinese government was actually approaching them actively.  Just 
as Peter Evens argues, the success of developmental states depends on a balance between 
institutional autonomy and dense links to societal actors (Evans 1995, 49).  Wang’s 
success coincided with the state efforts to strengthen its software industry as a national 
strategy for leapfrogging development.93
Wang’s case demonstrated that local government support helped enterprises 
overcome many market barriers, a symbiosis that characterized the new market with its 
incomplete information, undefined property rights, and price distortion.  In many 
conferences, Wang got in touch with the vice mayor of Beijing, Lin Wenyi.  Born in 
1944 from Taiwan, Mayor Lin used to be a professor of physics at Tsinghua University.  
Beijing municipal officials relied on small enterprises and a hands-off approach to market 
coordination in the information industries.  She helped to reduce the VAT to less than 5%, 
compared with a 17% of other manufacturing industries.  This help from the Beijing 
mayor demonstrates that the state is willing to assist the IT leaders in achieving  their 
goals, at the same time, they can strengthen national competitiveness and rule of the 
Communist Party.   This is a cozy relationship between government and entrepreneurs, as 
they call it “good mother-in-law (hao po po)” (Segal 2003, 15).  The best mother-in-law 
does not interfere with the internal workings of the enterprise, with the relationship 
between husband and wife, but supported the couple in raising their children.  Of course, 
93 According to Ni Jianmin from the Policy Committee of the Communist Party, the government conducted 
several field researches in India.  They believed that by adopting new technology, especially information 
technology, would help developing countries like China accelerate their pace of development and skip over 
stages of development in order to connect with world economy while facilitating economic and political 
structures at home.  They found the effect of IT on leapfrogging development.  Software production from 
companies in Bangalore, India, yields annual exports worth $300 million USD as of 1994.  However, 
China’s software industry was domestic oriented while India’s was export oriented.  They have also 
discovered that Hinduism plays an important role in their IT industry, an interviews with Ni, March 12, 
2004.  
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even though no entrepreneur wants to many “mother-in-laws” to interfere with their 
businesses, they still prefer a mother-in-law to help them.  
In addition, the government support for software companies like 8848 or 6688 has 
security concerns.  China hopes to compete with American software industries such as 
Windows-related products by encouraging domestic competitors.  At the same time, 
promotion of other operating system such as Linux may ease the state’s fears of 
dependence on Microsoft and the United States.  People’s Liberation Army Daily covered 
an editorial on “information colonialism” in that China cannot have information security 
without its own software (Segal 2003, 167-8).  
Thus the symbiotic dimension tells us that actors do not work in a political 
vacuum, their visions must be complemented with political capacities to transform their 
efforts into reality.  Their “embedded” autonomy under the new era of political 
pragmatism and experimentalism in China is an interesting case. As is known that any 
possible change must be brought about by both external and internal forces, many 
policies are first designed by activists outside the policy circle, and then achieved by both 
the external and internal forces.   There are two instances where Wang tried to influence 
the legislative and judicial systems.  The first one involved software registration and 
encryption.  Many people were displeased by the explanation from the Supreme Court of 
China on the right of software registration and protection.  They pressed the case to 
Secretary Qian of the Law Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC).   He 
mobilized more than 30 delegates from the People’s Congress and the Political 
Consultative Committee to ask for revision of the legal explanation.  Through outside 
protest and internal urgings, negotiations were held between the court and the delegates 
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from the software industry.  Later, the legal explanation was revised by the Supreme 
Court.  It is a rare case that a policy is successful ly achieved by pressure from the bottom 
in China.
The second impact was that he also pushed for the draft and adoption of the 
Electronic Signature Law through his personal friend in Fujian People’s Congress.  The 
representative at Fujian People’s Congress mobilized support from Mr. Qian of the 
Office of Legislative Affairs under the State Council.  The proposal aroused heated 
debate and finally reached the central committee’s attention.  During the discussion 
period, the State Informatization Office and E-commerce association were also involved 
in it.  The final issue was addressed at the National Congress.  After several rounds of 
debates and revisions by experts, the act was passed in December 2004.  This is a 
successful story of joint efforts to draft and enforce laws regarding business interest at the 
e-commerce.  Even though this case does not have too much significance on politics, it 
was an attempt by these IT elites to push forward legal acts for their own sake.  
Mechanisms for Political Change
Compared with the IT leaders in the public sector, the IT leaders at the private 
sector enjoy more autonomy both structurally and ideologically.   They enjoy job 
mobilization and more free space with more monetary or material resources at their 
disposal.  At the same time, they also have more social space to develop their own 
independent understanding of developing China and catching up with the world.  Even 
though their ideological understanding of political change is liberal, their push for 
political change cannot be exaggerated.  They heed the bureaucrats at MPT for their 
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inadequate understanding of social demands, but their efforts end when their business 
interests are satisfied.  In addition, their dependence upon governmental deals also made 
them rely on personal ties for their business.  Thus, their parasitic characteristic exists, 
making this group less democratic or liberal as expected by believers of modernization 
theory.  We should also be cautious that these three examples do not represent all 
entrepreneurs in the ICT sector.  They are the carefully chosen ones who are influential 
enough to impact upon politics.  We also find their symbiosis with the state in the 
software industry, but the compromise from the state does not always prove that they are 
rising so fast for political changes in China.  Instead, it is a comfortable state-business 
relationship that the state bound these businessmen into its patronage.  However, this 
relationship also may point to a new negotiating pattern because some IT leaders may 
successfully evade state intrusion and work out something truly innovative for civil 
society.  But their political power is still quite limited in that they dare not challenge the 
state because of their business concerns and the state carefully gives them benefits in 
exchange for political loyalty (Pearson 1997). 
These IT elites are products of the Party’s reform and ironically the proof of their 
success: their prosperity was made possible because of the market reforms under Deng 
Xiaoping (Dickson 2002, 170).  They are not engaged in frequent collective actions for 
political change because they are beneficiaries of the reform.  Thus they are more likely 
to be partners of the state, not challengers of it.  They seem to help resolve one of the 
fundamental contradictions of Chinese politics: how to help the Leninist political system 
adapt to a thriving market economy.  These IT leaders cannot be assumed to be 
harbingers of democracy because their prima facie motive is still their business interests.   
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Many of them approach political patronage purely for self-interest.  Not all IT leaders can 
translate their economic advantage into political actions.  As long as they are committed 
to social stability and maintaining the Party leadership, their own authority depends on 
the same hierarchies that generate this resistance. In addition, they were aware of the 
danger of being entangled in numerous political drives that would cost them their career 
or even lives.   This apolitical stance persists in many of these IT leaders, thus they are 
cautious of promoting the structural power of the state, not the despotic power.  At the 
same time, the Party starts to incorporate successful IT entrepreneurs as a show of 
representing all social interests.  But they also believe, at least for the short run, the 
reform is still from the top down.  There are many fears that if these businessmen do not 
follow the Party line, they are going to lose their business, perhaps even risk of 
imprisonment.  
Even though they do not strive for collective action, this does not negate the fact 
they are seeking a collective identity as poster children of globalization.  These IT leaders 
are political amateurs who, for a variety of reasons, decided to become active in the new 
market entry.  They see new e-commerce opportunities as a means of self-fulfillment or 
for a modernized and civilized China; thus some of them will shoulder the risk of actively 
participating in the course and design of ICT diffusion.  But the path of change largely 
reflects the efforts of these IT leaders to integrate China into the global system and 
compete with advanced countries for leapfrog development.  However, these IT leaders 
were courageous at the initial stage of introducing new norms and business models into 
the Chinese practice.  Later they heavily embedded themselves with the governmental 
and relied on personal ties to support their business interests.  
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This demonstrates their amphibious character.  They were initially autonomous 
market actors, but later they became co-opted by the state.  It is also an example of  
situational leadership.  The leaders were brave enough to challenge the monopoly of 
China Telecom, but they did not have enough courage, power, and resources to challenge 
the irrationalities of orthodoxical Leninist state.  They do not challenge the closed and 
hierarchical decision making system, the lack of competition between organized political 
parties, and the lack of checks and balances on state power.  Yet they do make rule 
changes and institutionalize reforms for the representations of economic interests to the 
state. 
 The decline of regime legitimacy prompted the Party to switch from ideological
legitimacy to performance legitimacy.  Economic development and the politics of 
reform put a premium on economic expertise.  It has produced vast growth in the 
number of professional economists and a growing acceptance of their role in the polity.  
This kind of state-business relationship is not necessarily confrontational or immoral.  
But, economic plans, production quotas, salary schedules, and government sponsored 
trade associations are imposed on business from the state; businesses are involuntarily 
and passively involved in this political change.
Another important phenomenon is that many IT leaders started to actively involve 
themselves in public life and make philanthropic donations.  This is a way to fulfill their 
social responsibility as independent social elites.  Bruce Dickson shows that China’s 
private entrepreneurs make donations to the local community, but the motivations are 
unclear.  Some might be attributed to governmental pressures for social welfare and local 
construction.  But some feel a sense of civic responsibility, separate from tacit or overt 
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pressure from state or society (Dickson 2002, 117).  Private entrepreneurs contribute 54% 
of community schools, 42.6% of community roads, bridges, dams, wharfs, 42.4% of 
social welfare projects, and 29.4% of student’s scholarships.  Jasmine Zhang was invited 
to be a member of the National Youth Association, an honorable position for people 
under the age of 40 with outstanding achievements.  This association is a government-
sponsored organization and serves as a channel for policy dialogues between government 
and youth.  The members serve as youth representatives as well as exemplary models for 
youth.  Showing her awareness of public contributions, she then donated some of the 
income from a recital to the China Cancer Foundation.  
Some IT entrepreneurs also form a Society Entrepreneur Ecology (SEE) Fund in 
order to protect China’s fragile environment in light of industrial development.  The fund 
was created by one hundred entrepreneurs in an effort to check desertification in 
Northwest China.  It is perceived to be the social responsibility of entrepreneurs to help 
prevent desertification in the Alashan area in Inner Mongolia, which is situated very close 
to Beijing.  Others have also made ecological donations.  John Wang is also a well-
known soccer fan and an environmentalist.  He spent millions of dollars to protect a kind 
of endangered fig tree in Fuzhou, his hometown.  He also bought the courtyard of a 
martyr who sacrificed his life for China’s reform during the Qing Dynasty (Tansitong) in 
Southern Beijing and protected it for future generations.  These are important signs of an 
autonomous middle class emerging in Chinese society because social responsibilities are 
the ultimate concerns of humanity.  Finally, these providers as well as retired 
functionaries of the state are keenly aware of the digital divide, “information 
asymmetry”.  Some Internet service providers addressed the issue of inequality over the 
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Internet for asymmetrical information accesses and divide between rich and poor areas.  
Some of them believe that IT will also contributive to poverty relief.  
  
Summarizing, the IT leaders in the private sector actively involve themselves in 
the pricing and legislation of ISP and software industries.  Compared with IT leaders in 
the public sector, they have shown more autonomous elements as inchoate middle class 
as bridges between state and society in China.  They organized symposiums to channel 
social demands into the state level, challenged the pricing issue of China Telecom, 
touched problems of social justice, and developed visions and strategies to achieve 
liberalizations in the ICT sector. They have started to push political deals collectively, 
albeit their attempts were not so fruitful in the ISP market entry.  Their relationship with 
the state is “neither too close nor distant”—they seek support from the state at the time of 
business needs and at the same time, are cautious not to cross the thin red line of the 
Party tolerance.  Furthermore, they have demonstrated social responsibilities and begin as 
role models for China’s new development. Their role as bridges between state-society is 
more evident in the ISP market entry and software industries.  So their impact on political 
changes is modest, but higher on policy and institutional changes.  
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Chapter 5.  IT Leaders for a Burgeoning Civil Society
Internet Content Providers (ICPs) and IT Advocates at NGOs
This chapter presents those IT leaders who are Internet content providers and 
those who use the Internet to promote social justices in non-governmental organizations.   
These content providers help create numerous online communities, thus setting the trend 
for an online civil society. I focus on three content providers:  Liu Jun, Deputy Director 
of content at sina.com; Shan Chengbiao, Director of BBS at people.com; and Zhaxi, 
editor for an environmental website-- Tibetan antelope information center. The reason I 
choose these three is because they are in charge of the content of the most influential
online media.  Generally speaking, their autonomy lies in their ways to use the  Internet
to exercise independent influences over social and state behaviors, accelerating 
entrepreneurism, enhancing transparency and promoting new ideas of participation, all 
interacting in mutually reinforcing ways. Their power is “soft”, which lies not in 
resources but in the persuasive ability to change the behavior of others (Nye and Owen 
1996). But, these content providers also have a parasitic dimension in that they have to be 
cautious not to cross the thin “red” line of the state control.  Sometimes their symbiotic 
dimension is manifested in their cooperation with the state to report social issues such as 
Nandan Coal Mine accident before official media covered it and other environmental 
issues which could hardly be monitored by the state.  Eventually their negotiating 
dimension is more salient in that they attempt to pioneer new ways for social interactions 
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via the Internet with state support and evade state control as much as possible.  Thus their 
amphibiousness is clearly shown in their traits as sympathizers for social actors and 
supporters for the state.  
These leaders may bring political changes through online information exchanges 
and activities.  Even though these online activities create more transparent political 
atmosphere for public contestation, they do not necessarily produce concrete political 
changes without negotiations and compromises from the state.  Thus, the reality of the 
relationship between the Internet, civil society, and leadership is much more subtle and 
demands a more nuanced analysis. These IT leaders may facilitate more dialogues 
through online communications.  But these online activities remain unorganized.  They 
do not pursue any coherent political ideologies or agenda.  In addition, the government 
has strict control over online messages.  At least four governmental organs are in charge 
of websites --the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party, Ministry of Culture, 
the Network Surveillance Department of the Public Security Bureau, and News 
Department of the State Council.  The state allows some online complaints as a show for 
the respect of social voices, but in reality, it carefully monitors these online behaviors in 
order to gain a better control of the Internet.  Thus the role of these IT leaders cannot be 
exaggerated because they are not liberal democrats that can challenge the despotic power 
of the state.  Rather, they are active people who encourage these online communications 
for a “second culture” of civil society.   Their power hinges on introducing concepts such 
as digital divide and devising strategies to empower underprivileged groups.94 But these 
94 IT revolution has blurred the difference between both material power and normative power in world 
arena with a stronger emphasis of the latter.  Here material powers refers to conventional national 
capabilities based on measurable economic, military, demographical, and technological factors; normative 
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are only assertions if we do not consider the specific processes that produce concrete 
outcomes.  How much autonomy do they enjoy?  Are they creating channels for civilians 
to vent pent-up angers towards the abuses of government officials? Can they become 
bridges between state and society? How do they deal with state control? Are they willing 
to help the neglected social groups to advertise their activities on the web or to 
communicate with each other through the Internet?
Even though autonomous IT leaders in China are using the Internet to help 
publicize their causes, or try to draw new supporters for social justice, thereby 
strengthening their minority position, there is, however, another way to look at this.  The 
use of the Internet provides the state with a method for monitoring the activities of these 
groups.  Thus, even though the Internet may provide groups with a new form to 
communicate information with each other, it also provides avenues for the state to 
monitor their activities.  Even though some IT leaders have negotiated with the state for 
more freedom, this does not negate the fact that the state still remains in control of the 
Internet and bind these IT elites into its patronage.  To continue this avenue of inquiry, it 
is necessary to situate arguments more fully in the literature that deals with the Chinese 
state and its efforts to control or co-opt developments within society that may threaten its 
own power base.  We find that the Internet has become an experimental ground for the 
state to understand social needs.  This chapter specifically addresses the IT leadership as 
advocates of new concepts in society and addresses the ways in which they interact with 
the state and society to show their potential impact upon political change, e.g. state 
responsiveness and public contestation.  .  
power (often neglected in the systemic approach) is the ability to define, control, and transform the agenda 
of world politics and to legitimate a new dominant paradigm.
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The Autonomous Dimension of Content Providers  
These IT leaders’ autonomy can be seen through the way they enlighten people and 
create an “ethical root” of online culture.    This will be tested through a case of Liu Jun, the 
Director of Content at sina.com. 
Ethical Root
Hegel was the first to use the expression "civil society" to refer exclusively to this 
nonpolitical social economic realm.95 Family and civil society embody the principle of 
subjective freedom.  They play a crucial educative function, ensuring that individuals are 
not simply or narrowly self-interested in their relation to the state but already ethical in 
themselves and purged of their raw particularity.  He refers to the family and civil society 
as the “ethical roots” of the state.96  Therefore, civil society is not simply a realm of 
selfish individualism opposed to the universality of the state.  Rather, civil society 
educates the individual to the universality. In civil society, the universal is an 
unintentional byproduct of the pursuit of individual self-interest and thus appears as
“unconscious necessity,” while in the state it becomes an end that citizens knowingly and 
willingly acknowledge.  The state marks the telos (goals) of the dialectic of human 
95 The ethical unity of the family is the immediate one, based upon the natural feeling of love.  When 
people enter society, they do not relate to one another as self-sufficient personalities as in family but as 
parts of a larger whole with which they immediately identify themselves.  This is civil society, where all 
the individuality and self-sufficient interest that remains submerged in the family is liberated.
96 Civil society represents only an incomplete actualization of human freedom and one that needs to be 
distinguished from and ultimate subordinated to the full actualization of human freedom in the state.  In 
civil society, in contrast to family, “each individual is his own end, and all else means nothing to him 
(Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 181A).”  Nevertheless, Hegel retains from his early writings a certain 
suspicion of unfettered economic activity and a desire to subordinate it to the higher, more universal aims 
of the state.  “Civil society affords a spectacle of extravagance and misery as well as of the physical and 
ethical corruption common to both” (185).  
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freedom insofar as it is in the state that individuals finally make the universal their 
explicit aim and purpose.
These IT leaders play a role, in line with Hegel’s view on civil society, to 
socialize people through the gradual “education” via the Internet.  Some help people to 
know that the information revolution changes their way of thinking on social 
development, which represents not only a present condition but also a projection of a 
desirable alternative better life. Some interviewees at the foreign-sector express 
excitement about the “cultural revolution” brought about in China by the Internet.  Liu 
Jun, the Deputy Editor at sina.com enthusiastically comments that the Internet contains 
key features that are corrosive to the rule of authoritarian regimes, namely openness, 
variety, and transparency.   He expressed the difference that has been made by the 
Internet to usher in an “alternative comparison”.  In their opinion, the Internet sets the 
trend of a new way of thinking and an alternative life model, playing a role as a 
"transmission belt" of new values. One interviewee stresses that the Internet keeps a 
healthy political culture alive.   
The Internet gives us more clues to find our position and orientation in the modern 
world.  The Internet is a global repository of banned texts, a forum of wide-ranging 
political discussions with unlike thinkers and a vast source of news and opinions 
accessible to any user.  It has a great potential to create information pluralism in 
well-connected societies with easy links to ideological alternatives and 
socioeconomic comparisons.  Internet forums call for the expansion of rights, for the 
defense of the autonomy of civil society, and for its further democratization.  They 
keep a liberal political culture alive.  97
He believes that the Internet is bringing about “positive freedom” for China through the 
interactions on the Internet.  
97
 Personal communications on January 22, 2005 in Chongqing 
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Political Justice and the Case of Online Activitism: the Nobel Laureate
These entrepreneurs also express that it is impossible for the government to 
suppress the various ideas diffused on the Internet.  This is because the content-saturated 
ideational pluralism characterized by the Internet makes multiple sources of ideas, 
images, and news is widely accessible to the public.98 Samuel Huntington argues that 
authoritarian rule is unable to be sustained in societies where ideational pluralism exists 
and when less restricted flows of information alert its subjects to the success of pro-
democracy movements elsewhere (Huntington 1993, 6-8). They use the old Chinese 
proverb ---“Paper cannot wrap up a fire” to denote that human spirit is irrepressible; the 
truth will reveal itself.
Not all online groups are essentially reformist, gradualist.  Some groups are 
explicitly making more radical claims—such as to abolish Communist rule: open up 
multi-party competition.  With Internet related services including emails, chat rooms, and 
Usenet groups, these IT elites encourage more political voices.  For example, a famous 
singer, Li Guyi, went to the chat room of Daily Entertainment website (tiantianyule.com) 
to publicize her anger towards the corruption of Orientation Ensemble where she was 
working.  She publicized nine “crimes” of the ensemble to reveal leaders’ notorious 
embezzlement.  Major news media like Beijing Nightly News dared not report it to 
Chinese people.  The online news journal Dacankao, wenxuecity, and bignews.org.  The 
purpose of this bignews.org is to promote political reform, break the information 
blockade of the Communist Party,  and enhance the freedom of speech via new 
technology.  Neither is Dacankao the only Internet-based newspaper that reports stories, 
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including investigative articles and wide-ranging opinions, that would otherwise go 
unpublished in China, where the Communist Party exercises rigid control of the press.  
The Chinese government employs intimidation and brute force to quell the human spirit.  
The Internet is an effective link with Western media outlets and spark overseas coverage 
of human rights issues at home. One interviewee made a comparison: For instance, 
during the 1978-1979 "Democracy Wall" movements in China, a number of liberal 
journals such as Beijing Spring were circulated to a very limited amount of audience.  
However, underground journals like Mirror and Tunnel can reach tens of thousands of 
people in the international on-line community. In a word, Internet is a double-edged 
sword-- a powerful tool to integrate and invigorate economic, educational and political 
resources, while a potential threat challenging the authoritarian rule. 
Liu Jun told me a case of how some IT leaders use the Internet to encourage a 
different voice from the government.  It is true that the IT leaders encouraged some 
online activities against the governmental control over news.  However, their pursuit was 
still cautious and they were careful not to cross the “thin red line” of Communism.  The 
case of the Nobel Laureate, Gao Xingjian, clearly demonstrated the dissident voices from 
civil society in support of the first Nobel Laureate over Literature in China.  The dramatic 
effect was made possible by those IT advocates who sympathized with the greater 
demand for liberty.  
According to Liu Jun, the Nobel Prize of Literature 2000 was granted to a 
Chinese dissident Gao Xingjian “for an œuvre of universal validity, bitter insights and 
linguistic ingenuity, which has opened new paths for the Chinese novel and drama”. 
98 Since authoritarian regimes often rely upon particular interpretations of Communist canon as the basis of 
their legitimacy, the presence of novel sources of information challenge the ruling norms and values call to 
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In the writing of Gao Xingjian literature is born anew from the struggle of the 
individual to survive the history of the masses. He is a perspicacious skeptic who 
makes no claim to be able to explain the world. He asserts that he has found 
freedom only in writing.  His great novel Soul Mountain is one of those singular 
literary creations that seem impossible to compare with anything but themselves. 
It is based on impressions from journeys in remote districts in southern and south-
western China, where shamanistic customs still linger on, where ballads and tall 
stories about bandits are recounted as the truth and where it is possible to come 
across exponents of age-old Daoist wisdom. The book is a tapestry of narratives 
with several protagonists who reflect each other and may represent aspects of one 
and the same ego. With his unrestrained use of personal pronouns Gao creates 
lightning shifts of perspective and compels the reader to question all confidences. 
This approach derives from his dramas, which often require actors to assume a 
role and at the same time describe it from the outside. I, you and he/she become 
the names of fluctuating inner distances. (Oct. 12, 2000, Press Release of the 
Swedish Academy)
Gao’s case is an example that civic voices could be heard online against authorities.  
These content providers became the first to publicize the news that Gao won the Nobel 
laureate of literature in 2000.  The Chinese government remarks that the prize has lost its 
authority because it is judged from political motives.  As Gao is the first Chinese who has 
won a Nobel Prize for Literature, Chinese people began to vent their pent-up anger 
towards the government and express their admiration for the Chinese writer through all 
kinds of Internet forums, including the Powerful Country Forum at the website of 
People’s Daily,  the most conservative Party newspaper. Gao, a writer of prose, 
translator, dramatist, director, critic, and artist, graduated from the French Department of 
Beijing Foreign Language Institute in 1962. During the Cultural Revolution, he was sent 
to a re-education camp and was obliged to burn all his manuscripts.  Several of his 
experimental and pioneering plays-- inspired by Brecht, Artaud and Beckett-- were 
produced at the Theatre of Popular Art in Beijing:  His theatrical debut with Signal Alarm 
the questions of their public accountability for their failures.  
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was a tempestuous success, and the absurd drama which established his reputation, Bus 
Stop, was condemned during the campaign against “spiritual pollution”. 
In 1986, The Other Shore was banned and since then none of his plays have been 
played in China (that is why very few Chinese know him).  In order to avoid harassment 
he undertook a ten-month walking tour of the forest and mountain regions of Sichuan 
Province, tracing the course of the Yangtze River from its origin to the coast.   He settled 
down in Paris in 1987 as a political refugee.  After the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown he 
left the Chinese Communist Party and severely criticized the crackdown of democratic 
movement.  After the publication of Fugitives, he was declared persona non grata by the 
Communists and his works banned in China.  
In the summer of 1982, Gao had already started working on his prodigious novel 
Soul Mountain in which-- by means of an odyssey in time and space through the Chinese 
countryside-- he enacts an individual’s search for roots, inner peace and liberty.   On 
October 13, 2000, the Xinhua News Agency reported that the Nobel Prize of Literature 
was awarded to Gao Xingjian. Citing from a leader of China Writers' Association, it 
comments that Nobel Prize was biased to political motives, not determined on its 
literature merits.  Therefore, it concludes that Nobel Prize has lost its authority.  As this is 
the first Chinese writer who won a Nobel prize, this has aroused a heightened discontent 
among Chinese people. 
Liu told me after the comment from the Chinese government was released, these 
Internet content providers let people vent their pent-up anger online against state census 
over media and publications.  On October 12, Netease reported the whole exciting news 
from Sweden, earlier than the report from the official Xinhua News Agency.  It praised 
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the “universal value, insightful clairvoyance and the agile mastery of language” of his 
works which, “paved a new way for the Chinese literature and drama.”  In the BBS 
Powerful Country Forum of People Daily Network on October 13, a person named 
“Sublime and Fearless” argues that Gao's works represent a milestone that Chinese 
literature is developing towards the most advanced direction of world. On fm365.com, a 
web site run by Legend on October 13, an article criticizes the hysteria of the Communist 
Party out of fear and urges the government to respect the decision by the committee 
members of Nobel Prize. On October 14, sohu.com had a heated topical discussion over 
the “political motives of Nobel Prize of Literature”.  People express all kinds of 
enthusiasm for Gao and despises against the Chinese government.  “Wake up to the 
reality (members of the Writers' Association) of the new 21st century world culture in 
which you can no longer monopolize the freedom of speech.” 
Chinese Writers' Association is just a puppet of the Chinese Communist Party.  
Stop whinning (sic.), your idiots.  It is a pity that most Chinese in China have 
never heard of Mr. Gao.  They would only let people read stuff they like you to 
hear.  When do the Chinese people have real freedom?????!!! Listen up, the 
leaders in Chinese Writers' Association, with the next revolution in China, you 
will be punished for serving as a running dog for the Chinese Communist Party. 
Down with CPC (Communist Party of China)!!!99
On the forum of Sina.com on October 14, people commented this event and said it 
was a pride for Chinese nation.   These postings are representatives of most online 
messages, indicating an emerging online activism in China. 
All the members of Nobel committee must be well qualified to award the 
Nobel Prize and account for the world, or else they were nuts….Those people 
who always want to isolate Chinese literature from the world are frogs in a dark 
well, and criminals of Chinese nationality….  I know nothing about Gao Xingjian, 
but those people who label it a Western conspiracy are sycophants to the Chinese 
dictators.  Shame on them! Gao's works has bridged the wide gap between 
99
 BBS of sohu.com of October 14, 2000
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Chinese literature and the West.  He has presented a Chinese banner on the alter 
of world literature. 100
On Oct. 16, several articles continue to sing high praise of Gao and defend the humanistic 
values in his works on People.com.cn. 
It is for sure that literature is involved with politics. .. But literature is the product 
of freedom, transcending boundaries of religion and politics. Literature is the 
common wealth of human race, not molded by a certain political ideology. His 
works represent a human love that is manifested in most Nobel prize winners.  
We have understood that Chinese language has touched the highest authority of 
the world literature.  It means human soul is transnational….If you listen to a 
doctor, there is no sanitary place in the world. If you listen to a military guy, there 
is no safe space in the world.  If you listen to nuts, everyone is persecuting you.  If 
you listen to the Chinese government, everybody is mean and evil.  To criticize 
Nobel prize as a Western interference with Chinese domestic affairs, I do not 
know what strategic interests does China have for this tiny country--Norway.  If 
such an award should be given to the most "influential writer" in China as the 
Chinese authorities stated, then the prize should be awarded to Chairman Mao for 
he enjoys the most readers in history of world.  The Royal Academy of Literature 
of Norway is not a subsidiary of CIA…101
These content providers at sina.com and other ICPs are themselves quietly 
engaging people against the monopolistic control of information.  Gao's own statement 
covered on Le Monde in France was quickly translated into Chinese was also put on the 
BBS of people daily net that day.  
Diaspora is the rebirth of my creativity.  History and culture are created by man.  
People aspire for more lively, fruitful, and diverse images of contemporary 
heritages, not a perverted single memory of the past imposed by an authoritarian.  
The book One Man's Bible is a testimony of the spiritual oppression by the 
Communist Party as exemplified in the strict censorship of works by Chinese 
intellectuals.  History cannot babble.102
Therefore, these content providers played important roles to channel these civic voices to 
communicate with each other.  They attempted to convey their views subtly online.  This 
100
 BBS of sina.com.cn on October 14, 2000
101
 Strengthening China Forum on people.com.cn on October 16, 2000. 
189
represents an inchoate pluralist social movement in China.  However, though some of 
these IT leaders are helping online activism, they themselves are not necessarily leading 
the anti-government actions.  They are quite cautious of the political risks involved, thus 
engaged in a subtle power struggle with the state.  Another case may shed more light.  
The Symbiotic Dimension of BBS Content Providers
Some content providers like Shan Chengbiao from People.com make the Internet 
a forum to address social injustices and help the infrastructural power of the state. The 
Strengthening China forum is also a testing ground for the government to monitor the 
social grievances and activities.  Thus IT leaders are symbiotic with the state for support 
and at the same time, carry out social functions to channel civic demands to the state. 
Shan Chengbiao, the Director of BBS at the People.com, told me the history of 
the Strengthening China Forum.  Shan graduated from the Chinese Department of 
Beijing University. The Strengthening China Forum was started in May 9, 1999.  Its 
predecessor was  a trial sports forum.  What triggered the launch of the forum was due to 
a bombing in May 8, 1999.  It was the time NATO bombed the Chinese embassy at 
Yugoslavia.  Initially called the “BBS Forum for Strongly Protesting the Savage Act by 
NATO”, it became an instant attraction to politically conscious internet users.  Between 
May 9 and June 19, when the name was changed to the currently used Strengthening-
China Forum, more than 110,000 messages were posted on the forum.  The normal click 
rate is 300,000—400,000 times a day, but during 9/11 there were almost 1 million.  
Therefore the forum was overburdened for a long time.  At the initial stage, they wanted 
to make it a bridge to link voices of society to the central government.   Surprisingly, the 
102
 Ibid.
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government was very supportive, according to Shan.  The propaganda department gave 
lots of help and suggestions   For example, some people criticized the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, yet the ministry is very willing to listen to these criticisms.  The forum has so 
many comments on current issues, and many of them raised public awareness and to 
change governmental behaviors.  During the spring festival of 2003, in Chongqing people 
could not get train tickets because they were sold to ticket peddlers for higher profits.  
Later the Chongqing Railway station changed its behavior because of this online report.  
Shenzhen municipal government also changed its low efficiency behavior owing to a 
report on the forum too.  These IT advocates helped with a growing plural voice 
competing with government controlled media at so many e-forums.  These active players 
had their initiatives to bring people’s contending voice heard at the top level.    
People may be surprised by the unprecedented degree of tolerance at the 
Strengthening China Forum. Shan also told me that the people.com is different from the 
People’s Daily because the government wants to make it more flexible to social needs.  It 
is an experimental ground for the government to obtain more information over social 
activities.  As a result, at the end of October 2000, People's Daily network changed its 
name to People network.  As a director from People.com says, the name change connotes 
that People's net will advocate China's policies to the world, but will reorient itself to 
serve the people with a more flexible management and operation.  It attempts to use the 
influence of People's Daily but at the same time, to get rid of the inefficiencies of state 
owned propaganda machine in order to compete with other popular websites such as 
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sina.com and sohu.com.  The government sponsored People Net is an example that the 
Party allows contradictions to evolve and new things to be experimented upon.103
Since the public has little freedom to discuss “sensitive” political issues openly, 
Bulletin Board Systems (BBS) has become a popular way of political participating via 
interactive political discussions online. The BBS provides a platform for web surfers to 
engage in a more improvised discussion, as well as a place for people to publish articles 
unpalatable to the official editors.  Messages posted on the BBS can be surfed by any 
public audience. As any poster can join the BBS on the Internet from anywhere in the 
world, and are technologically difficult to monitor, the Chinese authorities have had 
limited success in censoring BBS sites.  The content of the forum is extremely rich, 
ranging from breaking news from around the world, through critical comments on current 
government policies and nationalistic outcries on Sino-American relationships and on the 
Taiwan issue, to all kinds of rumors and personal attacks.  Debates between the new 
Leftists and the liberals, the introduction of Western social theories (some even set up a 
link to Collected Works of Vaclav Havel), the promotion of nationalism, and the staging 
of historic and intellectual controversies in China are also posted.  Some liberal 
intellectuals’ works like Li Shenzhi can occasionally be found on the BBS.  Like the 
special economic zones where market economies have been allowed to emerge in the last 
two decades, the forum has been labeled a “special ideas zone” in China by online 
103 Mao believed that only through contradictions can things evolve.  Thus a degree of discussion and 
contention should be allowed within the Party.  “Within the Party, opposition and struggle between 
different ideas occur constantly; they reflect the class contradictions and between the old and new things in 
society.  If there were neither contradictions nor ideological conflicts through which the contradictions are 
resolved, the Party's life would come to an end.”  See Mao Zedong, "On Contradiction",  1968. 
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commentators because of the greater degree of freedom and tolerance in expressing 
political opinions that it permits (Zhou 2001). 
On the forum, the state is competing with societal players to establish a relatively 
controlled public sphere on the Internet by selectively opening up some previously 
controlled space and channeling political discourse into directions it desires.  In this new 
practice, the state takes initiatives that should not be seen as merely manipulative, but 
also experimental.  Though control remains the ultimate goal, the process has become 
more flexible and the state does not always play a straightforwardly repressive role.  Here 
we find a subtle power struggle online that the state frees up some space on the web in 
order to better monitor social trends and the people take advantage of it.   Thus these IT 
leaders as content providers understand their roles as not only to give more spaces for 
social grievances, but also a conduit for the state to understand hidden social issues.  
The Negotiating Dimension of IT Advocates at  Environmental NGOs
IT advocates at environmental organizations are examples of negotiating with the 
state for more concerns over ignored species.  At the same time, they evade “red tapes” of 
bureaucracies and wrap up support from international organizations and civil society.  
Online activities over environmental issues were also examples that these IT leaders set 
trends in civil society as a vanguard for environmental protection.  These networks are
forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of 
communication and exchange (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, 8).104 Thus, even though these 
104
 They are segmented, polycentric, and ideologically integrated networks.  By segmentary it is thought to 
be cellular, composed of many different groups.  By polycentric it is believed to have many different 
leaders or centers of direction.  And by networked is meant that the segments and the leaders are integrated 
into reticulated systems or networks through various structural, personal, and ideological ties. The networks 
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IT advocates do not have formal organizations, they can still impact upon environmental 
issues and political concerns.   An example of this is a local Brazilian NGO—the 
Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analysis (IBASE) bypassed the Telebra and 
created a new link with international partners.  
With the help of some IT gurus, environmental websites are sprung up.   
Homepages of governmental agencies started to provide a good source of information, 
especially regarding environmental policies and regulations.  For example, the homepage 
of the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) has online “Environmental 
Newsletters.”105 Websites of non-governmental organizations are quite informative and 
technologically sophisticated.  A recent example is the website of Friends of Nature106
and The China Program Office of the World Wide Fund for Nature operates a content-
rich website.107  Green Globe, was put up on December 31, 1999 by a high school girl 
and has attracted quite a lot of media attention.108  Electronic bulletin boards (BBS) or 
online forums are the fourth type.  There are numerous online communities operated by 
commercial portal sites with environmental forums.  For example, Netease.com has a 
“Green Forum to discuss issues to protect rights of indigenous people against 
exploitations of businessmen.”109
of civil society lie at five levels: the organizational level—its organizational design; the narrative level—
the story being told; the doctrinal level—the collaborative strategies and methods; the technological level—
the information systems in use; and the social level—the personal ties that assure loyalty and trust.
105
 See <http://www.zhb.gov.cn/sepa/sepa/index.htm>.
106<http://www.fon.org.cn/index.php>.
107<http://www.wwf.com.cn/>.  
108<http://theglobe.ep.net.cn/greentea.html>.
109It has posted the following message that aroused national attention.  Courtesy to Guobing Yang and 
Craig Calhoun. 
The protection of the three-river source must first involve the local people.  The knowledge of the 
local people must be respected.  ..  For example, a very rich company wants to start ecological 
cultural tourism here. 99.9% of the profit will go to this company. What’s there left for the local 
people? …We have lived here for centuries and we should have a say in these decisions.  
<http://knl.bj.163.com/cgi/main?guest=1>.  
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Individual IT advocates also spared no effort in protecting Tibetan antelopes and 
other endangered species.  Zhaxi made the initial attempt for environmental causes.  He 
got the support from the vice governor of Qinghai for his website to protect these rare 
species.  He founded an Internet-based organization, The Tibetan Antelope Information 
Center (TAIC) in 1998.  TAIC’s online mission is to be an information and 
communication center on the protection of the Tibetan antelope and other endangered 
species.  The website is maintained by volunteer IT advocates on rented server space with
grant support from the International Fund for Animal Welfare, the Worldwide Fund for 
Nature, and Global Greengrants.  In 2000, TAIC, co-sponsored by Greener Beijing, an 
Internet-based environmental group launched a “Save Tibetan Antelope Website Union” 
to enhance public awareness of the endangered species through the Internet.  TAIC also 
uses its website to recruit volunteers to work in the Kekexili Nature Research on the 
Qinghai-Tibet Plateau.  They tried to get the governmental support to make the Tibetan 
antelope safe, but the governmental bureaucracy can give them a little help.  Therefore, 
they have to evade governmental rules and seek help from international sources.  
A “boomerang effect” could be found on online environmental activities (Keck 
and Sikkink).  Domestic issues online caught the attention of wildlife biologist George 
Schaller of the Wildlife Conservation Society in Bronx, New York.  Schaller was alerted 
on the Tibetan antelope’s predicament and pushed for the international community to 
reject shahtoosh wool made from Tibetan antelopes.  Funded by the Wildlife 
Conservation Society in New York and with George Schaller’s support, the online report 
documents the endangered conditions of the species and the illegal operations of the 
shahtoosh trade.  On January 20, 1998, the Wildlife Conservation Society in Bronx, New 
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York, had a news release on the report titled “Demand for Wool could lead to rare 
mammal’s extinction.”110This is an example of leadership in the digital age. These IT 
leaders have to adopt combative, strategic, and occasionally secretive behaviors to 
challenge the entrenched and influential industrial groups that benefit directly from 
exploiting consumers and environment. They have negotiated with the state for their new 
paths of environmental protection.  But it is still too early to make the leap from 
describing emerging social networks of the IT leaders to concluding that this particular 
network configuration shapes political performance outcomes.
The Parasitic Dimension of IT Advocates
These IT advocates are not revolutionaries who wish to overthrow the Communist 
regime.  They are not democrats naïve enough to instigate sentiments directly against the 
Communist Party.  “We want to empower the people.”  One interviewee at the sohu.com 
told me, “but it does not necessarily entail a weakening of regulation or jeopardizing of 
market rules….  Yes, for Americans, it is ironic that we call for dismantling the state 
monopoly of telecommunications at the same time we want a strong and autonomous 
state.  But we are actually strengthening the state power by diversifying its economy and 
strengthening its international competition.” Others also express the similar view that 
they let people voice their frustrations in the chat rooms in order to redress the 
inefficiencies or irrationalities of the current institutions, but not to overthrow them.  “To 
overthrow the government would entail social fragmentation”, one interviewee at 
Sinotrust told me, “that is not what we want.”  
110
 <http://wcs.org/7411/?art=8857>
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We have to bear in mind the limitations of all kinds of social conditions that 
inhibit the smooth progress of democracy, especially a large uneducated 
population.  Social conditions—the enormous size and diversity of the population 
and the country, poverty and the disaffection it generates, as well as a rigid 
mentality of central planning, and greater exposure to foreign influence—make 
control a critical issue for the government.  These historic and cultural legacies 
will not disappear overnight.  Therefore, the road to democracy should start from 
developing civic virtue, instead of overthrowing the government.
The common value these IT elites share is that they want stability, they do not 
expect big upheavals, and they want a gradual reform.  They belong to the class that
benefits from the system.  The poor people are the most uncertain factor.  The 
government and the middle class cooperate with each other to resolve these potential 
problems.  Some interviewees are skeptical that Western democracy can actually work in 
China.  They share a cultural relativism perspective, similar to “path dependency” theory 
in the West.  They believe that Americans should put their feet in Chinese shoes, not in 
order to wear them as their own but in order to have some understanding (not approval) 
of why someone else might want to wear them.  They reject a universal standard to judge 
other peoples and recognize that upbringing, culture, history and even customs affect how 
people think and act.111
Even though some leaders understand the core problem facing China—the 
monolithic control of the Communist Party, they are not, and do not intend to, challenge 
the Party themselves because they are afraid of all kinds of social upheavals that may 
result in the breakdown of their businesses.  One interviewee told me the danger facing 
111
 One interviewee argues that the problem of Western social scientists is that they tend to apply Western 
theories rigidly into the Chinese culture.  They close down the range of options available for interpretations 
through a process of imposing order and logic.  The process of political reform is messy, ambiguous, fluid, 
and complex, but a scientific path is to clean one’s mind of all models to understand what people really 
need during a reform era.  They need order, no doubt, but it is achieved through constant experiments, 
success and failures.  The Western journalists only report anecdotes of human rights abuses.  What they 
have ignored is a broad panorama and thorough understanding of the Chinese history, beneath which lies its 
own logic and process.  
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the Communist Party.  “If it is true that a core cause of contemporary political problems 
in China is the aloofness of the political leaders from world development and their failure 
to see them as part of the people, seeing people rather as subjects external to be harnessed 
or overcome, then this period of ICT diffusion provides a significant warning about the 
dangers of such schismatic views and policies they generate.”  But he also believes that 
there is a “cushion effect” that they are satisfied with their economic status and wish to 
enjoy a stable social environment.  They are afraid that political reform might entail 
social turmoil, as demonized in numerous drives and campaigns of the Cultural 
Revolution.  Mao Wei and Zhao Wenquan expressed similar ideas over this.  
Some of these IT elites are skeptics about the transformative role of IT in China, 
especially its impacts on politics (Drake, et al 2002; Kathilil and Boas, 2003). They 
acknowledge the positive roles played by the Internet for ideational pluralism and 
information transparency, but warn us that these activities are still under strict scrutiny of 
the Communist Party.  They also warn that the application of the concept of “civil 
society” becomes a “teleological exercise: speculating whether or not China would 
achieve a breakthrough along an Eastern-Central European trajectory” (Ogden 2002, 27).  
However, it is not to suggest that the IT leaders are not interested in improving the 
system with the rule of law rather by guanxi  and reshaping socialist institutions in a 
manner to advance their business and personal development.  One interviewee from the 
China Railcom complained of the “executive interference” (xingzheng ganyu) with their 
free enterprise.  
It is much easier for us to deal with the horizontal relationships, such as the 
interconnection with China Telecom and China Netcom, equipment purchase with 
Huawei, and marketing our products.  The most trouble comes from the Ministry 
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of Railways.  There are so many ministers to report that you have to treat them 
like emperors respectively.  To operate a company, you need to have commercial 
secrets.  However, once you do not report to someone, he will be angry and give 
you “a smaller shoe to wear” (chuan xiaoxie).  You do not have enough power to 
hire or lay off people according to market law.  If you complain to MII, the 
leaders of the Ministry of Railways would think you are actually indirectly 
accusing their incapability.  Therefore, even the General Manager of this 
company is removed by the Ministry of Railway.  112
The real issue is that, even though they realize the political problem underlying ICT 
diffusion, sometimes they are unable to solve it by themselves.  The rigid bureaucracies 
can sometimes stifle their growing desires.  
A key issue for content providers is the way they deal with state control.  The 
state attempts to monitor development with refined measures of control (Zhou 2001, 19).  
While the development of dissident voices challenges the state stances, the government 
has not yet devised a clear and systemic policy in dealing with intellectual webzines (web 
magazines), BBS, and digital academic work archives.  Though the government shuts 
down overseas Chinese liberal websites such as Literature City <www.wenxuecity.com>, 
Unusual Bookstore <www.yifan.net>, and Big Reference <www.dacankao.com>,
Century China, and even more new websites emerge online.   Even though a domestic 
website the Realm of Ideas <www.sixiang.com> was closed down, its founder Li 
Yonggang, did not suffer from disciplinary measures from the Nanjing University and 
was subsequently sent to Hong Kong as a visiting scholar since 2001.  It seems that the 
state opts to exert indirect pressure on editors to conduct self-censorship rather than to 
close down the sites outright (Zhou 2001, 19).  But a direct challenge against the state 
will not be tolerated. A student nicknamed Stainless Rat published an anti-government 
message online and was put in jail.  Under international pressure, the girl was released 
112
 Personal communications in Beijing on May 7, 2005. 
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after a one-year imprisonment without trial.  The deputy editor of sina.com.cn, Liu Jun, 
told me he had to exclude certain sensitive topics such as religion, labor unions, party 
competition and other political complaints from his site.  “Beijing New News has covered 
an online article ‘China’s Seven Disgusting Issues’ and was force to close down”, Liu 
told me.   
From these stories, these IT leaders have made initial attempts for free voices and 
new ideas to redress social injustices.  However, these activities remain spontaneous and 
unorganized.  Furthermore, the state control made them parasitic to state needs and they 
are unwilling to sacrifice their business interests for the sake of political liberalization.   
The Amphibious Dimension of IT Advocates
These “amphibious” people are affiliated to a certain state institution or 
enterprise, but are reluctant to stick to the old rules.  They try to find more social spaces 
to give full scope to their capabilities.  Wang Junxiu, an organizer of Digital Forum, is 
constantly invited to Lan and Fangshan Counties (poor counties in Shanxi Province, 
north China) to deliver speeches to local cadres on e-commerce and e-government.  They 
are voluntary groups but not quite a lobby group because much of their effectiveness 
depends on their close relationship with the state officials.  However, they are not part of 
the establishment either.  Even people like Guo Liang who are working for the CASS, act 
independently—doing pretty much what they want.  The China Internet Network 
Information Center (CNNIC), a non-profit organization under CAS, also does serious 
research on attitudes and behaviors but strictly using very aggregate survey data on the 
habits on the Internet of millions of people.  Guo Liang, an expert on Hume in the 
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Department of Philosophy at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, did independent 
research on the social and political behaviors of adolescents and adults in major cities 
such as Beijing, Shanghai, Xian, Guangzhou, and Tianjin.  He got most of his funding to 
do statistical analysis from UCLA and the Markle Foundation.  This partly demonstrates 
intellectuals’ determination to carry out systematic investigations and write reports that 
reflected both the real situation on the ground and a freedom from ideological cant.  He 
also wrote an article to study the views and feelings on 9/11’s impact upon the Chinese.  
Such a report aroused interest at the top level of CASS and other Chinese leaders.  Duan 
Yongchao, a consultant at CCID (a consulting company affiliated with the MII), shuttled 
between a backward Shanxi Province and Beijing to study the “digital divide” in China.  
These groups are active in collecting first-hand unofficial data and are doing systematic 
surveys that report on the attitudes and behaviors of the “netizens”. The most important 
one is the Digital Forum.  Wang Junxiu from China Lab told me, “There is no leader in 
the forum, we just work together.”  It is usually held by Fang Xingdong, the Chairman of 
ChinaLab.com (also a Ph.D. candidate in hydroelectric engineering at Qinghua 
University).  They have published quite a few books including the IT History, and held
many discussions on China’s digital divide.  They have established an influential website, 
Blog China, as a virtual community for IT elites.  In this online community, numerous 
researchers try to compare the Western concepts and developments of IT and bring them 
to the Chinese practice.
Some IT leaders undertook independent investigations of social issues online and 
provided their own policy recommendations. These efforts sprouted bottom-up like wild 
mushrooms with an innovative, grassroots logic of its own, totally different from the old 
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line Communist hierarchical top down ideological incarnation.  These people attempted 
to persuade government officials to make China a civilized country, albeit a democratic 
one.  When the driver of a BMW committed a hit and run against an ordinary citizen in 
Harbin, there was a strong anti-rich and anti-bureaucratic sentiment in the on-line public. 
Gao Hongbing wrote long reports to the central government to suggest how to quell the 
social anger unleashed by ever-rising online activities.  They make the Internet an 
experimental ground, a link between state and society.  Gao told me: “The Internet is like 
a big fire to cook food faster.  But it cannot go too far to seethe.” 113 In sum, these IT 
leaders as content providers start to form some horizontal ties at society even though they 
work for certain official organizations.  Their amphibiousness lies in their attempt to 
bridge the shortfalls between the state and society.  
Evaluating Influence
The political role of the content providers and IT leaders at non-governmental 
organizations is more indirect and less salient than that of the public and private sectors.  
The autonomy of these content providers lies in their encouragement of online activities 
against social injustice. Their negotiating dimension is shown through their bargaining 
with the state for more online freedom.  Their symbiotic dimension is salient since they 
keep BBS alive and make it an experimental ground for governmental census.   They are 
also parasitic to the state in exchange for state permission for their forums.  Their 
amphibiousness lies in their roles as bridges of new ideas, but remain silent to directly 
challenge the irrationalities of the Communist system.  These IT leaders are trendsetters 
113
 Personal communications on August 3, 2004 in Beijing
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in that they are active in the pursuit of an independent virtual social space for the 
burgeoning civil society in China.114 They started numerous forums online for 
information exchanges and some social activitism over human rights, environment, and 
anti-monopoly issues.  Their activities coexist with a more or less tolerant government 
and global penetration of knowledge society, but they only play a catalyst role, not the 
dominant role in pushing China’s political development towards public contestation and 
state responsiveness.  They do not possess so much material and normative resources, but
provide a platform for these liberal practices at civil society and share a vision of an ever 
open and transparent future China.  
These IT leaders have power via the Internet—not the power of coercion (i.e. 
military forces) but the power of persuasion.  Their power lies in the “capacity to acquire 
and generate knowledge in all its forms, including recovery and upgrading of traditional 
knowledge”(Bezanson and Sagasti 1995, 5-6).  They make people understand that the 
current information revolution is not just a technical revolution, but a social and political 
transformation too. Daniel Bell argues that “technology was more than making things in a 
reproducible manner. It was a rational ordering of means-ends relations, a rationalization 
of work and even of sectors of life” (Bell 1999, xii).  At the same time, they have 
changed the traditional realpolitik to noopolitik, a new concept in international relations 
114 The term “trendsetter” is borrowed from David Goodman in that wealthier people set the trend by 
driving  limousines, wearing extravagant clothes, and building spacious houses .  He undertook a field 
research in Shaanxi province to study those cadres who got rich fast through reform policies (baofahu) and 
concluded that this middle class lacks social pluralism because "the party-state" or patron-clientism prevail.  
He categories middle class as simply wealthier people, namely private entrepreneurs (owner-operator in 
Goodman's term), managers of state owned enterprises (who can take advantage of loopholes in state policy 
and reallocate resources to its personal gains), and service providers or professionals.  The conclusion is 
that these wealthy people get rich because of their "guanxi"", therefore their relationship with the existing 
system is parasitic, not competing.  Their existence lies under the mercy of the Communist Party therefore, 
economic status does not imply political democracy in China.  Intense parochialism characterizes majority 
of Chinese middle class (Goodman 1999). 
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in digital age introduced by Arquilla and Ronfeldt.  They argue that two poles are 
associated with “information strategy”—one technological (cyberspace safety and 
security), the other political and ideational.  “Information strategy is seen as a way to 
harness and express the ‘soft power’ of American democratic and market ideals, to attract, 
influence, and lead others”(1999,ix-x)  We are changing our realist paradigm of political 
science to broaden our visions from statist national interest to global interests “in 
enhancing the transnationally networked ‘fabric’ in which the players are embedded.  
While realpolitik tends to empower state, noopolitik will likely empower networks of 
state and non-state actors.  Realpolitik pits one state against another, but noopolitik 
encourages states to cooperate in coalitions and other mutual frameworks
The study of their trendsetting role of these IT leaders is a step from the failure of 
political scientists to predict the collapse of Communism and the sudden end of the Cold 
War.  Such a failure has challenged political science to explain how just imperceptible, 
historical processes could culminate in dramatic instant change.  The diplomatic historian 
John Lewis Gaddis writing about the sudden and unexpected end of the Cold War notes 
that in the physical world change does not necessarily come about gradually: “Metal 
fatigue reveals its effects all at once: bridges do not collapse gradually, nor do airplanes 
decompress unhurriedly.  Faults in earthquake zones lock themselves into place for 
decades at a time, releasing accumulated strains rarely but, when they do release them, 
very dramatically” (Gaddis 1992, 3).  And so it is at times with change in social and 
political systems.  The strains in China may have been there for decades, and hence the 
explanation of cause becomes tricky because the relationship between the long-run 
imperceptible processes and the immediate dramatic events is hard to fathom.  Therefore, 
204
to study the role of the IT leaders in China is a new start to discern the long-term 
imperceptible process for drastic social changes.    
However, there are also serious limits for these IT leaders to press for political 
changes in civil society.  A clear weakness is that they are strictly following 
governmental instructions not to put bellicose and anti-governmental messages online.  In 
order for their business interests to succeed, they are quite obedient and cautious in 
following the government’s guidelines.  In addition, their organizations are loose without 
a coherent political ideology to pursue in the development of China.  They may constitute 
some necessary conditions for political freedom in China, but their power to influence the 
political structure is gradual and incremental, to a certain extent, latent.  
  
The concept of a civil society juxtaposed to the state figures prominently in 
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Marx’s On the Jewish Question, and Gramsci's Prison 
Notebooks. It has several important connotations.   First, it refers to the relationship 
between state and society, regarding them as separate and distinct spheres roughly to be 
equated with the public and  private spheres.  In this sense, through numerous websites, 
these IT leaders keep a “second culture” alive for private people to exchange their ideas 
and enjoy closer social bonds.  Second, it implies a certain power relationship between 
state and society such that there are limitations on the state’s capacity to pervade and 
control society, and a certain power on the part of members of a society to insulate 
themselves from, and exert influence upon, the state.  Thus, IT leaders contribute to the 
empowering the underprivileged groups and help them contend for power against state 
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control through all kinds of online activities.  Third, in this realm of autonomous social 
power and space, civil society denotes an associational realm in which autonomous 
organizations are formed through voluntary association to represent the interests and 
aspirations of members of society.  Civil society reflects the desire to curb the power of 
overweening states through a sphere of social organizations enjoying more or less 
autonomy from the state.  It is true that these IT leaders form associations, such as ISP 
associations, E-commerce associations, the Internet society, e-forums, and some online 
communities such as Blog China.  But some of them are parasitic to the state and directed 
by retired governmental officials.  Even though there are some online forums, these 
forums are largely reflecting some personal views on reform, and are not formal ways to 
organize autonomous social forces against state control. However, IT advocates and 
Internet content providers have started to arouse public participation and interaction in 
social issues, such as human rights, environment, and social justice issues.  Their 
autonomy lies in their way to provide platforms for online dialogues and discussions, an 
inchoate development for mass involvement in politics.  They are also negotiating with 
the state for more freedoms online.  Their symbiosis lies in that the state also wants to 
make the Internet forms an experimental ground for monitoring social grievances.  The ir
parasitic dimension of these leaders lies in their unwillingness to challenge the state 
directly, but engaging in a subtle struggle and cooperation with the state.  But it is quite 
important that these leaders at the civil society have introduced “ideational pluralism” 
and “alternative comparison” to the Chinese people for them to search for a better life.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusion:
Leadership as a Spark during Uncertain Transitions
In the last two decades, the trend of telecommunications liberalization has swept 
across developed countries and developing countries alike.  There was a process in which 
the telecommunications sector shifted from monopoly to competition, from centralization 
to decentralization, from public ownership to private ownership, and from domestic 
construction to international participation.  Eli Noam summarizes the global trend from 
monopoly to competition as “a paradigm shift in the concept of public 
telecommunications” (Noam 1987, 30)115. The information revolution is not just a 
technical revolution; it also involves lots of bargaining and compromise at the political 
stage.  Therefore, there is a need to study the strategic group of reformers who pushed 
forward such changes behind the ICT diffusion in China.  In addition, their potential role 
for the political change in China is also worthy of studying.  Thus the core research 
question of this dissertation is: are China’s IT leaders an independently innovative force 
that pushes for political changes in China?    
Hugh Helco argues that politics finds its source in “uncertainty-- on men (and 
women) collectively wondering what to do” (Helco 1974, 305).  Agents make conscious, 
contestable choices about whether they should open the ICT to competition, how to 
allocate resources, and how they organize themselves to push for these changes in the 
115 See also Peter L. Smith and Gregory Staple, pp. 24; L. Keta Ruiz, pp. 15.
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political realm.  Thus it is important for us to know who the IT leaders are, what values 
they hold, how they attain positions of influence at state level, and how they respond to a 
burgeoning civil society—the answers to these questions have important implications for 
the political future of China.
Research Focus
In this dissertation, those who guide and hold sway or set the trend in the current IT 
infrastructure restructuring, application, and policy reform were termed I T leaders.  They 
are pioneers in the ICT sector who play positive roles in the ICT diffusion in China, 
including those who promote infrastructures in the ICT sector (i.e.  Hu Qili for breaking 
up China Telecom, Edward Tian for Netcom,and other Internet Service Providers), and 
those Internet content providers who use the Internet to promote social justices (i.e. Liu 
Jun from Sina.com, Shan Chengbiao from People.com). They are the most influential 
figures in China's ICT reform. A common thread runs through all the definitions: their 
visions for a connected and advanced China, their capabilities for involving themselves 
into political deals, and their courage against conservative incumbents.  In other words, 
the concept of leadership involves the analysis on the vision, capacity, and authority of a 
vanguard strategic group (less of a social stratum) in the ICT diffusion and its political 
implications.  As a result of change and development in the modern world, society 
inevitably places a premium on new skills and talents; the new social values give rise to 
new criteria for allotting status rewards, and a new leading group emerges.  From this 
standpoint, China’s IT leadership is a broad and heterogeneous group; some are in the 
public sector, such as Minister Hu Qili, Peng Peng of China Railcom; and some are 
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private entrepreneurs (digital leaders) with prestige in providing Internet services, such as 
Edward Tian, Charles Zhang, Jasmine Zhang, Michael Wan, John Wang.  Also included 
are leaders of the digital age who are advocates and activists in non-governmental 
organizations areas who use ICT for public causes such as Liu Jun of sina.com, Shan 
Chengbiao of people.com, and scientists, intellectuals, NGO leaders; all of whom 
together constitute a reservoir of skills, talents, and influences.  
I choose these IT leaders who play proactive roles in the ICT diffusion in China 
because they are the pioneers of the IT reform, thus the value to test their potential impact 
upon politics lies in the “crucial case” study to discern these vanguards’ role in politics.  
Therefore, I do not choose Party leaders, MII leaders, and other leaders in formal 
positions in the government or other conservative IT elites because they are followers of 
old lines and the value to test their potential role for political change is low.  This 
definition must not obscure the fact that it is the leaders as a whole with which this 
analysis is ultimately concerned. Thus this study is not only on the individual traits and 
behaviors of IT leaders, but also the coordination between the public, private, academia, 
and non-profit-organizations.  In order to study this strategic group and assess its political 
impact, its five dimensions are studied in order to dissect their traits and trace the 
mechanisms for change.  These dimensions are the autonomous dimension, symbiotic 
dimension, parasitic dimension, negotiating dimension, and amphibious dimension.  In 
the public sector, the symbiotic dimension is more salient than the others, while in the 
private sector the autonomous dimension is clearly shown to be dominant.  In the non-
governmental organizations, the negotiating dimension is strongly demonstrated.  In all 
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sectors, the IT leaders were also characterized by their parasitic and amphibious 
dimensions.
In the process of ICT diffusion, there are many factors driving this change.  The 
reason I chose to study leadership is that in times of reform, changes are always brought 
about by courageous, shrewd, and sagacious men and women who can guide people over 
uncertainty.  I do not deny that structural factors such as elite rationality, bureaucratic 
politics, or WTO pressures may yield political outcomes in ICT diffusion, but it is 
leadership that provides the first cut of the bold and treacherous reform in the muddled 
water of ICT diffusion.  Therefore, these actors are behind all structural changes in ICT 
diffusion and are worthy of careful studying because their initiatives for political changes 
are hardly captured by structural analysis.  The independent variable for the dissertation 
is the traits and behaviors of the IT leaders, and the dependent variable is the political 
change measured by state responsiveness and public contestation.  However, there are 
intervening variables that contribute to changes in the ICT sector, which are unrelated to 
efforts of these IT leaders.  The first variable is elite rationality—political elites 
themselves can learn to improve the competitiveness of the ICT sector.  The second 
intervening variable is bureaucratic politics—these ICT diffusion policies may also be a 
result of power struggles between different departments.  The third intervening variable is 
the pressure facing WTO requirement that the Chinese government has to yield to 
international pressures for competition in the ICT sector.   Even though there are 
intervening variables such as elite rationality and bureaucratic politics, the study of 
leadership is an attempt to trace the trajectory of novel ideas for change in the ICT 
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diffusion in China and the way they are implemented by IT leaders.  Their specific traits 
and behaviors will be elaborated in the following section. 
Figure 9. Variables and Parameters of the Research
(Antecedent variable) structural factors
Market Reform and Opening up (conditional and intervening variables)
                                                                                 , 
Traits of IT Leaders                                          
                   Behaviors at ICT diffusion             Political change
(Independent Variable)                               (intermediate variable)            (dependent variable)
(creativity, craftsman, courage)           (awareness building & resource mobilization)
Source: author
Source: author
Functions of Leadership
Leaders produce enticing visions for a developing country like China.  Robert 
Michels felt that the most important factor in the rise of oligarchic leadership was the 
inability of the masses to give direction to their own movement.  Because of the apathy 
and general lack of political skills among the masses, leadership was not only inevitable, 
but also necessary; “since rank and file are incapable of looking after their own interests, 
it is necessary that they should have experts to attend their affairs.  From this point of 
view it cannot be always considered a bad thing that the leaders should really lead” 
(Michels 1962, 112). Many IT leaders share common values and backgrounds.  Most 
early innovators were educated abroad, often in the US and other countries.  They were 
Anti-monopoly activities 
National information initiatives
(Golden Projects)
rule-making and new institutions
Western education
Traumatic past
Missionary fervor
Socialist blending
State responsiveness
Public contestation
Institutional performance
Trend-setting
Elite rationality
Bureaucratic politics 
WTO pressure
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exposed to these new applications in a cultural and institutional context that encouraged 
and rewarded experimentation and change.  These individuals were also trained in 
technical fields like electrical engineering and computer science.  They returned home 
driven by a compelling sense of duty and they recognized unique opportunities to do 
something socially important and personally rewarding.  The visionaries like Edward 
Tian, Charles Zhang, and Jasmine Zhang were enthusiastic about the broadband networks 
that connect China and enlighten the Chinese people.  Their advocacy of the “green 
revolution” of a networked knowledge society in China imbues most people with the 
hope for prosperity and freedom.116  It seems like the Great Leap Forward—one step in 
Commune, another step in Communist a utopia; one step in broadband networks, and 
another step into an advanced and bright China.  Their charisma establishes a powerful 
emotional and personalized bonds between the leader and his followers, becomes the 
perfect bridge between the old and new systems.117 They are bridges between West vs. 
China, past vs. future, and state vs. society.   They bring international norms of 
competition and decentralization into domestic practice.  By educating officials at the 
central government, they attempt to help the government heed its commitment to 
globalization and make changes in accordance with international principles.  The IT 
entrepreneurs such as Edward Tian, co-founder of AsiaInfo, the country’s first 
homegrown Internet infrastructure company, Michael Wan, and Edward Zeng, have 
shared visions that the Internet could set an unceasing trend of development for China.  
116 President Bill Clinton remarks on March 8, 2000 in Beijing
“In the new century, liberty will spread by cell phone and cable modem.. we know how much the 
Internet has changed America, and we are already an open society.  Imagine how much it could change 
China.  Now, there’s no question China has been trying to crack down on the Internet—good luck. 
That’s sort of like trying to nail Jello to the wall.”
117
 Leadership produces a temporary authority structure that unifies the society around the few 
charismatized figures and establishes the legitimacy of new institutions (Glassman 1992, 245).
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They have helped construct the backbone of the country’s national and provincial 
networks.  In other words, they possessed a mix of altruism and idealism.
Figure 10:  The Working Process of Leadership
Institutional Performance
Vision                      Resource Mobilization
Trend-setting
Big Bang from Outside Small Bang from inside
These leaders also mobilize resources both from inside the state and outside of it.    
They were not just a one-time, coincidental collection of occasionally interacting 
individuals, but a group of people who remained in close contact over the years, trading 
professional positions, providing ideas and advice, doing political deals, and pushing
forward novel ideas of development via the Internet (Wilson 2004a, 68).  Their 
interactive, feedback relationship between these leaders and the state gave agency a 
prominent status in the study of China’s ICT diffusion and political changes.  Some 
reformers at the state level infiltrated existing institutions to alter their purposes and 
procedures, while others hammer on the doors from the outside.  Thus, two 
developments—first, creating a community of like-minded reformers within the main 
ICT sector with access to political and organizational resources and then successfully 
venturing against monopoly of China Telecom from outside—reveal the ways in which 
strategically placed individuals deliberately structured the reform process.  Dr. Hu 
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Qiheng, Prof. Qian Tianbai, Director Song Ling created alternative institutions like the 
State Informatization Office and CNNIC alongside inherited state institutions to serve the 
Communist ideologies and state efforts for development.  Others, like Gao Hongbing, 
Jasmine Zhang, and Wang Juntao, scaled the walls that took over at the top.  Leaders 
such as Hu Qili, Peng Peng, Gao Hongbing made initial bold moves to build a robust 
national information infrastructure.  Edward Tian, Jiang Mianheng, Hou Ziqiang and Kan 
Kaili helped design the breakup of China Telecom and establish new market entries of 
competitive telecommunications carriers such as China Netcom and China Railcom.  
Shen Jian, Hu Qiheng, Jasmine Zhang, and Song Ling were engaged in rules and 
regulations of the ICT sector.  Both groups were engaged, in complementary ways, in 
political changes at the ICT sector.  They pass on up-to-date information, diffuse new 
norms, and attempt to convince the populace to act in certain ways, as well as to support 
particular ideas and policies.  Different from transitions in Eastern Central Europe, the 
Chinese case is interesting because it starts with political institutionalization.  Thus they 
became new political players like Jasmine Zhang and Gao Hongbing’s design for China 
Netcom. Thus the “Quad” cooperation between the public, private, academia and social 
organizations is essential to meet social demands for pricing reform, anti-monopoly 
desire, and wide diffusion of the Internet service to the state level.  
Their role in institutional performance is also salient.  Leadership is not solely a 
matter of policy direction; it is also a matter of building, maintaining, and modifying a 
governing rule or regime.  These IT leaders are helpful not only for the laws and 
regulations they created in the e-commerce sector (i.e. Electronic Signature Law), but 
were also instrumental for state responsiveness.  For the first divestiture of China 
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Telecom in 1998, real competition did not come into fruition.  As the general manager of 
China Unicom used to be deputy minister of MPT, China Unicom did not oppose China 
Telecom systematically.  Jasmine Zhang, Gao Hongbing, and Hou Liqiang designed 
China Netcom, which eventually led to the breakup of the China Telecom regime, and 
created the rules of the political games that would determine the distribution of power.  
These rules prescribe who may engage in politics and how.  These rules may be codified 
in constitutions or other legal statutes; or may be informal, embodying customs and 
habits to which all participants are attuned (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 9-10).  
During an interval of political uncertainty, leadership input is crucial for the shape of 
the new institutional dispensation.  They helped political elites to recalculate their 
interests in the ICT sector.  Then they engaged public officials to engage in numerous 
dialogues and discussions to change their understanding from monopoly to competition 
in the ICT sector, and finally decision-makers accepted their idea and make decisions 
favorable to the ICT diffusion.  As a result, Shen Jian and Gao Hongbing wrote a report 
in 2000 on the impact of information technology on American society to President Jiang 
Zemin’s mentor, Wang Daohan.  This report became an integral part of the Tenth Five-
Year Plan in China.  Openly acknowledging necessity for this post-industrial revolution, 
the 10th Five-Year Plan calls for information technology to take its place along side other 
industrial sectors and take a central place along side other industrial sectors and take a 
central place as a “pillar” in the economy, and according to planners, the sector is 
expected to grow 30 per cent a year (Harner 2000).  Thus leadership is an important step 
towards a harmonious state-society relationship.  The attempts of these IT leaders may 
serve as bridges between state and society.  Their cooperation with the state partly solves 
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the contradiction that the state’s desire to encourage domestic and foreign competitive 
pressures in the economy while preserving its unchallenged political authority: to what 
extent to allow market reforms to co-exist with the continued dominance of the party-
state.  They helped build a strong ICT infrastructure and institution that are key to 
ameliorate state-society relationship in time of uncertainty.  
They also set trends in civil society by creating online communities and encouraging 
civil engagement. They make Chinese people susceptible to global factors such as the 
increasing importance of technology, the arrival of the information age, and the
specialization of knowledge and interests.  Even though they have not fueled the engine 
of revolt against Communist morality, they sow the seeds for a new world culture among 
people.  The international youth culture, as linked to high-tech consumerism, is important 
to direct people’s world outlook.  These trends become one of the factors for government 
to yield to global pressures and conform to global standards.  In an era when the Chinese 
government is “crossing the river by groping for the stones beneath the river”, these IT 
leaders have stepped into the vacuum to help the self-help function of civil society and 
become vanguards for fresh ideas from the West.  They play a subtle role in the process 
of trend-setting and crafting the blueprint for future development. The following table is a 
summary of their activities.  The first kind of activities is their attempt to influence the 
above—political bargaining at the state level.  The second kind consists their endeavors 
to educate both political elites and grassroots to accept the Internet, thus playing a role of 
state-society bridges.  The third kind of activity is their social responsibilities for 
alleviating environmental and other tensions at society.  
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Table 3. Activities of the IT Leaders
Activity Leader Position
Political Bargaining
Lobby for price hearings and ISP licensing Jasmine Zhang
Michael Wan
Infohighway
Net China (ISP)
Design and implement national information 
infrastructures
Hu Qili Ministry of 
Electronic 
Industry
Plan divestiture of China Telecom Liu Cai
Kan Kaili
Zhou Qiren
MPT
Univ. of Posts and 
Telecom
Beijing Univ. 
Proposing new legislature Wang Juntao 
Song Ling
8848.com
E-commerce 
Association
Socio-political Education
Organizing symposiums and workshops on 
licensing and prices
Jasmine Zhang Infohighway Co., 
Ltd.
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Educating policy-makers on Internet Café and 
broadband networks
Edward Zeng 
Edward Tian
Sparkice
China Netcom
Field investigation for political leaders Gao Hongbing
Shen Jian
Cnlink
Shineworks
Establishing online forums Shan Chengbiao
Jiang Yaping 
Web Bo
People.com
Green China
Policy consultation with political elites Gao Hongbing
Edward Tian
ChinaLink
China Netcom
Organizing overseas study groups Peng Peng China Railcom
Social Responsibility
Public donations and social welfare Jasmime Zhang 
Wang Yan 
Genesis Capital
Sina.com
Creating horizontal ties via blogs Wang Junxiu Chinalab
Surveying Internet behaviors of ordinary people Guo Liang 
Mao Wei
CASS
CNNIC
Source: author
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Theoretical Contribution
Before understanding the theoretical contribution of China’s IT leadership, we 
should first understand the contradictions inherent in the Communist regime because we 
want to know whether this newly emerged strategic group can make political changes 
possible out of such a contradictory system.  Lucien Pye argues that the spirit of Chinese 
politics is “the supreme importance of consensus, conformity, and agreement requires a 
standardized denial of conflicts…but underneath the surface show of conformity, 
tensions, feuding, and factional conflicts abound” (Pye 1992, 197).  The fundamental 
dynamic of Chinese politics is continuous tension between the imperative of consensus 
and conformity on one hand, and the belief, on the other, that contradiction is natural for 
the development of theories and practices.   Therefore, to study leadership is meaningful 
to see how political changes can come about via contradictions beneath the political 
system for us to identify the sources and processes of such changes.  There are several 
models about the state-society relationship that shed light on the possibilities or 
impossibilities and possible paths that may resolve that contradiction.  These theories 
emphasize the opportunities and possibilities of political changes, with different factual 
support as well as underlying logic.  Their logic and mechanisms are important for us to 
test whether these IT leaders may become an innovative and independent force to push 
for political changes in China.  All models have strengths and weaknesses, while 
amphibious actor model is superior to other models because it points out the two-
sidedness of China’s IT leaders.  
The study of leadership shares the same views with modernization theory (here 
renamed “autonomous actor model”) that the newly emerged IT elites are products of 
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reform and openness, and thus enjoy structural and ideological autonomy.  It is true that 
these elites also enjoy freer social space and acquire more resources.  But the path by 
which they influence political change is totally different.  In other words, economic 
freedoms, such as having a free social space and material resources, do not easily 
translate into political power.  In addition, the state may also attempt to control these
social activities and bind them into its patronage.  For these emerging social elites to 
influence politics, there are other prerequisites:  (1) innovative beliefs that can help more 
people participate in the courses of design and conduct of political activities; (2) viable 
channels and skills to be involved in the process of decision-making; and (3) courage to 
fight against conservative incumbents.  Putting it simply, they need creativity, 
craftsmanship, and courage.  
In China, these IT elites became influential not because they were wealthy.  There 
are many other tycoons who had no influence at all at the political arena.  Thus these IT 
leaders have increasingly gained their influence as they introduced foreign concepts and 
grafted them onto Chinese customs.  Their autonomous beliefs were shaped largely out of 
the establishment and courage was not given by the state.  They began to form horizontal 
relationships, but this relationship is not achieved through associations or societies.  Their 
path of resource mobilization is achieved through finding people with common visions 
and attacking incumbents from both inside and outside.  Thus it is totally different from 
the path encapsulated in the “autonomous actor model” (modernization/civil society 
model).  In such a model, with a rising consciousness for collective political action, they 
develop a complex of social organizations that are autonomous and beyond state control.  
These organizations may eventually challenge the state.  But the IT leaders in China start 
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in the patron-clientelist system as advisors to help political institutions, not as challengers 
of state power.  They do not exercise their power through those middle organizations or 
associations. It is correct that leaders must have state resources to push forward their 
agenda, thus their personal relationship with the state is important.  But this kind of 
system sometimes provides useful ties for these IT leaders and allows them to influence 
the state, thereby becoming viable channels for new ideas and practices.  
The “parasitic actor model” captures the patron-clientelism and state corporatism 
that binds these business elites to the government through favorable deals in exchange for 
political loyalty.  Therefore, civil society organizations, under authoritarian conditions, 
may be just one more instrument of state control rather than a mechanism of collective 
empowerment (Wiktorowicz 2000, 43-44).   Weber and Mill warned that the middle class 
would become docile and locked into status hierarchies.  Thus the business elites may not 
be a vanguard in the formation of a public sphere (Lum 2000, 12).  Some scholars adopt 
an approach that sees the everlasting patron-clientelism and state corporatism, which 
inhibits creative changes from taking place. These parsimonious models include: 
“nomenclature capitalism,” “bureaucratic capitalism,” “socialist corporatism,” “symbiotic 
clientelism,” “Confucian Leninism”, “Leninist patrimonialism,” and “institutional 
amphibiousness”.118
State corporatism points out the socialist strategy to incorporate business elites into 
state control.  The state deliberately restricts the channels of political access and 
multiplicity of associations. Under the old state socialist system, leadership was 
paternalistic, hierarchical, and highly centralized (Yoder 1999, 28).    Bruce Dickson 
118 See also X. L. Ding, pp. 293-318; Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan, pp. 104ff;. Richard Baum and Alexei 
Shevchenko, pp.  333-334.   
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shows that businessmen are closely interconnected with the state, but they do not 
necessarily share the same beliefs as those of officials (Goldman 2002, 16).  As derived 
from the patron-clientelist bond, social elites strived to find other outlets for their voices.  
But this overly parasitic relationship stymies changes, as contrary to our observation 
that China is moving forward quickly in recent decades, especially in the ICT sector. 
Patron-clientelist analysts get only half the story on the constraining effect of institutions 
and structures, but ignore the proactive role of actors to try to change, ameliorate, or alter 
structural constraints.  The enabling or empowering factors to resolve the tension
between a desire for policy innovation and institutional constraints can be found 
throughout the whole process of policy making during ICT diffusion.  Kevin O’Brien has 
observed that the domicile co-opted groups became embedded in the political system for
a time, they gradually release their latent energy within the system and without the 
system (O’Brien 1994).  Over time, they gradually got the upper hand and acquired 
viability and legitimacy.  This points to a new development of state -society synergy as 
captured in the “symbiotic actor model”.  There is mutual empowerment between the 
state and IT elites in that these IT leaders strengthen the infrastructural power of the state 
and at the same time, these IT leaders gradually gained legitimacy.  Thus these IT 
leaders are strengthening the infrastructural power of the state.  Infrastructural power is 
the institutional capacity of a central state to penetrate its territories and logistically 
implement decisions.  Efforts by the IT elites facilitate a joint project of IT liberalization, 
while a robust and coherent state apparatus facilitates the strength of these IT leaders.  
These elites constantly shift their positions because they are also engaged in a 
continued learning process.  Therefore, the “negotiating actor model” captures the 
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multivariate efforts of social elites to press for changes at the state level.  These IT 
leaders have devised strategies to negotiate with the state a semi-independent relationship 
in order to evade or deflect state intrusion.  These IT leaders increasingly set trends and 
formulate a patterns of negotiation with the state that maximizes their power of rule 
making while minimizes state penetration.  Thereafter, there is a constructive process that 
makes human behavior and social structure inseparable, simultaneous, and co-constituted.   
People as agents are not only bound by immaterial and inanimate institutions, but are 
active participants in creating their own social rules.  “Structure alone explains only the 
possibilities (and impossibilities) of action” (Desseler 1989, 57).  The constructive 
process via the IT leaders to help the state evolve from instrumental calculation, 
discursive understanding and norm internalization is a contribution to our understanding 
of political change in China during an era of uncertain transformations.  They started with 
economic recalculation, then proceeded into a discursive stage participated in by all 
ministries and ordinary people.  And, finally the political elites were persuaded and 
internalized many key principles in the ICT diffusion.  In a word, the constructivist 
approach of the dissertation attempts to track down the “ratchet effect” at working--once 
norms of competition and decentralization have entered the dialogue between state and IT 
entrepreneurs, the practices keep ratcheting forward.  They are changing China’s political 
system in gradual, incremental, and perhaps even unintended ways.
However, their influence cannot be exaggerated.  The “amphibious actor model” 
points out the weakness of these IT leaders in the asymmetric power distribution between 
state and social actors.  The state’s power can be despotic.  Despotic power refers to the 
distributive power of the state elite over civil society.  It is the absolute power and force 
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of the state without routine negotiation with civil society groups.  Thus one important 
question arises: can social elites or these IT leaders challenge conservative incumbents?  
The story can be either optimistic or pessimistic.  Hu Qili, Jasmine Zhang, and Peng Peng 
were successful at their initial attempts for ICT reform, but they finally lost the power 
struggle.  Therefore, we cannot simply divide their relationship with the political regime 
as simply cooperative or confrontational.  These leaders dare not challenge the legitimacy 
of the Party and its monolithic despotic power.  They have a dual character—a mixture 
with a desire for a responsive political regime and the dependence on personal ties within 
this hierarchical system for their own self-interest.  Therefore some of these leaders are 
quite satisfied with the working mechanism of this political system.  The amphibiousness 
of these IT leaders has determined that their relationship with the state is to be neither too 
close nor distant (ruo ji ruo li).  It remains to be seen whether they can evolve into an 
independent social stratum that can push for democracy in China.  Caution is also 
required in the analysis of the role of “guanxi” (connection) in social organization.  It 
may be a kind of patron-clientelism or corporatism, but can also become a power of 
erosion through which IT elites can have access to the state’s resources and its decision 
making circle.  Thus this amphibious actor model points out two possible paths of 
political change: one might be that these IT elites are satisfied with their gains, thus 
losing interest in further political reform.  The other path might be that these IT leaders 
become embedded in the system and gradually change the legitimacy of the government 
to be more responsive to social demands.  Both directions are possible and need follow-
up studies.  
224
Figure 11: Theoretical Development of China’s IT Leadership
Autonomous Actor Model            Parasitic Actor Model
            Symbiotic Actor Model     Negotiating Actor Model
Amphibious Actor Model
  IT leaders as
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Source: author
Limitations of IT Leaders in China
The IT leaders belong to a non-critical sphere for political development and do 
not pose a direct challenge to the regime.  They play a balancing role in political 
institutionalization and social mobilization.  But even though they encouraged all kinds 
of civil groups, from professional associations to hobby clubs, to blossom all over the 
country they have not contributed to a coherent and organized force to challenge the 
despotic power.  These IT elites lack the necessary common orientations for political 
reform that transcend geography and professions and a common normative fabric linking 
diverse social groups (publics) and underprivileged communities together.  Many IT 
elites prioritize their efforts for business interests, thus may stop pushing forward a 
political agenda on their vested interests.  Some people have liberal political ideologies, 
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but do not necessarily translate them into political action.  In addition, we cannot be 
overly optimistic over the liberalizing effect of the Internet by these IT leaders.  There is 
an exemplary effect of the Internet by providing alternative comparisons for people to get 
a broader understanding of political freedom.  There is also a contagion or snowballing 
effect of global capitalist system over the Internet, but the linkage to local democracy 
remains murky.  In addition, the state may use the Internet as a tool to monitor social 
activities.  It allows some free space on the Internet for free discussions (chat-rooms)
such as Strengthening China Forum of the People’s Daily dot com.    Although scientists, 
intellectuals, and NGO groups establish ISP/ICPs to express their own opinions and 
formulate forums that have a subtle impact upon the state, the state can also take 
advantage of this technology to invigorate its power of control.  These IT leaders have 
unleashed rising demands for rewriting egalitarian rules in the political arena, but
whether those same pressures will touch off a new round of development, or reproduce
and reinforce the old rules of the game, is still an unresolved question.
Formal and regular channels between state and society have not been created by 
these IT leaders.  These IT leaders received particular attention at the state because they 
have the skills, knowledge, and some resources—the means to create high-speed 
economic growth—that the state requires. Even though there are some consultative 
bodies like the China E-commerce Association that can help these IT leaders connect 
with the state.  Yet it is still unclear if these elites will promote collective action on 
political issues.  They have not made special efforts to create a regular and free-flowing 
interactive channel between state and society, a key for political change in developing 
countries.  Even though some new institutions such as the State Informatization Office 
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have been established, it is still doubtful whether they can transform a hierarchical state-
society relationship into a horizontal one.  The assertion is that they have helped 
reconfigure or re-adjust the state-society relationship in mutually beneficial terms is still 
too idealistic. Their role in creating civic awareness about the political agenda is limited 
and they do not have strong horizontal ties.  In addition, state-society synergy is more 
likely to occur when the state is enmeshed in dense ties with multiple social groups.  
Therefore, mutual empowerment is too optimistic and idealistic as a feasible path for IT 
leaders to impact upon politics.  The proposed symbiotic relationship is still highly 
unevenly tilted to the hierarchical decision power of the state.
There are conditional and intervening variables that may have an impact on 
political change.  Therefore to discern the political impact these IT leaders have is tricky 
and their influence must not be overstated.  China is not simply an authoritarian system 
undergoing democratization; it is a Leninist system undergoing both political change and 
economic reform simultaneously (Fewsmith 2000, 161; and Minxing Pei 1994).  In recent 
years, Western studies of China have offered dramatically different images of the way the 
political system works and how policies are made. The richness of this work suggests the 
intellectual mileage that can be gained by looking carefully at the formal, institutional 
structure of the system.  Two important branches of their studies constitute two key 
conditional variables to evaluating the IT leaders’ possible political influence: elite 
rationality and bureaucratic politics.  The rational actor theory holds that a government 
maximizes social gains by choosing from an array of desired goals and strategic 
objectives, given its perception of national interests and strategic goals.  Policy makers’ 
rationality is “bounded” and sufficient for policy options.  “The Chinese Communist 
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leadership pursues its objectives in a systematic and logical way, given its perception of 
the world….  This assumption provides a path through what would otherwise seem an 
incomprehensible swamp”(Allison 1971, 22-23).  The current development of the 
information infrastructure has inherited the traditional zeal for China’s development and 
dream of grandeur in the world.  However, as the Chinese leaders were more aware of 
past lessons and keen to experiences from developed countries, their optimism if not 
utopianism affecting their policy making was less driven by coercion and chaos.  In 
contrast to Mao’s era, elite scientific knowledge in Deng Xiaoping’s era was not 
suppressed but respected, dissent not stifled but tolerated on development issues.  
By the late 1990s, the Communist Party was no longer repudiating economists’ 
warnings of the dangers of concentrating on labor and resource intensive industries.  The 
Chinese government has started to be committed to the advance of science and 
technology for decades.  As Peng Peng commented that the success of China Railcom’s 
market entry was due to the grand and wise decision of the central political leaders.  Thus 
the approval of state leaders for ICT diffusion is also crucial for the rapid competition of 
ICT market in China.  Under reform and opening up initiative, the state is adapting its 
administration from direct control to communication and from communication to 
coordination.  This is clear from the learning curve over the information technologies.  
Another important intervening variable is bureaucratic politics.  Institutional studies 
of China’s political system have drawn on Western understandings of bureaucratic 
processes to develop a picture of a highly institutionalized, albeit fragmented, 
administrative system (Harding 1984).  In particular, Lieberthal and Oksenberg’s 
monumental study of the energy bureaucracy depicts a system in which there is an 
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elaborate division of labor and institutionalized operating procedures that direct the paper 
flow and greatly influence the decision-making process (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1992).  
Their work, as well as that of others, has highlighted the fragmentation of power and 
consequent bargaining that takes place in the system (Lampton 1992).  John Ure 
concluded that new market entry was not the result of a single pressure to modernize; it 
arose from the interests of the provincial administrations of posts and 
telecommunications, People’s Liberation Army’s business interests, state enterprises as 
big users, and ministries with network capacity for resale (Ure 1994, 182-194).  Policy 
outcomes are a result of fragmented bureaus that compete with each other for resources 
and influence on policy. Different bureaucrats pull and haul for their personal fame and 
gains as well as their organizational interests, such as their organizational survivals, 
resources and influence on policies.  Bargaining, compromise, and consensus building in 
the policy-making process may be a result of “standard operation procedure” of 
bureaucratic politics, unrelated to efforts of IT leaders. Thus the breakup of China 
Telecom is also power struggle between new aristocracies of President Jiang and Hu and 
old aristocracies of paramount leader Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng.   Therefore, the IT 
leaders must have permission from the top elites for the protection of their reform agenda.  
IT leaders operate in that broader political environment, and may be a catalyst for 
change and thus create a part of the necessary conditions for political change.  They play 
a role in state responsiveness, information transparency, civic contestation, and state-
society communications.  But their role is not strong enough to be a sufficient condition 
for political changes.  For sufficient conditions to be reached, these IT elites have enough 
resources so that the state’s power may be checked and balanced.  With one party’s 
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monopoly, the inherent peculiarities of Communism and capitalism will keep for a long 
time, albeit the abusive despotic power is lessened to a certain extent.  The government 
still strictly supervises the Internet operation. It has taken the specific moves to 
accommodate the increasingly wide range of articulate audiences to thwart or limit the 
possibility of political-ideological threat.  Even though the state’s position has changed
from insulation from social elites to integration, it still retains monolithic power over 
social issues.  The state still attempts to bind IT elites into its organizational patronage. 
This is a smart strategy of the state to establish corporatist links with state for fear of the 
potential for social unrest and the opposition that the reforms have created.  But a softer 
strategy of state control does not blind us the paramount power of the Communist Party 
in the state-society relationship. 
Comparisons with IT Leaders in Other Developing Countries
There are many similarities in the process by which leadership plays an important 
role for ICT diffusion in China and other developing countries.  They coincide with their 
similar beliefs and behaviors for anti-monopoly initiatives.  A strong vision gained during 
an overseas education, a good relationship with the president or other elites, active 
interaction with public, private, academic or non-governmental sectors, and a charismatic 
personality that can sway social opinions.  Usually these leaders have some political clout 
(Nii Quaynor and President Rawlings in Ghana, Edward Tian and Jiang Mianheng), but 
they depend more on their independently innovative strategies to graft foreign concepts to 
the local environment for the rehabilitation of the ICT sector, not necessarily huge 
amounts of wealth.  Their success in the ICT sector does not cause a fundamental 
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weakening of the core problems in their respective countries, i.e. neo-patrionism in 
Africa, and institutional inertia in Brazil, but their courageous attempts have set 
precedents in their respective countries to break political paralysis over decentralization, 
thus paving the first stones for political liberalization. 
A crucial similarity is that leadership is a bridge that coalesces domestic reformers 
with international forces for ICT diffusion.  Peter Cowhey argues that domestic politics is 
the primary source of telecommunications regime change from the natural monopoly to a 
county-hegemony community.  But he also contends two other factors are involved, 
“domestic actors make calculations about international constraints when choosing a 
strategy, and domestic change can only spill over to international change if there is a 
market coalition with sufficient global influence and if there is an alternative cognitive 
framework around which to organize new principles and norms for the international 
regime” (Cowhey 1990, 173).  Thus for ICT regime change in China, there should 
emerge a number of elites who understand international development clearly and are able 
to mobilize both domestic and international forces to push forward such a liberalizing 
change.  The people who can make calculations and frame cognitive concepts are leaders 
such as Hu Qili, Jiang Mianheng, and Gao Hongbing.  It also seems that Edward Tian 
who succeeded in AsiaInfo was also instrumental in bringing a global market coalition to 
press for changes at home.  In Ghana, Ghana Telecom had a backward infrastructure and 
poor service.  It was Quaynor who aligned with international forces to spread ICT in 
Ghana.  In Brazil, the “Gang of Four” also mobilized both domestic and international 
sources for reform.  This evidence proves that Cowhey’s claim that both domestic and 
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foreign factors should work together to bring down monopoly and drive the ICT diffusion 
in developing countries.  
In comparison with IT leaders in other developing countries, their immersion into the 
patron-clientelist system has double-edged outcomes: one independent, and the other 
parasitic.  Through personal ties, they have gained trust and viable resources and 
channels for ICT liberalization.  But this tie also may erode their independent pursuit of 
grander political goals, thus sacrificing their independent political pursuits for favorable 
economic deals from the establishment.  They are similar to IT revolutionaries in other 
countries, like Nii Guaynor in Ghana.  First of all these leaders have a strong vision that 
their countries and peoples should not be left behind as the rest of the world rocketed 
ahead.  Many of these IT leaders received Western education, such as Michael Wan from 
Stanford, and Quaynor from State University of New York at Stony Brook.  Second, they 
recognized great opportunities to offer ICT services to consumers when political elites 
were bewildered as to what to do.  They provided a wonderful model for people to follow, 
such as Network Computer Systems (NCS) in Ghana and Sohu.com.  Third, they all 
devised strategies to break or bypass monopolies in their respective nations, such as 
China Telecom, Ghana Telecom, and Telebras.  Quaynor succeeded by bypassing Ghana 
Telecom with his own direct international satellite link.  Fourth, personal relationships 
(Guanxi) sometimes played important roles too.  Quaynor attended the same school with 
President Rawlings and some of his closest confidants and got trust from political elites.  
This is core to his success to manage his career within the context of Ghana’s sometimes 
tumultuous political climate with its powerful patron-client structures and the regime’s 
fears about political threats from new or unknown quarters like the Internet.  So Edward 
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Tian and Hongbing Gao’s success also relied heavily on their relationship with President 
Jiang Zemin’s son, Jiang Mianheng who got his Ph. D. from Drexel in the US.  And Mao 
Daolin of sina.com got his trust from the Chinese government due to his marriage with 
President Hu Jintao’s daughter.  Some people with close ties to the office of the president, 
the prime minister, or other top officials moved the Internet agenda forward.  The 
possible outcome might turn out to be more parasitic behaviors of these IT elites for 
political assets.  So their behaviors may very much reflect the top-down, highly 
authoritarian structure of the Communist Party system and its closely controlled statist 
institutions.  In 1998, Guo Wei, CEO of Shenzhou Digital Co. Ltd., was elected into the 
People’s Congress at Haidian District.  Some IT elites even designed programs for the 
state to effectively monitor online activities and to block democratic websites and control 
civil activities, and thus were engaged in anti-democratic behaviors.  Therefore, technical 
sophistication and social popularity are imperative for successful ICT diffusion, but so is 
entry into the indigenous patron-client system.  
A second similarity is that the path of these IT champions impacting the political 
system is not characterized by bottom-up efforts, but can be conceptualized as “an 
upwardly seeping chain of influence” (Wilson 2004a, 200).  Even though they are 
instrumental for some online activism, they are unable to mobilize grassroots resources to 
rebel against monopolies in the ICT sector.  Since in developing countries, the formal 
channels between state and society are weak, these leaders heavily rely on personal ties 
with senior political elites.  Thus in China, Edward Zeng projected himself with many 
good ties with senior Chinese leaders.  In his office, he hung up photos with Premier Zhu 
Rongji, Jiang Zemin, Bill Clinton, Albright, and officials of UNDP.  He even spent 
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millions of dollars lobbying his Sparkice, even renting presidential suite at the Tianyutai 
State Guest House.  In Ghana, Nii Quaynor first got support of Edward Salia from the 
Ministry of Communications.  President Rawlings’ senior advisor P. V. Obeng also gave 
him great help, thus his commercial firm was easily passed at the President level.  In 
Brazil, the pro-reform Communications Minister Motta imposed a ban on state telecom 
monopolies entering the value-added service market, this was vital for the growth of 
ISP/ICPs (Wilson 2004a, 166).  Therefore, the driving force of reform in the ICT sector 
does not come from bottom, as social demands require anti-monopoly efforts.  In 
developing countries where formal state-society links are too weak, the IT leaders are 
unable to mobilize grassroots resources to contend for power for the ICT diffusion. 
A key difference between IT leaders in China and other countries is that many of 
these IT leaders are “successful losers.”  In Brazil, Ivan Moura Campos, Eduardo da 
Costa, Carlos Jose Pereira de Lucena, Tadao Takahashi, who named themselves the 
“Gang of Four” as innovators in the ICT sector, had a disproportionate share of vital 
influence over the incentives that shaped the subsequent evolution of the Brazilian 
Internet (Wilson 2004a, 131).  In China, even though Minister Hu was successful in 
national information infrastructure, he himself suffered from political accusations as the 
underlying of ex-General Secretary of the Party, Zhao Ziyang, who was removed by 
Deng Xiaoping during the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown.  Later he lost his power at the 
Politburo and retired officially in 2001.  Peng Peng had similar difficulties.  He was a 
champion of invigorating the national networks of the MOR, but lost in the power 
struggle against Minister Cai Qinghua and Fu Zhihuan of MOR.  These ministers 
removed him from the presidency of China Railcom one year before his first tenure 
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without convening the Board conference.  These ministers demoted Peng Peng because 
they were afraid Peng would be too powerful and challenge their authority at MOR.  
Minister Cai even wanted to be one the board directors of China Railcom after he retired 
from MOR.  In addition, they wanted to curry favor to Minister Wu Jichuan by stating 
that China Railcom would only serve the railways, and would not become a national 
competitor with China Telecom.  
ISP pioneers, Jasmine Zhang, Michael Wan, and John Wang (Juntao), were 
successful at the initial stage, but later were driven out of ISP business.  Jasmine Zhang 
was brave enough to introduce the information highway to China and fought against 
irrational pricing of China Telecom, but she lost the battle at the board when the company 
was facing fiscal crisis.  She had to start from the capital market, and thus lost her 
business in ISP sector.  She was later invited to join the establishment of China Netcom, 
but her team lost to Edward Tian’s team because her team was not backed by the Vice 
President of CAS, Yan Yixun, who was at odds with Hou Ziqiang, an engineer with close 
relationship with her.  Even Jasmine Zhang and Gao Hongbin were successful in 
designing China Netcom, they lost in the power struggle and backed down.  Michael Wan 
was successful at first by launching campaigns against monopoly of China Telecom 
through his first ISP association.  But later he could not continue his business because 
China Telecom was so powerful that it rented Wan at a higher price than even the 
retailing price of bandwidth.  This made Wan shift his business plan to equipment and 
other businesses in the IT sector.  John Wang was initially victorious with his e-
commerce platform and software business at Mt. Everest Software Development Co., Ltd. 
(8848).  But when the business went to downturn in 2000, his ideas could not be accepted 
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by the Board.  Then he had to change to a new business.  One man told him that the more 
he fights, the more he loses.  He was mocked at this and said on TV, “once I am still 
fighting, I am not losing on the battleground.”  In sum, their success was undoubtedly 
attributed to their courage, craftsmanship, and creativity in a transitional period for ICT 
liberalization and their promotion of the infrastructural power of the state.  However, 
once they start to challenge the despotic power of the state, they immediately lost the 
battle.  This is also a lesson that their revolution is “incomplete.”
Privatization and commercialization in China is much harder to accomplish than in 
other countries.  Privatization involves selling or transferring at least part of the 
ownership of state--owned telecommunications companies or assets to private owners.  If
privatization is not accepted, governments commercialize state-owned 
telecommunications carriers.  These approaches include reducing governments’ control, 
creating market incentives, legal incorporation and making state-owned 
telecommunications operators subject to commercial or bankruptcy laws.  The difficulty 
is partly because China Telecom is so strong and powerful, and partly because of the 
adversarial stance of the Communist Party over autonomous telecommunications carriers.  
Thus the MOR was reluctant to give China Railcom a free hand to operate and demoted 
Peng Peng during his first term.  Later all these state-owned companies were entrusted to 
the State Assets Management Committee.  This is a step from state control to market 
operation, but not complete privatization.  In other countries with democratic capitalism, 
some IT leaders can resort to legal procedures to denounce natural monopoly and 
encourage privatization.  The example is Strive Masiyiwa vs. Postal and 
Telecommunications Corporation (PTC) in Zimbabwe.  President Magabe of Zimbabwe 
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opposed awarding a cellular license to Strive Masiyiwa, an engineer trained in UK, 
because he was deemed as a potential threat to the patrimonial rule of President Robert 
Mugabe.  He brought PTC to the Supreme Court and eventually the ruling was to his 
favor to break state monopoly on telecommunications and licenses that then should be 
granted to private telecommunications service providers.  However, in China these 
leaders rarely resort to law.  There are one or two anecdotal cases, such as price hearings, 
of people resorting to the law to solve diffusion issues.  But two reasons account for their 
lack of interest in legal procedure: first of all, China is not a democratic country where 
the executive power is checked by judicial systems.  They would rather resort to personal 
contacts instead of formal legal procedure.  Second, there were not enough laws during a 
transitional period (i.e Telecommunications Act) with clear provisions over competition 
and privatization.  Even though these IT leaders pushed for a Electronic Signature Law, 
such a law does not solve the fundamental contradiction of ICT diffusion—the 
imbalanced control of resources and decision-making power in few Communist 
compradors.  To the extent that telecommunications issues are highly statist affairs, legal 
litigations would not solve important issues over privatization and ownership.  
The institutional links between these IT leaders and the state are weaker than in other 
countries.  In Taiwan, a coalition formed the Institute for Information Industries (III) in 
1979 under the Ministry of Economic Affairs.  One of the leaders, Major General Gao, 
focused on difficult research and development initiatives and put up a team to review the 
implications for the Internet.  In 1994, III spawned the SEED Internet service provider 
and created Taiwan’s National Information Infrastructure Steering Committee (Wilson 
2004a, 58-9).  In other countries institutions play a pivotal role in shaping the way people 
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do research, invest in, produce and distribute the information and communications 
technology.  But in China, the State Informatization Office undertook some policy 
investigations on e-government.  Its role is far less instrumental than it is supposed to be 
as other countries where such institutions become engines of growth and frequent forums 
linking with IT leaders.  
An Interpretive Approach to Study Uncertainty
Social phenomena are constituted by individuals whose behavior is the results of 
rational decision-making and non-rational psychological process.  To say that national or 
self interest is the locomotive of this change in ICT sector is true but trite, for national or 
self interest is but interests of various players—not all of which may coincide, and not all 
of which are coherently related to anything resembling an objective national interest.  As 
human rationality is bounded, people are exposed to one or two possible alternatives at a 
given time.  Thus most people are irrational, especially when facing something they 
totally feel uncertain about , such as the Internet.  Thus we need a concrete understanding 
at the micro-level of how actors make strategic decisions freed from narrow economic 
calculation, but on a concern with all kinds of outside influences and interactions between 
institutions with which new meanings can emerge and human choice can occur.  
Policymakers are active in seeking information to better understand the world around 
them; increasing knowledge about problems and the factors influencing problems; 
learning from the lessons of previous policy implementation; and importing foreign 
experiences or even directly borrowing policy innovations from the others.  A close look 
at the process of ICT diffusion reveals that the IT leaders are instrumental for the
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“political learning” on the part of the senior political leaders, decision makers and social 
actors.  These IT elites exhorted the Chinese leaders to develop knowledge-based 
information industries to “leapfrog” the missing stages of the Chinese development so 
that, by dint of increased productivity, China could withstand pressures of exhaustion of 
natural resources and overpopulation. This zeal for rapid growth thus created conditions 
for later policies making IT a priority industry to develop and intensified struggles over 
resources for information infrastructure. The evidence over the breakup of China 
Telecom, market entries of China Netcom and China Railcom, national information 
infrastructure and Golden Projects, licensing and price reform for private ISP/ICPs in the 
telecommunications sector suggests the inchoate attempts by these IT leaders to spread 
new attitudes among policymakers.  
Political science is a discipline in constant danger of fragmentation because of the 
inherent contradictions between our rigourous, scientific, and parsimonious methodology 
and a humanistic thick description tradition (Pye 1990).  Political scientists are constantly 
vacillating between choosing between scientific methodology and humanistic details. 
Comparative political studies are torn between the universal and the particular, theory 
and description, parsimony and ”thick descriptions” (Pye 1990, 4).  We are constantly 
pushed and pulled by the centrifugal force that leads to deviant cases of our elegantly 
constructed models of modernization, democratization, etc.  This, in turn, has triggered 
fresh academic interests to respond to new developments that are revising and reshaping 
the political universe.  Modernization theory predicts that accelerated communication and 
technological exchanges, economic growth, and the spread of higher educational systems 
will inevitably contribute to political changes.  But the process is highly complicated and 
239
involving numerous political forces jointly searching for ways out of uncertainty. Thus 
we need to go beyond the formal structures and bureaucratic politics to explore the 
human meaning of politics as I have tried to do in the study by concentrating largely on 
individual political agents.  Merely delineating “political man” as the greedy power 
seekers or interest maximizers blurrs our mission to unearth the personal qualities 
essential for the civilized activities that are true politics (Pye 1990, 16).  Thus leadership 
is an attempt to restore the creative aspect of politics, an emerging attempt to overcome 
obstacles for genuine pluralist participation and rejuvenate a static and irresponsive 
political regime.  In this sense, these leaders in China may constitute catalysts for change 
including greater transparency of decision making and wider range of participation in the 
ICT sector.
China and Communist Transitions
How do my arguments about IT leaders in China fit into the broad literature of 
socialist and authoritarian transitions? In the Communist transitions in Eastern Central 
Europe, scholars point out that the path seems to be either top-down or bottom-up.   As 
Sidney Tarrow argues, it was inevitable in a highly centralized system of the Soviet 
Union, liberalization began at the top, with a change in policy to allow socialist 
pluralism.  As Mikhael Gorbachev intended to renovate the political class, he unleashed  
the experiment of glasnost and perestroika in order to prevent official obstruction or 
inactivity that he might lose power together.  He transformed formalistic elections of the 
USSR’s Congress of People’s Deputies into the first even partially open and competitive 
national election in the history of the Soviet Union.  Thus the initial purpose to reform the 
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Party in order to survive engendered the demise of the Communist Party in the USSR 
(Tarrow 1998, 74-5).  The same process of liberalization happened in Bulgaria, too.  
Bulgarian younger and less implicated reformers within the Party initiated a “palace 
coup” after consulting with Gorbachev in 1989 that displaced the discredited top leaders.    
Munck and Leff suggested a bottom up approach on transitions in other 
Communist countries.  They argue that small, non-state organizations at the bottom had 
sparked an explosion of organized extra-state political activity that tore down the 
Communist Party.  In Poland, it is evident that it is a revolution from the bottom. The 
impetus came originally from outside the incumbent elite, from the labor-based social 
movement Solidarity, founded in 1980 (Munck and Leff 1997, 352).  In Hungary, the 
transition was negotiated by opposition and incumbent elites who both had a stake in 
pursuing an opening.  The reform wing wanted to search for socialist pluralism in order 
to validate effective economic reform.  Thus Hungary’s negotiated revolution reflected 
the balance of power between rulers and opposition (Munck and Leff  1997, 354-6).    
But in China, we seem to find no revolutions at either the top or bottom levels.  Neither 
explanation alone fits China: there is no organized social movement as revolution from 
below and nor pluralist opening that led to a revolution from the above.119
119
 First of all, the problem is that the relative autonomy of the state from society, resistant to change.  This 
is a particular leitmotif of modern  Chinese politics, namely the quest for total dominance, that 
characterized the elite politics throughout the century.  Political power is monistic, unified, and indivisible, 
zero-sum game (Fewsmith 2000, 87).  The era of reform has been an intense contradiction, in which the 
emergence of new norms and institutions stand in tension with long standing norms and traditions, in which 
the CCP is carrying out dual task maintaining an authoritarian party and market economy.  In general, the 
window of opportunity for successful democratic transitions is relatively small and the likelihood of a hard-
line crackdown, reversal, or unconsolidated democracy is correspondingly great. 
Turning to the society side of the equation, it is apparent that the Chinese society today remains 
very much dominated by the state, so much so that the term “civil society” cannot hardly be put in China.  
The corrosion of the state bureaucracy has been mirrored by a very weak civil society (107).  According to 
Joseph Fewsmith, what has not happened is the emergence of a strong, bureaucratic state dealing with 
autonomous social organizations along the lines of what Peter Evans has called “embedded autonomy.”   
China is again in the midst of a new social transformation.  At the same time, it seems that societal, 
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In the China case, my research on elites in three IT sectors demonstrates that it is 
also meaningful to look at the middle-level in order to locate the sources and processes of 
change through a small group of IT leaders.  As information is power, it is a cutting edge 
sector and has created potential opening for political change in China.  I argue that the IT 
amphibians do press for political and economic changes, but they themselves are not 
sufficient for broad scale changes today.  But they may play an important role in the 
future if they ally with other social forces.   Thus I have situated my dissertation among 
the broad literature of Communist transitions to see whether there is a possible path for 
democratic transitions in China.  My finding is that leadership is potentially a spark.  It is 
a part of necessary conditions for China’s political change.  The other necessary 
conditions, political opening at the top is like the oxygen; and social tensions are like dry 
wood.  All together they constitute sufficient conditions for political changes in China.  
The significance of the leadership is just as what the great helmsman Mao Zedong said: 
“A single spark can start a prairie fire.”
China today is going through a period of transition which is full of uncertainties.  
What the Chinese Communist party lacks, and has not articulated, is a convincing vision 
of where it seeks to lead the nation. Thus the Communist Party is in desperate need of a 
systematic and convincing rationale to justify itself and its continued rule.    “The central 
economic, and intellectual pressures generated by two decades of reform have begun to challenge the 
conduct of elite politics, but those same pressures could not transform the old rules of the game remains . 
The crisis of the movement in the spring of 1989 was caused by all the same conditions that led to the 
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe: the contradictions of economic reform in a system still run by 
communist officials, growing corruption, loss of faith in the official ideology, and increasing disgust with 
the endless hypocrisy of those in power.  But the China did not have a successful democratic transition.  
The main difference was that China in 1989 was much less developed, much less urbanized than the East 
European countries, and also much more insulated from the effects of the economic and political crisis in 
the Soviet Union (Spence 1990, 712-47).  There are some commonalities in East European and Soviet cases 
such as the rise of civil society, loss of Party control, or intelligentsia such as Havel and Walesa, but there 
was no singular pattern that brought all of these regimes down.  
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challenge for the Fourth Generation leadership is not only how to remain relevant to 
society as a ruling party, but how to inspire and lead the nation in new directions” 
(Shambaugh 2003, 283).  IT brings openness, transparency, and new trendsetters that 
open greater political debate to invigorate this nation. Thus the central conclusion of this 
dissertation is to demonstrate how a strategic group of IT leaders can devise, within 
limits, strategies to hasten trends in ICT diffusion, thus having a potential impact on the 
political panorama in China. In this sense, they envisage a network-based knowledge 
society for the future of China and provide us with proactive and convincing messages 
and direction of this nation. I conclude this dissertation with an optimistic view that 
China’s IT leadership offers a peculiarly fruitful opportunity for analyzing the gradual 
forces for political change at the present time as China embarks upon a wider and deeper 
level of reform and opening up more than ever before.  
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Appendix I:  Interviewees
Entrepreneurs
Chen 
Junhong
Executive Assistant to 
CEO
China Netcom Corporation Ltd. 
Gao 
Hongbing 
Chairman/ President ChinaLink Networks Technology Ltd. 
Gao Zhikai Executive Director Pacific Century   
Guo Lianpo Director of Operation Intecs Technology, Ltd. 
Jia Bo Vice President Beijing Golden Coast Royal Technology 
Development Co., Ltd.
Robert Lewis Vice President Nortel Ltd. Beijing Office
Luo Shijia Deputy General Manager SINOTRUST Business Risk Management 
Ltd.
Ma Hui Senior Vice President CCID Consulting Co., Ltd.
Peng Peng President China Railcom 
Song Cheng CEO Sanfront Information Technology Co., Ltd. 
Tian Wenqi General Manager CMEC International Engineering Co., Ltd.
Wan Pingguo 
(Michael) 
General Manager China Net Corporation Group.  
Wang 
Donglin
Chairman and President Beijing Scholar Corporation; also Deputy 
Board Chairman of Beijing Zhongguancun 
IT Association
Wang Juntao 
(John)
President 6688. com Ltd., Mt. Everest Software 
Development Co., Ltd. 
Wang Junxiu Senior Consultant ChinaLabs Limited
Wang 
Shizhong
(Strong)
General Manager of 
Enterprise Marketing 
Communications
China Netcom Corporations Ltd. 
Wang Sing Chief Executive Officer 
and Executive Director
Tom.com Ltd. 
Wang Yan General Manager Stone Rich Sight Info.  Tech. Co., Ltd. 
Sina.com.cn
Wang 
Yusheng 
Senior Account Manager Nortel Networks
Xie Wen General Manager ChinaLabs Limited
Yang Jin Chief Operating Officer Fudao.net
Yao Lan Manager Beijing Concord Intellectualized Electric 
Technic Corporation Ltd. 
Yu Jie Project Manager, Senior China Clicks 2, International Consulting Co., 
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Consultant Ltd. 
Zhai Jun Office Director China Railway Communications Co., Ltd. 
Zhang 
Shuxin 
(Jasmine)
Chairwoman
Genesis Capital Holdings Ltd. 
Zhao 
Wenquan
Executive President Beijing Blue Focus Corporation
Government Officials
He Dequan Vice President State Informatization Advisory Committee
Hu Qili President Song Qingling Foundation
ex- Minister of Electronic Industry
Ni Jianmin Professor Department of International Affairs,  Policy 
Research Studies Office of State Council 
Ouyang Wu Deputy Director of E-
government department 
State Informatization Office, Beijing
Qiu Weili Director American and Oceanian Division, CASS
Qiu Xiaoling Director Department of Computer Software, Torch 
High-tech Industry Development Center, 
Ministry of Science and Technology, PRC
Zhang 
Xunhai
Deputy Director General Foreign Investment Administration, Ministry 
of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, 
China
Zhao Xiaofan Deputy Director-General State Informatization Office, China
Academia
Dong 
Xiaoying 
Associate Dean National Institute for Science Industry Parks 
(NISIP)
Li Mingzhi Associate Professor E-commerce lab at the Dept. of Economics, 
Tsinghua University
Mao Wei Director General China Internet Network Information Center
Tan Zixiang Assistant Professor School of Information Studies, Syracuse 
University
Xu  Anjie Program Officer American and Oceanian Division, Foreign 
Affairs Bureau, Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences
Xu 
Rongsheng
Professor, Director Institute of High Energy Physics
Chinese Academy of Sciences Computing 
Center
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Content Providers, Non-governmental organizations and journalists
Chen Zhixia Vice Director People’s Daily Online
Duan 
Yongchao
Editor in Chief China Computer Users  
Jiang Yaping Deputy Director People’s Daily Online and Golden 
Newspaper Electronic Publishing Center
Li Yuxiao Director of Secretariat Internet Society of China
Li Xuelin Executive Editor in Chief E-Week China. com
Lin Guorong Editor in Chief China Society for Strategy and Management, 
Journal of Strategy and Management
Wang 
Xuejun
Deputy Secretary-
General 
China Reform Forum
Shan
Chengbiao
Director, BBS 
Department
People’s Daily Online
Jonathan 
Shen Jian
Director China Reform Forum, Silicon Valley Times
Shi Lihong Producer Wild China Documentary Studio
Song Ling
Director
China Electronic Commerce Association
Xu Zhiyuan Editorial Editor The Economic Observer
Zhaxi Dele Director Tibeten Antelope Information Center
Zhao Lijian 
(Jason)
Program Officer Global Village of Beijing
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Appendix II:
Chronicles of ICT Development in China
Source: author, China Internet Information Network Center, and China Telecommunications Trade, 
special issue 2003. 
1. In December 1978, Deng Xiaoping instructed that the communications and 
transportation sectors shall be prioritized for the take-off of the national 
economy.
2. In June 1979, the State Council promulgated the policy to charge telephone 
installation fee to subscribers for the development of the local telephone service.
3. In 1986, Chinese Academic Network (CANET) – one of international 
networking projects of Beijing Research Institute of Computer Application 
Technology has been launched. The University of Karlsruhe in Germany acted 
as a partner.
4. In September 1987, CANET built up the first domestic Internet e-mail node in 
Beijing Research Institute of Computer Application Technology, and sent out 
the first e-mail from China on September 14 with the title of “Across the Great 
Wall we can reach every corner in the world.” The e-mail was sent by PAD (set 
in Beijing by ITAPAC [Italy]) through ITAPAC and DATEXP PAC 
[Germany]. It was connected to the University of Karlsruhe, with the initial 
communication baud rate of 300bps.
5. In early 1988, China’s first X.25 PAC – CNPAC has been established. Major 
cities including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenyang, Xi’an, Wuhan, 
Chengdu, Nanjing, and Shenzhen had been covered.
6. In December 1988, the college network of Tsinghua University was connected to 
Canada's University of British Columbia (UBC) through X.25 network and 
initiated the E-mail applications by adopting X400 protocol E-mail software 
pack, which was introduced by Professor Hu Daoyuan from UBC.
7. In 1988, the DECnet of the Institute of High Energy Physics (IHEP), Chinese 
Academy of Sciences (CAS) became the extension of the central DECnet in 
Western Europe by adopting X.25 protocol. It then achieved long-distance 
connection of computers and E-mail communications with regions in Europe and 
North America.
8. In May 1989, the Chinese Research Network (CRN) was connected to the 
German Research Network through the pilot X.25 net. Members of CRN 
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include: the No. 15 Institute of Electronic Science of the Ministry of Electronic 
(located in Beijing), the No. 30 Institute of the Ministry of Electronic (located in 
Chengdu), the No. 54 Institute of the Ministry of Electronic (located in 
Shijiazhuang), Fudan University, Shanghai Jiao Tong University (located in 
Shanghai) and Southeast University (located in Nanjing), etc. Services that CRN 
can provide include Email (X.400 [MHS] standard), file transmission (FTAM 
standard), catalogue (X.500 standard) and so on. People may also access the 
Internet through the gateway of DFN in Germany.
9. In October 1989, one of credit projects of the World Bank -- the Demonstration 
Network for Education and Scientific Research in Zhongguancun Area (named 
by the State Development Planning Commission), or National Computing and 
Networking Facility of China (NCFC, named by the World Band) prepared for 
initiation. It was then formally launched in November. NCFC is a high-tech 
information infrastructure project of the “Key Subject Development Project” of 
the World Bank, and was invested and supported by the State Development 
Planning Commission, CAS, the National Natural Science Funds and the State 
Development Planning Commission. The project was charged by CAS, and was 
jointly implemented by Peking University and Tsinghua University. The chief 
goal of the project was to consummate the construction of the NCFC backbone 
network and the college networks through technical cooperation with Peking 
University, Tsinghua University and CAS.
10. On Nov. 28, 1990, Professor Qian Tianbai formally registered .CN - the country 
code top-level domain (ccTLD) of China in Stanford Research Institute’s 
Network Information Center (SRI-NIC), and initiated the international e-mail 
services under .CN. From that day on, China obtained its own identity on the 
Internet. Since China was not achieved the full functional connection with the 
Internet yet, the .CN TLD server was temporarily deployed in the University of 
Karlsruhe in Germany.
11. In 1991, by using DECNET proxy, High Energy Physics Institute, Chinese 
Academy of Sciences connected to the LIVEMORE laboratory of Stanford 
Linearity Accelerator Center (SLAC) in X.25 mode, and initiated the email 
applications.
12. In June 1992, ’92 INET Conference held in Kobe, Japan. Prof. Qian Hualin 
made an appointment with the principal of International Network Department; 
National Sciences Foundation discussed the issue of official connection between 
China and the Internet. However, he was informed there were political obstacles 
since so many U.S. governments had connected to the Internet.
13. In later December 1992, Tsinghua University Network (TUNET) was set up and 
went into service. TUNET is the first college network that adopts TCP/IP 
structure in China. The backbone was successfully adopted FDDI technique for 
the first time, which leaded many aspects within China such as the scale, the 
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technique level and the application of networks.
14. In later 1992, the College Network (i.e. CASNET, which connects over 30 
research institutes in Zhong Guan Cun area and CAS headquarter in San Li He) 
of Project NCFC, TUNET (Tsinghua University Net) and PUNET (Peking 
University Net) completed the construction.
15. On March 2, 1993, a 64K dedicated line to the Stanford Linear Accelerator 
Center (SLAC) was officially opened. Built by the Institute of High-Energy 
Physics, CAS, the dedicated line was connected to the United States through an 
international satellite communication channel rented from AT&T. It was only 
permitted to connect with the American energy network, because the U.S. 
government forbade any socialist countries to access the Internet that contained 
plenty of science and technology information and other resources. Nonetheless, 
it was still the first dedicated line through which China partly connected to the 
Internet. With corporation and investment of 300,000 RMB from the State Fund 
Commission, it then brought all the scientists in charge of key topics in various 
subjects to the dedicated line and enabled several hundred scientists to use E-
mail in China. 
16. On March 12, 1993, deputy premier Zhu Rongji proposed and deployed the 
establishment of National Public Economic Information Network (i.e. Golden 
Bridge Project).
17. In April 1993, Computer Network Information Center, Chinese Academy of 
Sciences called part of Network specialists in Beijing to investigate the domain 
name systems of each country, then framed the domain name system of China.
18. In June 1993, experts of NCFC reiterated China's requests for being connected to 
the Internet at the '93 INET Conference, and discussed such issue with the global 
Internet communities. After the meeting, researcher Qian Hualin attended the 
CCIRN (Coordinating Committee for Intercontinental Research Networking) 
Meeting, and won the support of majority participants in favor of bringing the 
Internet connection to China. The conference gave a great boost to China's 
connection to the Internet.
19. In August 1993, the State allowed private companies to provide nine kinds of 
telecom services to the public: wireless paging, 800 MHz radio trunked system, 
450 MHz mobile communications, ntional VSAT, telephone information 
provision services, IT services, e-mail service, electronic data exchange and 
telex.
20. On August 27, 1993, Premier Li Peng approved to use the Premier Reserve of 3 
million USD to support the Golden Bridge Project in initiating its prophase 
construction.
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21. On December 10, 1993, the National Joint Conference on Economy 
Informatinalizing had been formed. Zou Jiahua, the deputy Premier of the State 
Council was appointed the chair.
22. In December 1993, the backbone network construction of NCFC was 
accomplished. It connected three universities by high-speed optic cable and 
routers. 
23. In December 1993, the State Council formally approved the establishment of 
China United Communications Co., Ltd (China Unicom), which was inaugurated 
in July 1994.
24. In January 1994, Jitong Communications Co., Ltd. was established. 
25. In early April 1994, the Sino-American Federation of Scientific and 
Technological Cooperation Committee held meeting in Washington. Before the 
meeting, on behalf of China, the academician Hu Qiheng, the vice-president of 
the Chinese Academy of Sciences reiterated to the National Science Fund (NSF) 
the request of China’s Internet connection. The proposal was approved.
26. On April 20, 1994, the NCFC project opened a 64K international dedicated line 
to the Internet through Sprint Co. Ltd of the United States, which achieved its 
full-functional connection to the Internet. Since then, China has been officially 
recognized as a country with full functional Internet accessibility. It was elected 
one of China's top 10 scientific and technological events in 1994 by the Chinese 
press community and designated as one of China's key scientific and 
technological achievements in 1994 by the State Statistical Communiqué. 
27. On May 15, 1994, the High-Energy Physics Research Institute, CAS set up 
China's first web server and made the first set of web pages. Apart from briefing 
on the development of high technology in China, there was another column 
called “Tour in China”. Since then, the column expanded its range to the 
information about news, economies, culture and business and provided essays 
together with pictures and renamed “Windows of China” afterward.
28. On May 21, 1994, with the assistance of Professor Qian Tianbai and Karlsruhe 
University (Germany), the computer network information center, CAS finished 
setting up the China's top domain name (CN) servers, which ended the history of 
location abroad of CN servers. Qian Tianbai and Qian Hualin are nominated 
managing contactor and technical contactor respectively.
29. In May 1994, the National Research Center for Intelligent Computing System 
opened the first BBS in Chinese mainland – Dawn BBS.
30. On June 8, 1994, general office of the State Council issued “General Office of 
the State Council‘s Notice on the Related Issues of ‘Three Golden Projects’”. 
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From this day on, the prophase construction of the Golden Bridge Project was 
entirely carried out. 
31. On June 28, 1994, with help of Tokyo University of Sciences, Beijing University 
of Chemical Technology began the pilot run of the leased line connecting with 
the Internet. 
32. In earlier July 1994, the six-college-established (mainly by Tsinghua University) 
trial network “China Education and Research Network” began to operate. By 
using IP/x.25 technique, it became a TCP/IP based computer network that 
connected Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Nanjing and Xi’an, and also 
connected with the Internet through the international port of NCFC.
33. In August 1994, the project of China Education and Research Network 
(CERNET) was officially set. It was invested by the State Development 
Planning Commission and charged by the State Development Planning 
Commission, and aimed at connecting college computers and share the resources 
by using advanced computer and network communication technologies. Further 
more, it planed to connect with international learning networks, and establish a 
full functional administrative network system.
34. In September 1994, Directorate General of Telecommunications P & T and the 
Department of Commerce of United States signed an agreement on the Internet 
connection. In the agreement, the Office of Telecommunication should open two 
64K leased lines (one was in Beijing, another was in Shanghai) with the 
assistance of the Sprint Corporation in America. It marked the start-up of the 
CHINANET.
35. In October 1994, MPT decided to introduce GSM. 
36. In November 1994, the Administrative Commission of NCFC hosted the annual 
meeting of Asia-Pacific Networking Group (APNG) in Tsinghua University with 
assistance of CAS, Peking University and Tsinghua University. It was the first 
International annual meeting of Internet community in Asia-Pacific region held 
in China.
37. In January 1995, Directorate General of Telecommunications P & T, China 
Telecom opened Beijing and Shanghai 64K leased lines to the United States with 
help of Sprint Co. Ltd. It began to provide Internet accessing services through 
telephone networks, DDN leased lines and X.25 networks.
38. In January 1995, “Chueng Kong Scholars” (Chisacm), the journal published by 
Ministry of Education (State Educational Committee) was put onto the Internet 
through CERNET, focusing on providing information to the students abroad. It 
was the first Chinese E-journal in China.
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39. In March 1995, CAS completed the long-distance connection to its four branch 
institutions in Shanghai, Hefei, Wuhan and Nanjing with IP/X.25 technology. It 
is the first step that China began to spread the Internet connection to the whole 
nation.
40. In March 1995, Professor Li Xing from Tsinghua University was elected the 
Executive Committee member of the Asia-pacific Network Information Center 
(APNIC) for the first time.
41. In April 1995, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) launched the project of 
connecting its institutes that out side Beijing (known as “100 CAS Institutes 
Connection Project”). The objective of the project was to expand the institute 
network (connected over 30 institutes of CAS in Beijing) to 24 cities all over the 
country, in order to realize the fully connection of all domestic learning 
institutions and the connection with the Internet. Based on this project, the 
network expanded continuously, and gradually connected with many scientific 
academies and researching outside CAS. It became a scientific oriented national 
network, serving scientific users, research branches and relevant governmental 
departments. Its name was also changed into “China Science and Technology 
Network”(CSTNet). 
42. In May 1995, the China Telecom began to prepare for building up the national 
backbone network for CHINANET.
43. In July 1995, China’s first 128K leased line that connects to the United States 
was opened by CERNET; meanwhile, CERNET also opened DDN channels for 
its backbone network, connecting with eight cities - Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangzhou, Nanjing, Shenyang, Xi’an, Wuhan and Chengdu. The connecting 
speed was 64Kbps. The NCFC connection was also achieved. 
44. In August 1995, the primary phase of “Golden Bridge Project” was 
accomplished. It achieved the connection (through satellite network) with 24 
provinces and cities all over the country, and it further connected with the 
Internet.
45. In December 1995, “100 CAS institutes connection project” was accomplished.
46. In December 1995, ”CERNET demonstrate project” was accomplished. This 
project was designed and constructed wholly by Chinese engineers.
47. In January 1996, the Informatization Leading Group of the State Council and its 
executive office were established. Zou Jiahua, the deputy premier of the State 
Council leaded the group. The former office of National Economic 
Informatization Joint Meeting was renamed the office of Informatization 
Promotion Leading Group of the State Council. 
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48. In January 1996, CHINANET backbone network completed its construction and 
began to provide network services through out the country.
49. On February 1, 1996, The State Council issued “The Interim Regulations of the 
People’s Republic of China on the Management of International Networking of 
Computer Information”.
50. On February 27, 1996, China International E-Commerce Center of China 
International Electronic Commerce Center was formally established.
51. In March 1996, Tsinghua University proposed “the Unified Transmission 
Standard for Chinese Character Coding Adept in Different Countries” to IETF 
and was approved as RFC1922. It was the first Chinese proposal being approved 
as RFC document. 
52. On April 9, 1996, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications issued “Rules 
for Administration of China’s Public Computer Networks and International 
Connection”, and effective as of the same day. 
53. On June 3, 1996, the Electronics Industry Administration published “The 
Relevant Decisions on Administering the International Connection of Computer 
Information Networks”. In the document, “China GBN” was renamed “China 
Golden Bridge Information Network”. It also accredited Jitong Communication 
Co. Ltd the inter-connecting organization of China Golden Bridge Information 
Network, which was responsible for managing the connection of inner 
organizations and users. 
54. In July 1996, the Information Office of The State Council called specialists form 
relative institutions to investigate the current technique implemental and 
administrative situations of 4 major Networks and nearly 30 ISPs in China. The 
investigation facilitated the standardization of network administration.
55. On September 6, 1996, the China Golden Bridge Network (China GBN) opened 
a 256K leased line connected to the United States. China GBN also announced 
the decision to provide Internet access service, mainly for institutional users 
through dedicated lines and individual users through telephone lines.
50. On September 22, 1996, the first domestic City Area Network (CAN) - Shanghai 
Hotline started its test run, which marked the accomplishment of the Shanghai 
Public Information Network – the main structure of Shanghai information port 
project. 
51.   In September 1996, the State Development Planning Commission formally 
approved starting the first stage project of “the Golden Bridge”. 
52. On November 15, 1996, the Shihuakai Corporation built up the Shihuakai Internet 
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Café besides the capital gymnasium; it was the first Internet café in China. 
53. In November 1996, CERNET opened the 2M international line connected to the 
U.S. In the same month, during the German president’s visiting, CERNET opened 
the learned network between China and Germany – CERNET-DFN, which is the 
first Internet connection to Europe from Chinese mainland. 
54. In December 1996, the China Public Multimedia Communication Network, known 
as Net 169 began its operation. As preliminary group of connected web sites, 
Guangdong Shilingtong, Tianfu Hotline and Shanghai Online had officially opened.
55. On January 1, 1997, People’s Daily Online (directed by People’s Daily) connected 
to the Internet. This is the first key news website of central government.
56. In January 1997, MPT decided to separate the operation of the post sector from that 
of the telecom sector, piloting the effort in Chongqing and Hainan before national 
implementation. 
57. In February 1997, the Info-Highway Network began its operation. In three months, 
it achieved the connection of eight cities including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, 
Fuzhou, Shenzhen, Xi’an, Shenyang and Haerbin. It became the earliest and largest 
private ISP/ ICP. 
58. From April 18 to 21, 1997, The State Council held National Informatization 
Workshop in Shenzhen and finalized the definition, elements, guidelines, working 
principles, objectives and chief missions of the national informatization mechanism. 
The workshop also approved “the 9th five-year planning” and “2000 long-range 
objective”. Chinese Internet project was listed on the construction agenda of the 
State Information Infrastructure. The workshop also proposed to set up national 
network information center and Internet exchange center.
59. On May 20, 1997, the State Council promulgated “the State Council's Decision on 
Revising the Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on 
Managing Computer Internet Information Networks”. It amended “the Provisional 
Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Managing Computer Internet 
Information Networks”.
60. On May 30, 1997, the Informatization Leading Group Office of the State Council 
issued “Interim Policies on the Administration of Internet Domain Names in China”. 
It then accredited CAS as the institute for founding and administering China Internet 
Network Information Center (CNNIC), while gave the authorization to the center of 
CERNET for managing “.edu.cn” through a contract with CNNIC.
61. On May 31, 1997, Beijing University of Chemical Technology cut off the satellite 
leased line and connected to the China Education and Research Network 
(CERNET).
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62. On June 3, 1997, entrusted by the Office of Informatization Promotion Leading 
Group of State Council, CAS set up China Internet Network Information Center
(CNNIC) in its Computer Network Information Center. CNNIC operates as the 
national Internet information center. On the same day, the Office of Informatization 
Promotion Leading Group of State Council announced the formation of CNNIC 
Steering Committee.
63. In October 1997, China's first national Internet backbone (ChinaNet) realized the 
connection with other three backbone networks -- China Science and Technology 
Network (CSTNET), China Education and Research Network (CERNET) and China 
Golden Bridge Network (CHINAGBN). 
64. In November 1997, CNNIC published the first “Statistical Report on Internet 
Development in China”. By October 31, 1997, there were 299,000 computer hosts 
and 620,000 Internet users in China; 4,066 domain names were registered under 
.CN. China had about 1,500 WWW web sites and 25.408M of the international 
bandwidth.
65. On December 30, 1997, the Ministry of Public Security issued the State Council 
approved “The Management of the Security of International Computer Network 
Information Networking”.
66. On March 6, 1998, the Informatization Steering Group of the State Council issued 
“Implementing Rules for Interim Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on 
the Management of International Computer Information Networking”. The rules 
went into effect as of the date of promulgation.
67. In March of 1998, the first meeting of the 9th National People’s Congress gave 
approval of the establishment of the Ministry of Information Industry (MII). The 
major task for MII is to administrate the national manufacturing of IT products, 
national communication and software industries, facilitating the informatization of 
the national economy and social services.
68. In May 1998, the project of constructing China Great Wall Network was approved 
by central government.  
69. In June 1998, CERNET formally participated in the trail network of the next 
generation IP (IPv6) - 6BONE. 
70. In July 1998, China Information Technology Security Certification Center 
(CNITSEC) initiated its trial operation after obtaining the acceptance of the 
Informatization Leading Group office of the State Council. 
71. In July 1998, CHINANET launched the second-phase project of its backbone 
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network construction. This would expand the backbone bandwidth in its major 8 
regions into 155M; all the node routers in these regions will be upgraded to kilo-
mega bit routers.
72. In August 1998, the Ministry of Public Security officially formed the Public 
Information Network Security Supervision Bureau. It takes the responsibility of 
maintaining computer network securities, striking against crime in cyberspace, 
supervising the security protection of computer information systems.
73. On January 22, 1999, led by China Telecom and the Economic Information Center 
of the State Economic and Trade Commission, over 40 relevant government 
departments (offices and bureaus) hosted the Conference for Launching the E-
Government Project of P.R. China in Beijing. www.gov.cn, the primary website of 
the project initiated its trial operation.
74. In January 1999, CNNIC published “the Third Statistic Report on the Development 
of Internet in China”. By December 31, 1998, there were 747,000 computer hosts 
and 2.1 million Internet users in China; 18,396 domain names were registered under 
.CN. China had about 5,300 WWW web sites and 143.256Mbit/s of international 
bandwidth.
75. In January 1999, CERNET opened all its satellite backbone networks, which 
enormously increased the transmission speed. In the same month, China Science and 
Technology Network (CSTNET) launched two sets of satellite systems, which 
replaced IP/X.25, and connected with more than 40 cities all over the country.
76. In February 1999, the State Council adopted the restructuring plan of the telecom 
sector in China.  As a result, China Mobile Communications Corporation, China 
Telecommunications Corporation and China Satellite Communications Group 
Corporation were established with the approvals from the State Council respectively 
in December 1999, January 2000 and June 2000.  In the meantime, the State Council 
reorganized China Unicom by spinning off from China Telecom and incorporating 
Guoxin paging company into China Unicom in May 1999.
77. On February 3, 1999, “the Certification System of Electronic Business Information 
Security” – one of the Key Technological R&D Programs of China’s 9th five-year 
planning (powered by China International E-Commerce Center) passed the technical 
achievement appraisal by the Ministry of Science and Technology and the National 
Pass-code Administrative Commission. It also obtained the license for selling 
information security products from relevant departments, and became the first 
purely self-developed and copyright self-owned CA security certification system for 
E-commerce. This system was successful in administrating the quota licenses of 
domestic textile. 
78. In February 1999, China National Information Security Testing Evaluation & 
Certification Center (CNISTEC) was established.
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79. On April 15, 1999, 23 influential presses of domestic websites gathered together for 
the first time to discuss the development of the press media of Chinese websites. 
“Chinese Journalistic Circles Network Media Joint Pledge” was approved in 
principle. The participants called on the recognition and protection of the 
information property on the Internet.
80. In April 1999, China Network Communications Co., Ltd. was established.  The 
broadband high speed Internet of the Company was launched in November 2000. 
81. In May 1999, CCERT (CERNET Computer Emergency Response Team) was 
formed in the Network Engineering Research Center of Tsinghua University. It is 
the first organization for dealing with network emergencies in China.
82. On July 12, 1999, ChinaNet went public on Nasdaq. This is the first Chinese 
conceptual stock of network company in Nasdaq. 
83. In August 1999, over 200 colleges in 6 provinces used “All-China College Students 
Recruiting System” on CERNET, and achieved the first success. 
84. On September 6, 1999, China International Electronic Commerce Exhibition (E-
COMMERCE Expo’99) was held in Beijing. The exhibition was hosted by the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and the Ministry of 
Information Industry (MII). For the first time, Chinese government hosted an E-
commerce exhibition, and for the first time, China held such a fruitful conference 
that demonstrated so many E-business technologies and applicable resolutions.
85. In September 1999, China Merchants Bank took the lead in providing the online 
banking service called “All in One Net”, establishing the online service system that 
was composed mainly by enterprise/individual oriented bank, online payment, 
online negotiable securities and online shopping. Approved by the People’s Bank of 
China on conducting personal banking business, China Merchants Bank became the 
first online commercial bank in China.
86. In October 1999, Mr. Wu Jianping, a professor of Tsinghua University was 
nominated the member of Address Supporting Organization (ASO) of the Internet 
Corporation of Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). 
87. On November 2, 1999, Mr. Chen Yin, the deputy director general of Telecom 
Administrative Bureau of MII attended ICANN Governmental Advisory Committee 
(GAC) Meeting.
88. On December 23, 1999, the State Informatization Steering Group came into 
existence, Wu Bangguo, the Vise Premier of the State Council chaired the group. 
The former State Office of Informatization was renamed the State Office of 
Informatization Promotion.
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89. On January 1, 2000, “Regulations for the Protection of National Computer 
Networks”was promulgated by National Administration for the Protection of State 
Secrets, and was put into force on the same day. 
90. On January 17, 2000, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) approved “China 
International Economy and Trade Net” (CIETNet) project which would be 
conducted by China International E-Commerce Center. 
91. On January 18, 2000, China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) 
published the fifth “Statistical Report on Internet Development in China”. By the 
end of December 31, 1999, there were 3.5 million computer hosts and 8.9 million 
Internet users in China. 48695 names were registered under .CN, and China had 
about 15153 WWW websites and 351Mbit/s of the international bandwidth. 
92. On January 18, 2000, accredited by MII, China Internet Network Information Center 
(CNNIC) launched the trial system of Chinese domain name. 
93. On March 30, 2000, a national Internet exchange center started operation in Beijing, 
which increased the inter-connection bandwidth of domestic backbone networks 
from less than 10Mbit/s to 100Mbit/s. 
94. On March 30, 2000, China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued “the 
Interim Measures for the Administration of Online Stock Commission”. 
95. On May 17, 2000, China Mobile Network (CMNET) was put into operation. On the 
same day, China Mobile Co. formally initiated the “Global link WAP” Service. 
96. On May 20, 2000, Chinese Domain Name Consortium (CDNC) was founded in 
Beijing. It takes the responsibility of harmonizing and regulating the development of 
Chinese domain name at a nongovernmental level.
97. On June 21, 2000, China Electronic Commerce Association was formally 
established. It aimed at strengthening the cooperation and communication among 
China and overseas in the field of E-commerce.
98. On July 1, 2000, being authorized by the State Council, the State Development 
Planning Commission designated http://www.chinabidding.gov.cn the sole network 
media that was entitled to publish government bidding announcement. 
99. On July 7, 2000, directed by the State Economic and Trade Commission and MII, 
China Telecom Group and the State Economic and the Economic Information 
Center of the Trade Commission jointly launched “the project of enterprise 
accessing the Internet”. 
100. On July 18, 2000, Qian Hualin, the research fellow of the Computer Network 
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Information Center, CAS, was elected the chair of Asia-Pacific Top Level Domains 
(APTLD) and won all the ballots. 
101. On July 19, 2000, China Unicom Public Computer Internet (UNINET) was 
officially opened. 
102. In July 2000, Dr. Gao Lulin, the former director general of the State Information 
Property Bureau participated in the ICANN at-large board election. He was 
nominated as one of the candidates on August 1.
103. On August 21, 2000, World Computer Congress 2000 was held in Beijing 
International Conference Center. President Jiang Zemin gave an important lecture in 
the conference, he stressed the necessity of setting up the Internet pact, and also 
called on people to strengthen the administration of information security, and make 
full use of the Internet.
104. On September 25, 2000, the State Council issued “The Telecommunication 
Regulation of the People’s Republic of China” (Telecom Act). This is the first 
integrated regulation for administering the industry of telecommunication in China, 
which marked the development of China’s telecommunication industry had marched 
into the legal system track. On the same day, the State Council implemented “Rules 
for Administering the Internet Information Services”.
105. In September 2000, Tsinghua University finished constructing DRAGONTAP, the 
first domestic exchange center of the next generation Internet. Through 
DRAGONTAP, the three domestic backbone networks (CERNET, CSTNET, and 
NSFCNET) were connected to STARTAP, an American exchange center of the next 
generation Internet located in Chicago, and an exchange center of Asia Pacific 
Advanced Network (APAN) in Tokyo, Japan. The connecting speed of the two lines 
was 10Mbps. The project built up the connection of many scientific networks such 
as Abilene, vBNS and CA*net3l, it also achieved the connection of the next 
generation Internet through out the world.
106. In September 2000, CERNIC, the information service center of CERNET took the 
lead in providing IPv6 assignment service in China.
107. On October 11, 2000, the 5th Plenary Session of the 15th Central Committee of 
Communist Party of China made a momentous decision in achieving the 
informatization. The plenary meeting reviewed and approved “Suggestions on 
Programming the 10th five-year plan on National Economy and Social 
Development by the Central Committee of Communist Party of China”, which 
indicated “the promotion of national economy and social informatization is a 
strategic action which would be adopted along with achieving the modernization of 
socialism. Drive industrialization through informatization, make better use of their 
advantages as late starters and attain progress on social productivity by leaps and 
bounds.
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108. On November 1, 2000, China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) 
published “Trial Measures for the Administration of the Registration of Chinese 
Domain Names” and “Trial Dispute Resolution Policy of Chinese Domain Names”. 
CNNIC also entrusted the Chinese domain name dispute resolution institution to 
China International Economy and Trade Arbitration Center (CIETAC).
109. On November 6, 2000, the State Council News Office, the Ministry of Information 
Industry (MII) issued “Interim Regulations for the Administration of Publishing 
News Materials on Websites”.
110. On November 6, 2000, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) issued 
“Regulations for the Administration of the Internet Electronic Bulletin Services”.
111. On November 7, 2000, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) issued 
“Announcement on Administering Chinese Domain Names”. In this document, MII 
standardized the registration services and administrations of Chinese domain names, 
and specifically accredited the Chinese domain name registry to CNNIC.
112. On November 7, 2000, China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) 
upgraded the Chinese Domain Name system, and initiated the registration services 
of Chinese domain names under “.CN”, “.China (in Chinese)”, “.Corporation (in 
Chinese)” and “.Network (in Chinese)”.
113. On November 10, 2000, China Mobile presented “Monternet Program”. By this 
means, it intended to found an open, cooperative and mutual beneficial chain of 
industrial value.
114. On December 7, 2000, initiated by the Ministry of Culture, the Central Committee 
of Communist Youth League, the State Administration of Radio Film and 
Television, National Students' Federation, the State Office of Informatization 
Promotion, Guangming Daily, China Telecom and China Mobile, “the Internet 
Manners and Culture Project” was launched in Beijing. “Civilized website 
accessing, civilized network establishment and civilized Internet environment” was 
the theme of the project.
115. On December 12, 2000, People’s Daily, XinhuaNet, ChinaNet, CCTV International 
Website, International Online Website, China Daily and CYCNET obtained the 
approval form the State Council News Office for press publication, and became the 
preliminary group of press websites that obtained official authorization.
116. On December 28, 2000, members of the Standing Committee of the 9th National 
People's Congress voted and approved “the Standing Committee of CPC’s Decision 
on Protecting the Internet Security” on their 19th session.
117. On January 1, 2001, the Internet project of “Every School Access the Network” 
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entered the phase of formal implementation.
118. On January 17, 2001, China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) 
published “the 7th Statistical Report on the Development of the Internet in China”. 
By the end of December 31, 2000, there were approximately 8.92 million computer 
hosts in China, about 22.5 million Internet users.122, 099 domain names were 
registered under .CN. China had approximately 265,405 WWW websites, and 
2,799Mbit/s of international bandwidth.
119. In early February 2001, China Telecom began to provide the service of International 
Roaming on the Internet.
120. On March 2, 2001, research fellow Qian Hualin and professor Li Xing of Tsinghua 
University were elected members of the Executive Committee of APNIC.
121. On April 3, 2001, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII), The Ministry of 
Public Security, the Ministry of Culture and the State Administration For Industry & 
Commerce jointly promulgated “Measures for the Management of Internet Cafés”, 
and put it into effect as of the same day.
122. On April 13, 2001, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII), The Ministry of 
Public Security, the Ministry of Culture and the State Administration for Industry & 
Commerce started the special Rectification of “Internet Cafe”.
123. In April 2001, Professor Li Xing from Tsinghua University was elected the new 
chair of the Asia Pacific Network Group (APNG) Executive Committee.
124. On May 25, 2001, the Internet Society of China (ISC) was founded with the 
approval of the Ministry of Civil Affairs. It was established under the direction of 
the Ministry of Information Industry (MII), and was formed by over 70 relevant 
organizations, including domestic ISPs, ICPs, facility manufacturers, system 
integration business, academies and educational institutions.
125. In May 2001, approving by the Central Establishment Committee, China National 
Information Security Testing Evaluation and Certification Center was founded. The 
main task of the organization was to examine and confer state certifications on 
information security products, information system security, information security 
services and information security professionals.
126. On June 1, 2001, leading by the Customs General Administration of the People’s 
Republic of China, the port law enforcement system that was developed by 12 
relevant ministries and commissions finished its trial operation in Beijing, Tianjin, 
Shanghai, and Guangzhou. Thereafter China’s “Electronic Port” became functional 
all over domestic ports. 
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127. In July 2001, “NSFCNET” (a high-speed Internet, the biggest project invested so far 
by the Natural Science Foundation of China, 1999-2000), a momentous joint project 
of the national natural fund that was undertaken by Tsinghua University, Computer 
Network Information Center of CAS, Peking University, Beijing University of Posts 
and Telecommunications, Beijing Beihang University passed acceptance check, and 
established the first learning network of the next generation Internet in China. The 
contents include general design of China’s experimental network of the high speed 
Internet; density wave minute multiplexing optical fiber transmission system; high-
speed computer network and key researches on applications and demo systems in 
the environment of high-speed networks.
128. On July 9, 2001, the Bank of China promulgated “The Interim Rules for the 
Administration of Online Banking Business”.
129. On July 11, 2001, the CPC held a lecture on legal affairs in Zhongnanhai 
Huairentang, with the theme of protecting and facilitating the sound development of 
information on the Internet by legal means. Jiang Zemin, the secretary general of the 
CPC chaired the lecture, and emphasized that China shall catch hold of 
opportunities, expedite the development of information and network technologies, 
and apply it to practice in economy, society, technology, national defense, 
education, culture and law.
130. On July 29, 2001, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) announced the 
Structure Guideline of National Informatization, which became the warranty and 
measure for analyzing and quantizing the current level of informatization.
131. In July 2001, “the Key Informatization Program of 10th five-year plan on National 
Economy and Social Development” was promulgated.
132. On August 23, 2001, the State Informatization Leading Group was reestablished. 
Premier Zhu Rongji chaired the group.
133. In August 2001, the National Computer Network and Information Security 
Administration Center established the national “Computer Network Emergency 
Response Technical Team / Coordination Center of China” (CNCERT/CC).
134. On September 7, 2001, “The Program for the 10th Five-Year-Planning of 
Information Industry” was issued. This is the first industry program after 
establishing the strategy of informatization by the government.
135. On September 7, 2001, the State Office of Informatization Promotion published “the 
Survey Report on Quantity of Information Resources of the Internet in China”, the 
survey was entrusted by the State Office of Informatization Promotion, and jointly 
conducted by China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), China 
Electronic Information Industry Development Research Institute and Nanjing 
Researching Base of the National Information Resources Administration. This is the 
262
first domestic survey aiming at the information resources on the Internet. By the end 
of April 30, 2001, China had 692,490 domain names, 238,249 websites, 
159,460,056 web pages and 45,598 online databases.
136. On September 20 2001, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) issued 
“Measures for Inter Accounting among Internet Backbone Networks”.
137. On September 29 2001, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) issued “Interim 
Regulations for Connecting Services of the Internet Backbone Networks”.
138. On October 8, 2001, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) published “The 
Interim Regulation for the Management of the Connection of Backbone Networks”.
139. On October 27, 2001, after the 24th session of the Standing Committee of the 9th 
National People's Congress, “the Information Network Dissemination Right” was 
formally included in the revised version of “The Copyright Law of People's 
Republic of China”. Relevant regulations would protect copyrights by legal means 
in the environment of Internet spreading.
140. On November 20, 2001, the demonstration project of Chinese electron government 
affairs application was approved by the relevant departments, which marked a 
momentous advancement of China’s “E-government”.
141. On November 22, 2001, the Central Committee of Communist Youth League, the 
Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Culture, the State Council News Office, All 
China Youth Federation, National Students' Federation, the National Working 
Committee on Young Pioneer and China Youth Network Association jointly 
presented “the Civilized Internet Pact of All Country Teenagers”, a set of criteria for
millions of domestic teenagers to regulate their behaviors when using the Internet.
142. In November 2001, Academician Hu Qiheng, the vice Chair of Chinese Association 
of Science, the director general of CNNIC Steering Committee was appointed as the 
member of ICANN Internationalized Domain Name (IDN) Committee.
143. On December 3, 2001, China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) 
published the first “The Survey Report on the Internet Bandwidth in China”. By the 
end of September 30, 2001, the international bandwidth in China reached 5724M.
144. On December 20, 2001, “The Project of Families Access the Internet” was formally 
initiated. The project was led and directed by the Ministry of Information Industry 
(MII), the National Women's Federation, the Central Committee of Communist 
Youth League, the Ministry of Science and Technology and the Ministry of Culture.
145. On December 20, 2001, the Telecommunication Administration Bureau of MII 
promulgated “Regulations for Financial Accounting of the National Internet 
Exchange Center”.
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146. On December 20, 2001, the 10 domestic backbone networks signed the inter-
connection agreement, which implied more convenient accessing of the Internet by 
users in difference regions.
147. On December 22, 2001, China Unicom announced in Beijing that the first-phase 
project of China Unicom CDMA mobile telecommunication network had 
accomplished on time, and started its operate since December 31, 2001 in 31 
provinces, municipalities and cities. The building up of China Unicom’s CDMA 
network indicated that the telecommunication technology of China Mobile had 
stepped into a new era.
148. On December 25, 2001, Premier Zhu Rongji, Chair of the State Informatization 
Leading Group (SILG) moderated the first SILG meeting. As Premier Zhu pointed 
out, the construction of China’s informatization should be push forward by attaching 
greater importance to unified planning, persisting with marketing, and preventing 
repeated construction of a same project.
149. At the end of December 2001, “China Education and Research Network CERNET”, 
a high-speed backbone network project (1999—2001) was obtained its qualification 
from the government. The project was a main element of “the modern remote 
education project” in “the national education promotion plan of 21st century”, and 
also the important base for constructing the lifelong education system in China. 
Based on DWDM/SDH, the project finished building the high-speed transmitting 
network with a capacity of 40Gbps and backbone transmit rate of 2.5Gbps. Except 
for Lhasa in Tibet, CERNET connected with other 35 provinces and central cities at 
speed of 55Mbps. Nearly 100 colleges were connected at speed of 100~1000Mbps.  
Based on CERNET, the Ministry of Education had approved 47 colleges’ setting up 
network educational institutes (later enlarged to 67 colleges), and also allowed 19 
online cooperative research centers to carry out remote education and scientific 
research through CERNET.
150. On December 31, 2001, the National Internet Exchange Centers began their 
operation in Shanghai and Guangdong respectively.
151. On January 15, 2002, China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) 
published the 9th “Statistical Report on the Development of Internet in China”. By 
the end of December 31, 2001, there were about 125.4 million computer hosts and 
33.7 million Internet users in China. 127,319 domain names were registered under 
.CN. China had over 277,100 WWW websites and 7597.5M of international 
bandwidth.
152. On March 14, 2002, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) approved “Rules for 
the Administration of Internet Domain Names in China” in its 9th session. The 
regulation was put in force on September 30, 2002. 
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153. On March 26, 2002, the Internet Society of China (ISC) issued “Self-Discipline 
Treaty of Internet Industry in China” in Beijing, establishing the foundation of 
domestic self-discipline mechanism.
154. On May 17, 2002, the Ministry of Culture issued “Notification on Strengthen the 
Market Supervision of Internet Culture”.
155. On May 17, 2002, China Telecom made a start on “China Vnet” plan in Guangzhou,
which indicated the alliance of ISPs and ICPs in building the industrial chain on 
broadband Internet.
156. On May 17, 2002, China Mobile took the lead in providing GPRS services in the 
whole country. On November 18, Telecommunication Corporation of China Mobile 
and AT&T jointly announced the starting of the GPRS International Roaming 
Service between the two companies.
157. On June 27, 2002, the State Administration of Press and Publication and the 
Ministry of Information Industry (MII) jointly issued “Interim Regulations for the 
Administration of the Internet Publications”. The regulation was formally put into 
force on August 1, 2002.
158. On July 3, 2002, the State Informatization Leading Group hosted its second 
meeting. During the meeting, three documents were approved, i.e. “Informatization 
– the Key Program in the 10th five-year plan on National Economy and Social 
Development”, “Guiding Suggestions on Constructing China’s E-government” and 
“Proceeding Program on Promoting Software Industry”.
159. On September 25, 2002, China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) 
issued “Detailed Rules for the Registration of Domain Names”,  “Domain Name 
Dispute Resolution Policy” and “Rules for Accrediting Domain Name Registrars”.
160. On September 29, 2002, Premier Zhu Rongji signed “Regulations for the 
Management of Places of Internet Accessing”, the order No. 363 of the State 
Council of the People’s Republic of China, It was put into effect on November 15, 
2002.
161. On September 30, 2002, “Rules for the Administration of Internet Domain Names in 
China” was put into force. 
162. From October 26 to 31, 2002, the Internet Corporation of Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN) held its meetings in Shanghai. This was the first ICANN 
meeting in China. The conference was hosted by China Internet Network
Information Center (CNNIC) and the Internet Society of China (ISC). 
163. On November 1, 2002, ISC formed the Counter- junk mail coordinated group in 
Beijing with assistance of 263 Group and Sina.com. The main task of the working 
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group is to protect the proper benefits of Internet users and E-mail service providers 
in China, fairly use the Internet resources and regulate domestic E-mail service 
system.
164. On November 22, 2002, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) issued “The 
Bulletin about Internet Domain Name System in China”. 
165. On November 25, 2002, approving by the Ministry of Information Industry (MII), 
the first Internet Conference and Exhibition of China was held in Shanghai with the 
Internet Society of China as the host. The conference mainly discussed the 
innovation of the Internet application in China, directing the further development of 
China’s Internet industry. The theme of the conference was “The application of the 
Internet – long for innovation”. 
166. On December 16, 2002, as a sole registry of .CN, China Internet Network 
Information Center (CNNIC) transmitted its customer services to the accredited 
registrars. This is a fundamental innovation in domain name registration service 
system since the deployment of .CN ccTLD in 1990 in China.
167. On January 16, 2003, China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) 
published the 11th “Statistical Report on the Development of the Internet in China”. 
By the end of December 31, 2002, there were about 20.83 million computer hosts 
and 59.10 million Internet users in China; 179 thousand domain names were 
registered under .CN. China had about 371 thousand WWW websites and 9380M of 
the international bandwidth.
168. On March 17, 2003, China opened the name space of the second level domain under 
.CN ccTLD. People now are permitted to register names directly under .CN.
169. On May 10, 2003, the Ministry of Culture issued “Provisional Regulations for 
Administering Internet Culture”. It took effect on July 1, 2003.
170. On June 5, 2003, the Ministry of Culture issued “the Announcement of the Approval 
Situation of Nationwide Internet Accessing Chain Store Operators”. 10 
organizations were approved to construct nationwide Internet accessing store chain.
171. On June 26, 2003, CAS researcher Qian Hualin, an expert of computer network and 
data communication, was elected as a member of ICANN board of directors with 3 
years’ term. This was the first time for Chinese expert step into the highest decision 
making group of Internet address resources.
172. On July 9, 2003, the information working office of the State Council issued “Survey 
Report on China Internet Information Resources” in Beijing. By the end of 
December 31, 2002, the total number of domain names in China reached 940,300. 
China had 371,600 websites, 157 million web pages and 82,900 online databases.
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173. On August 8, 2003, the first release of “China Internet Development Report” was 
formally published by ISC and CNNIC in Beijing. It was the first large-scale 
literature that comprehensively described the development situation of the Internet 
in China.
174. On August 8, 2003, the “anti-spam coordinate group” of ISC announced the first 
issue of “Spam Server Name List”, which attracted attentions of all circles of the 
society.
175. In August 2003, net game player Li Hongchen sued Beijing Arctic Ice Technology 
Development Co. Ltd, the operator of “Red Moon” net game, for losing his virtual 
equipments. This was the first net game case, and legally educed the issue of virtual 
property conception.
176. On September 27, Asia-Pacific Internet Research Alliance (APIRA) was formed in 
Beijing. The organization was initiated by CNNIC. The initial member organization 
also included Korea Network Information Center (KRNIC), City University of 
Hong Kong, University of Macao and Taiwan Network Information Center 
(TWNIC).
177. On November 18, 2003, the State General Administration of Sport formally 
approved the E-sports as the 99th national athletic sports.
178. On November 20, 2003, CNNIC published “Survey Report on the Hot Issues of 
Internet Use”. The report covered the information of website short message and 
bandwidth. It was the first time for CNNIC, even for the whole nation to publish 
such kind of survey report. Statistics showed that users averagely send 10.9 short 
messages through the Internet, while 70.8% of the broadband users use ADSL.
179. On January 12, the three nations’ project (China-US-Russia) - “Global Ring 
Network for Advanced Applications Development” (GLORIAD) was accomplished. 
GLORIAD was funded and constructed by CAS, the National Science Foundation 
(US) and Russia Ministry and Science Group Alliance. GLORIAD will support the 
three countries even the global advanced scientific and educational applications. 
Computer Network Information Center of CAS, National Supercomputing 
Application Center of Illinois University and Kolchatov Institute of Russia.
180. On January 15, 2004, CNNIC published the 13th “Statistical Survey Report on the 
Internet Development of China”. By the end of December 31, 2003, there were 
approximately 30.89 million computer hosts, 79.50 million Internet users in China; 
340,040 names were registered under .CN domain. China had about 595,550 WWW 
website, and 27,216Mbps of international bandwidth.
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